docketrouter

Anti-assignment: Texas vs. California vs. New York

3 states side by side on anti-assignment: the rule, the trap, and every authority behind it, exactly as the full survey states them. A state with no verified rule for this clause says so rather than being left out.

read at the 2026-10-03 bar

Does this 'no assignment without consent' clause stop the counterparty assigning the money owed?

Not as to the receivable. A term in an agreement between an account debtor and an assignor, or in a promissory note, is ineffective to the extent that it (1) prohibits, restricts, or requires the consent of the account debtor to the assignment or transfer of, or the creation, attachment, perfection or enforcement of a security interest in, the account, chattel paper, payment intangible or promissory note; or (2) provides that such an assignment, transfer or security interest may give rise to a default, breach, right of recoupment, claim, defense, termination, right of termination, or remedy. This is subject to § 9.406(e) and (h) and to §§ 2A.303 and 9.407: (h) meaning the section yields to law other than the chapter that sets a different rule for an account debtor who is an individual and who incurred the obligation primarily for personal, family or household purposes. Subsection (f) does the same work one level up, against the law itself: a rule of law, statute or regulation that prohibits, restricts or requires the consent of a government, governmental body or official, or of an account debtor, to the assignment or transfer of, or the creation of a security interest in, an account or chattel paper is ineffective to those same two extents, subject to (h), (i) and (k).

The trap

Two halves, and drafters usually only think about the first. Subsection (d)(1) means the consent requirement simply does not bite on the receivable; (d)(2) closes the obvious workaround by making the anti-default and termination-right dressing equally ineffective, so you cannot convert the assignment into a breach instead. What it does NOT do is make the whole contract freely assignable: it reaches accounts, chattel paper, payment intangibles and promissory notes, the payment side, not performance obligations generally. And the section has its own exits. § 9.406(e) takes the outright SALE of a payment intangible or promissory note back out. § 9.406(j) takes out an interest in a partnership or limited liability company altogether, which is the exit that catches drafters most often: a consent-to-transfer restriction on an LLC or partnership interest is not touched by this section, so do not read § 9.406(d) as neutering it. § 9.406(i) takes out an assignment of a health-care-insurance receivable. § 9.406(k) subjects an assignment under the section to Gov't Code § 466.410, except that this section prevails over § 466.410 so far as is necessary to permit assignment of installment prize payments falling due in the final two years of the prize payment schedule. § 9.408 is a different section and is not reached by this rule, but it is not a safe harbour either: it makes a consent restriction on a general intangible (expressly including a contract, permit, license or franchise) or on a health-care-insurance receivable or promissory note ineffective to the extent the term would impair the creation, attachment or perfection of a security interest (and, for a payment intangible or promissory note, only where the interest arises out of a sale), while § 9.408(e), like § 9.406(j), leaves an interest in a partnership or limited liability company alone. And § 9.406(b)(2) keeps an account debtor's agreement with a seller of a payment intangible effective where other law makes it so: the one place a restriction DOES hold at the discharge stage.

as of 2026-09-14

7 authorities

  • statuteTex. Bus. & Com. Code § 9.406enacted 2013-07-01
    The words that state the rule
    (d) Except as otherwise provided in Subsection (e) and Sections 2A.303 and 9.407 , and subject to Subsection (h), a term in an agreement between an account debtor and an assignor or in a promissory note is ineffective to the extent that it: (1) prohibits, restricts, or requires the consent of the account debtor or person obligated on the promissory note to the assignment or transfer of, or the creation, attachment, perfection, or enforcement of a security interest in, the account, chattel paper, payment intangible, or promissory note; or (2) provides that the assignment or transfer or the creation, attachment, perfection, or enforcement of the security interest may give rise to a default, breach, right of recoupment, claim, defense, termination, right of termination, or remedy under the account, chattel paper, payment intangible, or promissory note.
  • statuteTex. Bus. & Com. Code § 9.406enacted 2013-07-01
    The words that state the rule
    (e) Subsection (d) does not apply to the sale of a payment intangible or promissory note, other than a sale pursuant to a disposition under Section 9.610 or an acceptance of collateral under Section 9.620 .
  • statuteTex. Bus. & Com. Code § 9.406enacted 2013-07-01
    The words that state the rule
    (h) This section is subject to law other than this chapter that establishes a different rule for an account debtor who is an individual and who incurred the obligation primarily for personal, family, or household purposes. (i) This section does not apply to an assignment of a health-care-insurance receivable. (j) This section does not apply to an interest in a partnership or limited liability company. (k) An assignment under this section is subject to Section 466.410 , Government Code, except to the extent that Section 466.410 (a), Government Code, prohibits the assignment of installment prize payments due within the final two years of the prize payment schedule, in which case this section shall prevail over Section 466.410 solely to the extent necessary to permit such assignment.
  • statuteTex. Bus. & Com. Code § 9.406enacted 2013-07-01
    The words that state the rule
    (f) Except as otherwise provided in Sections 2A.303 and 9.407 , and subject to Subsections (h), (i), and (k), a rule of law, statute, or regulation that prohibits, restricts, or requires the consent of a government, governmental body or official, or account debtor to the assignment or transfer of, or creation of a security interest in, an account or chattel paper is ineffective to the extent that the rule of law, statute, or regulation: (1) prohibits, restricts, or requires the consent of the government, governmental body or official, or account debtor to the assignment or transfer of, or the creation, attachment, perfection, or enforcement of a security interest in, the account or chattel paper; or (2) provides that the assignment or transfer or the creation, attachment, perfection, or enforcement of the security interest may give rise to a default, breach, right of recoupment, claim, defense, termination, right of termination, or remedy under the account or chattel paper.
  • statuteTex. Bus. & Com. Code § 9.406enacted 2013-07-01
    The words that state the rule
    (b) Subject to Subsection (h), notification is ineffective under Subsection (a): (1) if it does not reasonably identify the rights assigned; (2) to the extent that an agreement between an account debtor and a seller of a payment intangible limits the account debtor's duty to pay a person other than the seller and the limitation is effective under law other than this chapter; or
  • statuteTex. Bus. & Com. Code § 9.408enacted 2013-07-01
    The words that state the rule
    (a) Except as otherwise provided in Subsection (b), a term in a promissory note or in an agreement between an account debtor and a debtor that relates to a health-care-insurance receivable or a general intangible, including a contract, permit, license, or franchise, and which term prohibits, restricts, or requires the consent of the person obligated on the promissory note or the account debtor to, the assignment or transfer of, or creation, attachment, or perfection of a security interest in, the promissory note, health-care-insurance receivable, or general intangible, is ineffective to the extent that the term: (1) would impair the creation, attachment, or perfection of a security interest; or (2) provides that the assignment or transfer or the creation, attachment, or perfection of the security interest may give rise to a default, breach, right of recoupment, claim, defense, termination, right of termination, or remedy under the promissory note, health-care-insurance receivable, or general intangible. (b) Subsection (a) applies to a security interest in a payment intangible or promissory note only if the security interest arises out of a sale of the payment intangible or promissory note, other than a sale pursuant to a disposition under Section 9.610 or an acceptance of collateral under Section 9.620 .
  • statuteTex. Bus. & Com. Code § 9.408enacted 2013-07-01
    The words that state the rule
    (e) This section does not apply to an interest in a partnership or limited liability company.
read at the 2026-10-03 bar

Does this no-assignment clause stop the other side from assigning its receivables or pledging them to a lender?

Mostly no. Under Cal. Com. Code § 9406(d) a term in an agreement between an account debtor and an assignor, or in a promissory note, is INEFFECTIVE to the extent it prohibits, restricts, or requires consent to the assignment or transfer of, or the creation, attachment, perfection or enforcement of a security interest in, an account, chattel paper, a payment intangible or a promissory note, and equally ineffective to the extent it makes such an assignment a default, breach, right of recoupment, defence, termination or other remedy.

The trap

The override is narrower than drafters on both sides assume, and the carve-outs are in the same section. Subdivision (e) takes the SALE of a payment intangible or promissory note (other than a sale on a disposition under § 9610 or an acceptance under § 9620) outside subdivision (d); subdivision (k) provides that subdivisions (d), (f) and (j) do not apply to a security interest in an OWNERSHIP INTEREST in a general partnership, limited partnership or limited liability company; subdivision (h) makes the section subject to other law establishing a different rule for an account debtor who is an individual and incurred the obligation primarily for personal, family or household purposes; and subdivision (i) takes the section off altogether for an assignment of a HEALTH CARE INSURANCE RECEIVABLE. Subdivision (d) is also expressly subject to Sections 9407 and 10303: § 9407 states its own rule making a term in a LEASE agreement restricting assignment or a security interest ineffective, with stated exceptions, and § 10303 governs transfers of an interest under a lease contract. So the clause is ineffective as to ordinary trade receivables and remains operative as to a security interest in an LLC membership interest. This rule does not address anti-assignment clauses covering other contract rights.

as of 2026-09-16

10 authorities

  • statuteCal. Com. Code § 9406enactment date not established
    The words that state the rule
    (d) In this subdivision, “promissory note” includes a negotiable instrument that evidences chattel paper. Except as otherwise provided in subdivisions (e) and (k) and in Sections 9407 and 10303, and subject to subdivision (h), a term in an agreement between an account debtor and an assignor or in a promissory note is ineffective to the extent that it does either of the following: (1) Prohibits, restricts, or requires the consent of the account debtor or person obligated on the promissory note to the assignment or transfer of, or the creation, attachment, perfection, or enforcement of a security interest in, the account, chattel paper, payment intangible, or promissory note. (2) Provides that the assignment or transfer or the creation, attachment, perfection, or enforcement of the security interest may give rise to a default, breach, right of recoupment, claim, defense, termination, right of termination, or remedy under the account, chattel paper, payment intangible, or promissory note.
  • statuteCal. Com. Code § 9406enactment date not established
    The words that state the rule
    (e) Subdivision (d) does not apply to the sale of a payment intangible or promissory note, other than a sale pursuant to a disposition under Section 9610 or an acceptance of collateral under Section 9620.
  • statuteCal. Com. Code § 9406enactment date not established
    The words that state the rule
    (h) This section is subject to law other than this division which establishes a different rule for an account debtor who is an individual and who incurred the obligation primarily for personal, family, or household purposes.
  • statuteCal. Com. Code § 9406enactment date not established
    The words that state the rule
    (k) Subdivisions (d), (f), and (j) do not apply to a security interest in an ownership interest in a general partnership, limited partnership, or limited liability company.
  • statuteCal. Com. Code § 9407enactment date not established
    The words that state the rule
    (a) Except as otherwise provided in subdivision (b), a term in a lease agreement is ineffective to the extent that it does either of the following: (1) Prohibits, restricts, or requires the consent of a party to the lease to the assignment or transfer of, or the creation, attachment, perfection, or enforcement of a security interest in, an interest of a party under the lease contract or in the lessor’s residual interest in the goods. (2) Provides that the assignment or transfer or the creation, attachment, perfection, or enforcement of the security interest may give rise to a default, breach, right of recoupment, claim, defense, termination, right of termination, or remedy under the lease. (b) Except as otherwise provided in subdivision (g) of Section 10303, a term described in paragraph (2) of subdivision (a) is effective to the extent that there is either of the following: (1) A transfer by the lessee of the lessee’s right of possession or use of the goods in violation of the term. (2) A delegation of a material performance of either party to the lease contract in violation of the term. (c) The creation, attachment, perfection, or enforcement of a security interest in the lessor’s interest under the lease contract or the lessor’s residual interest in the goods is not a transfer that materially impairs the lessee’s prospect of obtaining return performance or materially changes the duty of or materially increases the burden or risk imposed on the lessee within the purview of subdivision (d) of Section 10303 unless, and then only to the extent that, enforcement actually results in a delegation of material performance of the lessor.
  • statuteCal. Com. Code § 10303enactment date not established
    The words that state the rule
    (b) Except as provided in subdivision (c) and Section 9407, a provision in a lease agreement which (1) prohibits the voluntary or involuntary transfer, including a transfer by sale, sublease, creation or enforcement of a security interest, or attachment, levy, or other judicial process, of an interest of a party under the lease contract or of the lessor’s residual interest in the goods, or (2) makes such a transfer an event of default, gives rise to the rights and remedies provided in subdivision (d), but a transfer that is prohibited or is an event of default under the lease agreement is otherwise effective.
  • statuteCal. Com. Code § 10303enactment date not established
    The words that state the rule
    (c) A provision in a lease agreement which (1) prohibits a transfer of a right to damages for default with respect to the whole lease contract or of a right to payment arising out of the transferor’s due performance of the transferor’s entire obligation, or (2) makes such a transfer an event of default, is not enforceable, and such a transfer is not a transfer that materially impairs the prospect of obtaining return performance by, materially changes the duty of, or materially increases the burden or risk imposed on, the other party to the lease contract within the purview of subdivision (d).
  • statuteCal. Com. Code § 9406enactment date not established
    The words that state the rule
    (i) This section does not apply to an assignment of a health care insurance receivable.
  • statuteCal. Com. Code § 10303enactment date not established
    The words that state the rule
    (d) Subject to subdivision (c) and Section 9407: (1) If a transfer is made which is made an event of default under a lease agreement, the party to the lease contract not making the transfer, unless that party waives the default or otherwise agrees, has the rights and remedies described in subdivision (b) of Section 10501. (2) If paragraph (1) is not applicable and if a transfer is made that (A) is prohibited under a lease agreement or (B) materially impairs the prospect of obtaining return performance by, materially changes the duty of, or materially increases the burden or risk imposed on, the other party to the lease contract, unless the party not making the transfer agrees at any time to the transfer in the lease contract or otherwise, then, except as limited by contract, (C) the transferor is liable to the party not making the transfer for damages caused by the transfer to the extent that the damages could not reasonably be prevented by the party not making the transfer and (D) a court having jurisdiction may grant other appropriate relief, including cancellation of the lease contract or an injunction against the transfer.
  • statuteCal. Com. Code § 10303enactment date not established
    The words that state the rule
    (g) In a consumer lease, to prohibit the transfer of an interest of a party under the lease contract or to make a transfer an event of default, the language must be specific, by a writing, and conspicuous.
read at the 2026-10-03 bar

Does this no-assignment clause actually stop the transfer of the contract and of the money due under it?

Two different regimes, and the clause's own words decide which one it meets. At common law, absent language clearly indicating that a contractual right shall be nonassignable, a prohibitory clause is interpreted as a personal covenant not to assign; where the clause uses clear, definite and appropriate language making any attempted assignment 'void' as against the obligor, the Court of Appeals holds it a valid and effective restriction of the right to assign (Allhusen). For receivables the statute overrides the drafting: under UCC 9-406(d) a term in an agreement between an account debtor and an assignor, or in a promissory note, is ineffective to the extent it prohibits, restricts or requires consent to the assignment or transfer of, or the creation, attachment, perfection or enforcement of a security interest in, the account, chattel paper, payment intangible or promissory note, or provides that doing so gives rise to a default, breach, right of recoupment, claim, defense, termination or remedy. Subsection (d) does not apply to the SALE of a payment intangible or promissory note (§ 9-406(e)). What actually decides who may be paid is the notification machinery the section opens with: the account debtor may keep paying the assignor "until, but not after" it receives a notification signed by the assignor or assignee identifying the assignment, and after that may discharge only by paying the assignee (§ 9-406(a)); a notification that does not reasonably identify the rights assigned is ineffective (§ 9-406(b)(1)); and if the account debtor asks, the assignee must seasonably furnish reasonable proof of the assignment or the account debtor may still discharge by paying the assignor (§ 9-406(c)); and none of that machinery, subsections (a), (b), (c) and (f), applies to a controllable account or controllable payment intangible (§ 9-406(i)). For rights that are not money (a contract, permit, licence or franchise), the section is § 9-408, and it cuts the other way: such a term is ineffective only to the extent it would impair the creation, attachment or perfection of a SECURITY INTEREST (§ 9-408(a)(1)) or provides that the assignment or the security interest may give rise to a default, breach, right of recoupment, claim, defense, termination or remedy (§ 9-408(a)(2)), and subsection (a) is itself subject to § 9-408(b), which applies it to a security interest in a payment intangible or promissory note only if the security interest arises out of a sale of that payment intangible or promissory note. Section 9-408(c) then strips the security interest of every right against the obligor: it is not enforceable against the person obligated on the note or the account debtor, imposes no duty or obligation on them, does not require them to recognise it or to pay or render performance to the secured party, does not entitle the secured party to use or assign the debtor's rights or to reach the obligor's trade secrets or confidential information, and does not entitle the secured party to enforce the security interest at all.

The trap

New York is the state where 'shall be void' is not surplusage. The Allhusen clause itself read: 'The assignment by the second party [Kroc] of this contract or any interest therein, or of any money due or to become due by reason of the terms hereof without the written consent of the first party [defendant] shall be void.' A clause that merely prohibits assignment is read as a personal covenant not to assign (Allhusen describes the earlier decisions as treating such covenants as limiting the covenantee to a claim for damages for breach); the clause that says a non-conforming assignment 'shall be void' as against the obligor restricts the right to assign itself. The second trap runs the other way: however the clause is drafted, UCC 9-406(d) makes it ineffective against an assignment of, or a security interest in, an account, chattel paper, payment intangible or promissory note, subject, in the published section, to the sections subsection (d) itself excepts (§§ 2-A-303 and 9-407, neither of which is among the New York statutes available for this research), to subsection (e) (sales of payment intangibles and promissory notes), subsection (g) (a different rule under other law for an individual account debtor who incurred the obligation for personal, family or household purposes) and subsection (h) (health-care-insurance receivables in the stated cases, personal-injury compensation claims under 26 U.S.C. § 104(a)(1)-(2), and special-needs-trust benefits). Drafters who rely on an anti-assignment clause to control who collects the money are relying on the half of the clause the UCC has already voided.

as of 2026-09-16

16 authorities

  • case303 N.Y. 446Allhusen v. Caristo Construction Corp.N.Y.decided 1952read it at the source ↗
    The words that state the rule
    Their contracts contained the following prohibitory provision: “ The assignment by the second party [Kroc] of this contract or any interest therein, or of any money due or to become due by reason of the terms hereof without the written consent of the first party [defendant] shall be void.”
  • case303 N.Y. 446Allhusen v. Caristo Construction Corp.N.Y.decided 1952read it at the source ↗
    The words that state the rule
    We have now before us a clause embodying clear, definite and appropriate language, which may be construed in no other way but that any attempted assignment of either the contract or any rights created thereunder shall be “ void ” as against the .obligor. One would have to do violence to the language here employed to hold that it is merely an agreement by the subcontractor not to assign. The objectivity of the language precludes such a construction. We are therefore compelled to conclude that this prohibitory clause is a valid and effective restriction of the right to assign.
  • case303 N.Y. 446Allhusen v. Caristo Construction Corp.N.Y.decided 1952read it at the source ↗
    The words that state the rule
    But these decisions are not to be read as meaning that there can be no enforcible contractual prohibition against the assignment of a claim; indeed, they are authority only for the proposition that, in the absence of language clearly indicating that a contractual right thereunder shall be nonassignable, a prohibitory clause will be interpreted as a personal covenant not to assign.
  • statuteN.Y. UCC Law § 9-406enactment date not established
    The words that state the rule
    (d) Term restricting assignment generally ineffective. For purposes of this subsection, "promissory note" includes a negotiable instrument that evidences chattel paper. Except as otherwise provided in subsection (e) and Sections 2-A-303 and 9--407, and subject to subsection (g), a term in an agreement between an account debtor and an assignor or in a promissory note is ineffective to the extent that it: (1) prohibits, restricts, or requires the consent of the account debtor or person obligated on the promissory note to the assignment or transfer of, or the creation, attachment, perfection, or enforcement of a security interest in, the account, chattel paper, payment intangible, or promissory note; or (2) provides that the assignment or transfer or the creation, attachment, perfection, or enforcement of the security interest may give rise to a default, breach, right of recoupment, claim, defense, termination, right of termination, or remedy under the account, chattel paper, payment intangible, or promissory note.
  • statuteN.Y. UCC Law § 9-406enactment date not established
    The words that state the rule
    (e) Inapplicability of subsection (d) to certain sales. Subsection (d) does not apply to the sale of a payment intangible or promissory note.
  • case303 N.Y. 446Allhusen v. Caristo Construction Corp.decided 1952read it at the source ↗
    The words that state the rule
    Our courts have not construed a contractual provision against assignments framed in the language of the clause now before us. Such kindred clauses as have been subject to interpretation usually have been held to be either (1) personal covenants limiting the covenantee to a claim for damages in the event of a breach (as, e.g., Manchester v. Kendall, 19 Jones & Sp. 460, affd. 103 N. Y. 638 ; Sacks v. Neptune Meter Co., 144 Misc. 70 , affd. 238 App. Div. 82 ), or (2) ineffectual because of the use of uncertain language (State Bank v. Central Mercantile Bank, 248 N. Y. 428 ).
  • case303 N.Y. 446Allhusen v. Caristo Construction Corp.decided 1952read it at the source ↗
    The words that state the rule
    In the Manchester case (supra) it was held (p. 463) that the words, “ 1 This contract not to be assigned, or any part thereof, or any installments to grow due under the same ’ ”, must be construed as an agreement not to assign, the breach of which would give rise to a claim for damages by the covenantee.
  • case303 N.Y. 446Allhusen v. Caristo Construction Corp.N.Y.decided 1952read it at the source ↗
    The words that state the rule
    The judgment should be affirmed, with costs. Loughran, Ch. J., Lewis, Conway, Desmond, Dye and Fuld, JJ., concur. Judgment affirmed.
  • statuteN.Y. UCC Law § 9-406enactment date not established
    The words that state the rule
    (a) Discharge of account debtor; effect of notification. Subject to subsections (b) through (i), an account debtor on an account, chattel paper, or a payment intangible may discharge its obligation by paying the assignor until, but not after, the account debtor receives a notification, signed by the assignor or the assignee, that the amount due or to become due has been assigned and that payment is to be made to the assignee. After receipt of the notification, the account debtor may discharge its obligation by paying the assignee and may not discharge the obligation by paying the assignor.
  • statuteN.Y. UCC Law § 9-406enactment date not established
    The words that state the rule
    (b) When notification ineffective. Subject to subsections (g) and (i), notification is ineffective under subsection (a): (1) if it does not reasonably identify the rights assigned; (2) to the extent that an agreement between an account debtor and a seller of a payment intangible limits the account debtor's duty to pay a person other than the seller and the limitation is effective under law other than this article; or (3) at the option of an account debtor, if the notification notifies the account debtor to make less than the full amount of any installment or other periodic payment to the assignee, even if: (A) only a portion of the account, chattel paper, or payment intangible has been assigned to that assignee; (B) a portion has been assigned to another assignee; or (C) the account debtor knows that the assignment to that assignee is limited.
  • statuteN.Y. UCC Law § 9-406enactment date not established
    The words that state the rule
    (c) Proof of assignment. Subject to subsections (g) and (i), if requested by the account debtor, an assignee shall seasonably furnish reasonable proof that the assignment has been made. Unless the assignee complies, the account debtor may discharge its obligation by paying the assignor, even if the account debtor has received a notification under subsection (a).
  • statuteN.Y. UCC Law § 9-406enactment date not established
    The words that state the rule
    (g) Rule for individual under other law. This section is subject to a rule of law, statute, rule or regulation other than this article which establishes a different rule for an account debtor who is an individual and who incurred the obligation primarily for personal, family, or household purposes. (h) Inapplicability. This section does not apply to: (1) an assignment of a health care insurance receivable to the extent such assignment conflicts with other law or the parties have otherwise agreed in writing that such receivable is non-assignable, (2) a claim or right to receive compensation for injuries or sickness as described in 26 U.S.C. § 104(a)(1) and (2), as amended from time to time, or (3) a claim or right to receive benefits under a special needs trust as described in 42 U.S.C. § 1396p (d)(4), as amended from time to time.
  • statuteN.Y. UCC Law § 9-406enactment date not established
    The words that state the rule
    (i) Inapplicability of certain subsections. Subsections (a), (b), (c) and (f) do not apply to a controllable account or controllable payment intangible.
  • statuteN.Y. UCC Law § 9-408enactment date not established
    The words that state the rule
    (a) Term restricting assignment generally ineffective. Except as otherwise provided in subsection (b), a term in a promissory note or in an agreement between an account debtor and a debtor which relates to a health-care-insurance receivable or a general intangible, including a contract, permit, license, or franchise, and which term prohibits, restricts, or requires the consent of the person obligated on the promissory note or the account debtor to, the assignment or transfer of, or creation, attachment, or perfection of a security interest in, the promissory note, health-care-insurance receivable, or general intangible, is ineffective to the extent that the term: (1) would impair the creation, attachment, or perfection of a security interest; or (2) provides that the assignment or transfer or the creation, attachment, or perfection of the security interest may give rise to a default, breach, right of recoupment, claim, defense, termination, right of termination, or remedy under the promissory note, health-care-insurance receivable, or general intangible.
  • statuteN.Y. UCC Law § 9-408enactment date not established
    The words that state the rule
    (b) Applicability of subsection (a) to sales of certain rights to payment. Subsection (a) applies to a security interest in a payment intangible or promissory note only if the security interest arises out of a sale of the payment intangible or promissory note.
  • statuteN.Y. UCC Law § 9-408enactment date not established
    The words that state the rule
    (c) Limitation on ineffectiveness under subsection (a). To the extent that a term in a promissory note or in an agreement between an account debtor and a debtor which relates to a health-care-insurance receivable or general intangible would be effective under law other than this article but is ineffective under subsection (a), the creation, attachment, or perfection of a security interest in the promissory note, health-care-insurance receivable, or general intangible: (1) is not enforceable against the person obligated on the promissory note or the account debtor; (2) does not impose a duty or obligation on the person obligated on the promissory note or the account debtor; (3) does not require the person obligated on the promissory note or the account debtor to recognize the security interest, pay or render performance to the secured party, or accept payment or performance from the secured party; (4) does not entitle the secured party to use or assign the debtor's rights under the promissory note, health-care-insurance receivable, or general intangible, including any related information or materials furnished to the debtor in the transaction giving rise to the promissory note, health-care-insurance receivable, or general intangible; (5) does not entitle the secured party to use, assign, possess, or have access to any trade secrets or confidential information of the person obligated on the promissory note or the account debtor; and (6) does not entitle the secured party to enforce the security interest in the promissory note, health-care-insurance receivable, or general intangible.