Consumer-protection waiver

(a) Any person who commits one or more of the acts or practices declared unlawful under this chapter and thereby causes monetary damage to a consumer, and any person who commits one or more of the acts or practices declared unlawful in subdivisions (19) and (20) of Section 8-19-5 and thereby causes monetary damage to another person, shall be liable to each consumer or other person for: (1) Any actual damages sustained by such consumer or person, or the sum of $100, whichever is greater; or (2) Up to three times any actual damages, in the court’s discretion. In making its determination under this subsection, the court shall consider, among other relevant factors, the amount of actual damages awarded, the frequency of the unlawful acts or practices, the number of persons adversely affected thereby, and the extent to which the unlawful acts or practices were committed intentionally; and (3) In the case of any successful action or counterclaim to enforce the foregoing liability or in which injunctive relief is obtained, the costs of the action or counterclaim, together with a reasonable attorney’s fee. On a finding by the court that an action or counterclaim under this section was frivolous or brought in bad faith or for the purpose of harassment, the court shall award to the defendant (or counterclaim-defendant) reasonable attorney’s fees and costs.

(f) A consumer or other person bringing an action under this chapter may not bring an action on behalf of a class. The limitation in this subsection is a substantive limitation and allowing a consumer or other person to bring a class action or other representative action for a violation of this chapter would abridge, enlarge, or modify the substantive rights created by this chapter. (g) Notwithstanding the limitation in subsection (f), only the office of the Attorney General or district attorney shall have the right and authority to bring action in a representative capacity on behalf of any named person or persons. In any such representative action brought by the office of the Attorney General or a district attorney, the court shall not award minimum damages or treble damages, but recovery shall be limited to actual damages suffered by the person or persons, plus reasonable attorney’s fees and costs.

At least 15 days prior to the filing of any action under this section, a written demand for relief, identifying the claimant and reasonably describing the unfair or deceptive act or practice relied upon and the injury suffered, shall be communicated to any prospective respondent by placing in the United States mail or otherwise. Any person receiving such a demand for relief who, within 15 days of the delivering of the demand for relief, makes a written tender of settlement which is rejected by the claimant may, in any subsequent action, file the written tender and an affidavit concerning this rejection. If the court finds that the relief tendered was sufficient to compensate the petitioner for his or her actual damages, the court shall not award any additional damages or attorney’s fees or costs to the petitioner. The demand requirements of this subsection shall not apply if the prospective respondent does not maintain a place of business or does not keep assets within the state, but such respondent may otherwise employ the provisions of this section by making a written offer of relief and paying the rejected tender into court as soon as practicable after receiving notice of an action commenced under this section. All written tenders of settlement such as described in this subsection shall be presumed to be offered without prejudice in compromise of a disputed matter.

(b) The liability provided in this section may be enforced by counterclaim in an action arising from the same transaction without regard to the statute of limitations provided in Section 8-19-14.

(a) The civil remedies provided herein and the civil remedies available at common law, by statute or otherwise, for fraud, misrepresentation, deceit, suppression of material facts or fraudulent concealment are mutually exclusive. An election to pursue the civil remedies prescribed in this chapter shall exclude and be a surrender of all other rights and remedies available at common law, by statute or otherwise, for fraud, misrepresentation, deceit, suppression of material facts or fraudulent concealment arising out of any act, occurrence or transaction actionable under this chapter. (b) An election to pursue any civil remedies available at common law, by statute or otherwise, for fraud, misrepresentation, deceit, suppression of material facts or fraudulent concealment arising out of any act, occurrence or transaction actionable under this chapter shall exclude and be a surrender of all rights and remedies available under this chapter. All other remedies, penalties or actions presently provided by statute or common law or hereafter provided for in any other law or rule of procedure are cumulative with the provisions, remedies and actions in this chapter and this chapter shall not be construed to repeal or supersede any law not inconsistent herewith.

No action may be brought under this chapter more than one year after the person bringing the action discovers or reasonably should have discovered the act or practice which is the subject of the action, but in no event may any action be brought under this chapter more than four years from the date of the transaction giving rise to the cause of action unless the contract or warranty is for more than three years. If the contract or warranty is for more than three years, no action may be brought more than one year from the expiration date of the contract or warranty or more than one year after the person bringing the action discovered or reasonably should have discovered the act or practice which is the subject of the action, whichever occurs first.

As used in this chapter, the following words and phrases shall have the meanings hereinafter ascribed to them: (1) ATTORNEY GENERAL. The Attorney General of the State of Alabama or his or her duly designated representatives. (2) BONA FIDE INVENTORY REPURCHASE PROGRAM. A program by which an entity repurchases from a salesperson current and marketable inventory in possession of the salesperson, on request and on commercially reasonable terms, when the salesperson’s business relationship is terminated. (3) COMMERCIALLY REASONABLE TERMS. The repurchase of current and marketable inventory within 12 months after the date of purchase at not less than 90 percent of the original net cost, less appropriate set-offs and legal claims, if any. (4) CONSUMER. Any natural person who buys goods or services for personal, family, or household use.

Nothing in this chapter shall apply to: (1) Acts done by the publisher, owner, agent or employee of a newspaper, periodical, radio, or television station or telephone company in the publication or dissemination of an advertisement, which the owner, agent, or employee did not have knowledge of the false, misleading or deceptive character of the advertisement; (2) Any seller of goods or services who meets all the following requirements: a. Has disseminated advertisement or promotional material from a manufacturer, packer, distributor, or other seller, from whom he has purchased the goods or services, unless the seller knew the advertisement or promotional material to be false or misleading; and b. On the request of the Attorney General or district attorney, provides the name and address of the manufacturer, packer, distributor or other seller from whom he has purchased the goods or services; and c. On the request of the Attorney General or district attorney, agrees in writing to discontinue dissemination of such false and misleading material; (3) Any person or activity which is subject to the provisions of the Alabama Insurance Code, Title 27, as amended, or any bank or affiliate of a bank which is regulated by the State Banking Department of Alabama, the Comptroller of the Currency of the United States, Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation or the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, or to any person or activity which is subject to the provisions of Title 10, Chapter 4, Article 6, or to the regulated activities of any utility, telephone company or railroad which is regulated by the Alabama Public Service Commission; (4) Any violation of the Federal Consumer Credit Protection Act (15 U.S.C. §1601 et seq.); (5) Any activity which is subject to the provisions of the Securities Act of Alabama, Chapter 6 of this title or to the provisions of the Sale of Checks Acts, Chapter 7 of this title; or to the provisions of Article 5 of Chapter 6 of this title (relating to a notification procedure for the issuance of certain industrial revenue bonds). (6) For purposes of this section, the burden of proving exemption from the provisions of this chapter shall be upon the person claiming the exemption.

Unfair methods of competition and unfair or deceptive acts or practices in the conduct of trade or commerce are declared to be unlawful.

The terms “unfair methods of competition” and “unfair or deceptive acts or practices” include the following acts:

representing that an agreement confers or involves rights, remedies, or obligations that it does not confer or involve, or that are prohibited by law

The unlawful acts and practices listed in (b) of this section are in addition to and do not limit the types of unlawful acts and practices actionable at common law or under other state statutes.

A waiver by a consumer of the provisions of AS 45.50.471 — 45.50.561 is contrary to public policy and is unenforceable and void.

A person who suffers an ascertainable loss of money or property as a result of another person's act or practice declared unlawful by AS 45.50.471 may bring a civil action to recover for each unlawful act or practice three times the actual damages or $500, whichever is greater. The court may provide other relief it considers necessary and proper. Nothing in this subsection prevents a person who brings an action under this subsection from pursuing other remedies available under other law, including common law.

Kenai Chrysler correctly asserts that these provisions require proof of something more than the mere assertion of a good faith but mistaken belief that a contract was valid. [43] Yet courts have broadly interpreted similar provisions to prohibit merchants from going beyond mere assertion of mistaken beliefs by engaging in conduct that is deceptive, unethical, or unfair.

In our view, a jury considering the totality of these circumstances in the light most favorable to the Denisons could reasonably have found that Kenai Chrysler's attempts to enforce the sales contract blatantly disregarded the Denisons' rights and amounted to unethical conduct. [49] We thus conclude that the evidence as a whole was sufficient to support the Denisons' claims under the UTPA.

While First National Bank and Aloha Lumber clearly hold that the act does not apply to transactions involving real estate, we do not think that these cases should be interpreted to bar the application of the act to transactions between businesses involving services or commercial or consumer personal property.

We thus conclude that no sufficient reason exists for departing from the literal language of the act in connection with commercial transactions not involving real estate. Consequently, we affirm the judgment of the superior court.

Any waiver by a consumer of the provisions of this title is contrary to public policy and shall be unenforceable and void.

As explained above, a provision in any contract — even a contract that has no arbitration provision — that purports to waive, in all fora, the statutory right to seek public injunctive relief under the UCL, the CLRA, or the false advertising law is invalid and unenforceable under California law. The FAA does not require enforcement of such a provision, in derogation of this generally applicable contract defense, merely because the provision has been inserted into an arbitration agreement.

Any one may waive the advantage of a law intended solely for their benefit. But a law established for a public reason cannot be contravened by a private agreement.

The provisions of this title are not exclusive. The remedies provided herein for violation of any section of this title or for conduct proscribed by any section of this title shall be in addition to any other procedures or remedies for any violation or conduct provided for in any other law. Nothing in this title shall limit any other statutory or any common law rights of the Attorney General or any other person to bring class actions. Class actions by consumers brought under the specific provisions of Chapter 3 (commencing with Section 1770) of this title shall be governed exclusively by the provisions of Chapter 4 (commencing with Section 1780); however, this shall not be construed so as to deprive a consumer of any statutory or common law right to bring a class action without resort to this title. If any act or practice proscribed under this title also constitutes a cause of action in common law or a violation of another statute, the consumer may assert such common law or statutory cause of action under the procedures and with the remedies provided for in such law.

Civil Code section 3513 provides: “Any one may waive the advantage of a law intended solely for his benefit. But a law established for a public reason cannot be contravened by a private agreement.” Consistent with this provision, we have explained that “a party may waive a statutory provision if a statute does not prohibit doing so [citation], the statute‟s „public benefit . . . is merely incidental to [its] primary purpose‟ [citation], and „waiver does not seriously compromise any public purpose that [the statute was] intended to serve‟ [citation].” (DeBerard Properties, Ltd. v. Lim (1999) 20 Cal.4th 659, 668-669.)

Because the parties have not mentioned, let alone discussed, this language, we do not decide whether, in light of our holding, it renders the remainder of the arbitration provision unenforceable. But because our holding raises this question, we need not detail each respect in which McGill‟s injunctive relief request constitutes a request for public injunctive relief. We leave these issues to the Court of Appeal on remand, should the parties raise them and should the court find it necessary to decide them. III. DISPOSITION The Court of Appeal‟s judgment is reversed and the matter is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

As used in this title: (a) “Goods” means tangible chattels bought or leased for use primarily for personal, family, or household purposes, including certificates or coupons exchangeable for these goods, and including goods that, at the time of the sale or subsequently, are to be so affixed to real property as to become a part of real property, whether or not they are severable from the real property. (b) “Services” means work, labor, and services for other than a commercial or business use, including services furnished in connection with the sale or repair of goods. (c) “Person” means an individual, partnership, corporation, limited liability company, association, or other group, however organized. (d) “Consumer” means an individual who seeks or acquires, by purchase or lease, any goods or services for personal, family, or household purposes.

A consumer contract shall remain enforceable, even though it violates this chapter. (b) Other consumer rights. Nothing in this chapter shall preclude a consumer from making any claim or raising any defense which would have been available to the consumer if this chapter were not in effect. (c) Waiver. A consumer may not waive the rights provided by this chapter, and any such waiver shall be void.

The following definitions shall apply in this chapter: (a) Consumer. A “consumer” is an individual who borrows, leases, buys or obtains money, property or services under a written agreement. (b) Consumer contract. A written agreement is a “consumer contract,” if: (1) A consumer enters into the agreement primarily for personal, family or household purposes; and (2) The agreement is one in which the consumer: (A) Borrows up to twenty-five thousand dollars or receives up to twenty-five thousand dollars in credit from a person who lends money or extends credit in the ordinary course of business; or (B) agrees to pay up to twenty-five thousand dollars to buy or lease personal property or services from a person who is acting in the ordinary course of business; or (C) leases any residential dwelling.

No person shall sell at retail a new mobile manufactured home or a new modular or prefabricated home in this state without a written manufacturer's warranty to the buyer containing the following terms: (1) That such home is free from any substantial defects in materials or workmanship in the structure, plumbing, heating and electrical systems and all appliances and other equipment installed or included therein or thereon by the manufacturer. (2) That the seller or manufacturer shall take appropriate corrective action at the site of such home in instances of substantial defects in materials or workmanship which become evident within one year from the date of delivery of such home to the buyer, provided the buyer gives written notice of such defects to the seller, manufacturer or dealer at his business address as soon as such defects become evident.

The seller or manufacturer shall not require the buyer to waive his rights under this chapter and any waiver shall be deemed contrary to public policy and shall be void and unenforceable.

This chapter shall apply to all consumer contracts made, entered into or signed by the consumer in this state after June 30, 1980. (b) Exclusions. Mortgages, deeds of real estate, insurance policies and documents relating to securities transactions are not consumer contracts.

Every consumer contract entered into after June 30, 1980, shall be written in plain language. A consumer contract is written in plain language if it meets either the plain language tests of subsection (b) of this section or the alternate objective tests of subsection (c) of this section. A consumer contract need not meet the tests of both subsections.

(e) Consumer represented by attorney at signing of contract. No consumer may bring an action under this chapter on a contract, if: (1) The consumer was represented at the signing of the contract by an attorney; and (2) This fact is shown by the attorney's signed and dated statement on the contract. (f) Limitations on actions. No consumer may bring an action under this chapter after the contract has been fully performed. No consumer may bring an action under this chapter more than six years after the date on which the contract was last signed.

(a) Any waiver of the buyer of this chapter shall be deemed contrary to public policy and shall be unenforceable and void.

No contract or obligation shall contain any provision by which: (1) The buyer agrees not to assert against a seller a claim or defense arising out of the sale or agrees not to assert against an assignee such a claim or defense other than as provided in § 4312 of this title; (2) In the absence of the buyer’s default in the performance of any obligations, the holder may, arbitrarily and without reasonable cause, accelerate the maturity of any part or all of the amount owing thereunder; (3) The seller or holder of the contract or other person acting as agent is given authority to enter upon the buyer’s premises unlawfully or to commit any breach of the peace in the repossession of goods; (4) The buyer waives any right of action against the seller or holder of the contract or other person acting as agent, for any illegal act committed in the collection of payments under the contract or in the repossession of goods; (5) The buyer executes a power of attorney appointing the seller or holder of the contract, or other person acting as agent, as the buyer’s agent in the repossession of goods; (6) The buyer relieves the seller from liability for any legal remedies which the buyer may have against the seller under the contract or any separate instrument executed in connection therewith.

Any provision in a contract which is prohibited by this chapter shall be void but shall not otherwise affect the validity of the contract.

No right of action or defense arising out of a retail installment sale which the buyer has against the seller, and which would be cut off by assignment, shall be cut off by assignment of the contract to any third party whether or not the third party acquires the contract in good faith and for value unless the assignee given notice of the assignment to the buyer as provided in this section and within 15 days of the mailing of such notice receives no written notice of the facts giving rise to the claim or defense of the buyer, or unless the assignee acquires the contract or evidence of indebtedness relying in good faith upon a certificate of completion or certificate of satisfaction signed by the buyer. A notice of assignment shall be in writing addressed to the buyer at the address shown on the contract and shall identify the contract and state that the buyer must, within 15 days of the date of mailing of such notice, notify the assignee in writing of any facts giving rise to a claim or defense which the buyer may have. The notice of assignment shall state the name of the seller and buyer, a description of the goods and services, the time balance and the number and amounts of the installments. If a certificate of completion or satisfaction is relied upon, the following notation must appear at the top thereof in at least 10 point bold type: “Notice to Buyer — Do Not Sign this certificate until all services have been satisfactorily performed and materials supplied or goods received and found satisfactory.

§ 4301. Definitions. Unless the context or subject matter otherwise requires, the definitions given in this section govern the construction of this chapter. (1) “Cash sale price” means the cash sale price stated in a retail installment contract for which the seller would sell or furnish to the buyer and the buyer would buy or obtain from the seller the goods or services which are the subject matter of a retail installment contract if the sale were a sale for cash instead of a retail installment sale. The cash sale price may include any taxes and cash sale prices for accessories and services, if any, included in a retail installment sale. (2) “Financing agency” means a person engaged in this State in whole or in part in the business of purchasing retail installment contracts, or installment accounts from 1 or more retail sellers. The term includes, but is not limited, to a bank, trust company, private banker, or investment company, if so engaged. (3) “Goods” mean tangible chattels bought for use primarily for personal, family or household purposes, as distinguished from commercial or agricultural purposes, including certificates or coupons exchangeable for such goods, and including goods which, at the time of the sale or subsequently are to be affixed to real property as to become a part of such real property whether or not severable therefrom, but does not include any motor vehicle which for the purposes of this chapter shall mean any device propelled or drawn by any power other than muscular power, in, upon, or by which any person or property is, or may be transported or drawn upon a highway.

(c) Except as provided in § 4315 of this title, this chapter shall not apply to any retail installment sale which is made for a cash sale price of $75 or less, where no title, lien or other security interest is retained or taken by the seller. This section shall not apply to sales made pursuant to the provisions of §§ 4334-4343 of this title.

(12) “Services” mean work, labor and services, for other than a commercial or business use, including services furnished in connection with the improvement of real property but does not include the services for which the tariffs, rates, charges, costs or expenses, including in each instance the time sale price, is required by law to be filed with the approval by the federal government or any official department, division, commission or agency of the United States.

Except in settlement of a bona fide dispute, a consumer may not waive or agree to forego rights or benefits under this chapter.

A claim by a consumer against a creditor relating to an excess charge, any other civil violation of this chapter, or a civil penalty, or a claim by a creditor against a consumer for default or breach of a civil duty imposed by this chapter, may be settled by agreement if the claim is disputed in good faith.

A settlement in which the consumer waives or agrees to forego rights or benefits under this chapter is invalid if the court as a matter of law finds the settlement to have been unconscionable at the time it was made. The competence of the consumer, any deception or coercion practiced upon the consumer, the nature and extent of the legal advice received by the consumer, and the value of the consideration may be considered, among other factors, with respect to the issue of unconscionability.

A consumer who suffers an ascertainable loss of money or property as the result of a prohibited practice or act in violation of this chapter may bring an action at law to recover actual damages.

An action pursuant to this chapter must be brought within two years of the occurrence of the last event giving rise to the cause of action under this chapter or within two years of the discovery of the violation of this chapter by the person bringing the action, whichever is later.

A class action lawsuit alleging a violation of this chapter shall not be filed with a court unless it has been approved by the attorney general. The attorney general shall approve the filing of a class action lawsuit alleging a violation of this chapter unless the attorney general determines that the lawsuit is frivolous.

“Consumer merchandise” means merchandise offered for sale or lease, or sold or leased, primarily for personal, family, or household purposes.

This section shall not affect the requirements of any other law or of the Iowa rules of civil procedure relating to class action lawsuits.

This chapter shall not apply to any of the following: a. Merchandise offered or provided by any of the following persons, including business entities organized under Title XII by those persons and the officers, directors, employees, and agents of those persons or business entities, pursuant to a profession or business for which they are licensed or registered: (1) Insurance companies subject to Title XIII. (2) Attorneys licensed to practice law in this state. (3) Financial institutions which includes any bank incorporated under the provisions of any state or federal law, any savings and loan association or savings bank incorporated under the provisions of any state or federal law, and any credit union organized under the provisions of any state or federal law, and any affiliate or subsidiary of a bank, savings and loan association, savings bank, or credit union. (4) Persons or facilities licensed, certified, or registered under chapters 135B, 135C, 135J, 148, 148A, 148B, 148C, 149, 151, 152, 152A, 152B, 153, 154, 154B, 154C, 154D, 155A, 156, 169, 522B, 542, 542B, 543B, 544A, or 544B.

g. Conduct that is required or permitted by the orders or rules of, or a statute administered by, a federal, state, or local governmental agency. h. An affirmative act that violates this chapter but is specifically required by other applicable law, to the extent that the actor could not reasonably avoid a violation of this chapter.

“Actual damages” means all compensatory damages proximately caused by the prohibited practice or act that are reasonably ascertainable in amount. “Actual damages” does not include damages for bodily injury, pain and suffering, mental distress, or loss of consortium, loss of life, or loss of enjoyment of life.

A person shall not be held liable in any action brought under this section for a violation of this chapter if the person shows by a preponderance of the evidence that the violation was not intentional and resulted from a bona fide error notwithstanding the maintenance of procedures reasonably adopted to avoid the error.

(a) Except as otherwise provided in this act, a consumer may not waive or agree to forego rights or benefits under this act.

(c) A settlement in which the consumer waives or agrees to forego rights or benefits under this act is invalid if the court finds the settlement to have been unconscionable at the time it was made.

(a) Notwithstanding any other provisions of law, with respect to property which is the subject of or is intended to become the subject of a consumer transaction in this state, no supplier shall: (1) Exclude, modify or otherwise attempt to limit the implied warranties of merchantability as defined in K.S.A. 84-2-314, and amendments thereto, and fitness for a particular purpose, as defined in K.S.A. 84-2-315, and amendments thereto; or

No supplier shall engage in any unconscionable act or practice in connection with a consumer transaction. An unconscionable act or practice violates this act whether it occurs before, during or after the transaction.

(b) The unconscionability of an act or practice is a question for the court. In determining whether an act or practice is unconscionable, the court shall consider circumstances of which the supplier knew or had reason to know, such as, but not limited to the following that: (1) The supplier took advantage of the inability of the consumer reasonably to protect the consumer's interests because of the consumer's physical infirmity, ignorance, illiteracy, inability to understand the language of an agreement or similar factor; (2) when the consumer transaction was entered into, the price grossly exceeded the price at which similar property or services were readily obtainable in similar transactions by similar consumers; (3) the consumer was unable to receive a material benefit from the subject of the transaction; (4) when the consumer transaction was entered into, there was no reasonable probability of payment of the obligation in full by the consumer; (5) the transaction the supplier induced the consumer to enter into was excessively onesided in favor of the supplier; (6) the supplier made a misleading statement of opinion on which the consumer was likely to rely to the consumer's detriment; and (7) except as provided by K.S.A. 50-639, and amendments thereto, the supplier excluded, modified or otherwise attempted to limit either the implied warranties of merchantability and fitness for a particular purpose or any remedy provided by law for a breach of those warranties.

(b) A claim, whether or not disputed, by or against a consumer may be settled for less value than the amount claimed.

The competence of the consumer, any deception or coercion practiced upon the consumer, the nature and extent of the legal advice received by the consumer, and the value of the consideration are relevant to the issue of unconscionability.

exclude, modify or attempt to limit any remedy provided by law, including the measure of damages available, for a breach of implied warranty of merchantability and fitness for a particular purpose.

(e) A disclaimer or limitation in violation of this section is void. If a consumer prevails in an action based upon breach of warranty, and the supplier has violated this section, the court may, in addition to any damages recovered, award reasonable attorney fees and a civil penalty under K.S.A. 50-636, and amendments thereto, to be paid by the supplier who gave the improper disclaimer.

Before discussing the parties’ arguments, we must acknowledge K.S.A. 50-625(a). It was not cited by the parties, but we cannot ignore its explicit statement that a consumer cannot waive or forego rights under the KCPA. So, even if Osterhaus had reinforced McLellan and permitted Paragraph 5 of the Buyer Acknowledgment to be read as a blanket waiver of the Stechschultes’ KCPA claims against Golson and PHB, K.S.A. 50-625(a) would have prevented its operation. See Hunter v. American Rentals, 189 Kan. 615, 618 , 371 P.2d 131 (1962) (“To allow defendant to escape liability by reason of its alleged contract would be defeating the purpose and intention of the legislature as provided in the mentioned statute.”)

(c) A supplier may limit the supplier's implied warranty of merchantability and fitness for a particular purpose with respect to a defect or defects in the property only if the supplier establishes that the consumer had knowledge of the defect or defects, which became the basis of the bargain between the parties. In neither case shall such limitation apply to liability for personal injury or property damage.

(g) This section shall not apply to seed for planting. (h) This section shall not apply to sales of livestock for agricultural purposes, other than sales of livestock for immediate slaughter, except in cases where the supplier knowingly sells livestock which is diseased.

Any waiver by a consumer of the provisions of this chapter is contrary to public policy and shall be unenforceable and void.

Unfair methods of competition and unfair or deceptive acts or practices in the conduct of any trade or commerce are declared unlawful.

It is the intent of the Legislature that in construing this section the courts will be guided by the interpretations given by the Federal Trade Commission and the Federal Courts to Section 45(a)(1) of the Federal Trade Commission Act (15 United States Code 45(a)(1)), as from time to time amended.

The Attorney General may make rules and regulations interpreting this section. Such rules and regulations shall not be inconsistent with the rules, regulations and decisions of the Federal Trade Commission and the Federal Courts interpreting the provisions of 15 U.S.C. 45(a)(1) (The Federal Trade Commission Act) as from time to time amended. Evidence of a violation of a rule or regulation made by the Attorney General shall constitute prima facie evidence of an act or practice declared to be unlawful by this chapter in any action thereafter brought under this chapter.

Any person who purchases or leases goods, services or property, real or personal, primarily for personal, family or household purposes and thereby suffers any loss of money or property, real or personal, as a result of the use or employment by another person of a method, act or practice declared unlawful by section 207 or by any rule or regulation issued under section 207, subsection 2 may bring an action either in the Superior Court or District Court for actual damages, restitution and for such other equitable relief, including an injunction, as the court determines to be necessary and proper.

At least 30 days prior to the filing of an action for damages, a written demand for relief, identifying the claimant and reasonably describing the unfair and deceptive act or practice relied upon and the injuries suffered, must be mailed or delivered to any prospective respondent at the respondent's last known address.

The demand requirement of this subsection does not apply if the claim is asserted by way of counterclaim or cross claim.

Transactions or actions otherwise permitted under laws as administered by any regulatory board or officer acting under statutory authority of the State or of the United States. This exception applies only if the defendant shows that:

2. Interstate commerce. [PL 1981, c. 569 (RP).] 3. Complaints. [PL 1973, c. 323, §2 (RP).]

To justify a finding of unfairness, the act or practice: (1) must cause, or be likely to cause, substantial injury to consumers; (2) that is not reasonably avoidable by consumers; and (3) that is not outweighed by any countervailing benefits to consumers or competition.

In determining what constitutes an unfair or deceptive act pursuant to the UTPA, we are guided by the interpretations given by the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) and the federal courts. 5 M.R.S.A. § 207(1); Suminski v. Maine Appliance Warehouse, Inc., 602 A.2d 1173 , 1174-75 n. 1 (Me.1992).

The entry is: Judgment vacated with respect to the court's restitution award to the indirect purchasers. Remanded for recalculation of the restitution only to direct purchasers. The judgment is affirmed in all other respects.

The substantial injury requirement is a limitation on the use of the UTPA for a private cause of action.

Maine's UTPA also requires that a plaintiff suffer "loss of money or property" before bringing a private action to recover. 5 M.R.S. § 213(1).

McKinnon, however, is not a proper representative of the class because he presents insufficient evidence of injury as a matter of law. The entry is: Judgment affirmed.

We have said that this provision was “designed to encourage settlement by notifying the defendant of the claim within a certain amount of time prior to the initiation of the suit.”

The elements of an unfair trade practice are substantively different than the elements for a simple breach of warranty under the UCC. To be a violation of 5 M.R.S.A. § 207 it is not enough that the act or practice be a violation of a particular statute, it must also be unfair or deceptive.

The Superior Court specifically denied the State’s request for a permanent injunction. The statute clearly provides for investigation costs only when a permanent injunction issues. The entry is: Judgment modified by vacating the award to the State of investigation costs and as modified affirmed.

A. Its business activities are subject to regulation by a state or federal agency; and

B. The specific activity that would otherwise constitute a violation of this chapter is authorized, permitted or required by a state or federal agency or by applicable law, rule or regulation or other regulatory approval.

The attorney general shall investigate violations of the law of this state respecting unfair, discriminatory, and other unlawful practices in business, commerce, or trade, and specifically, but not exclusively, the Nonprofit Corporation Act (sections 317A.001 to 317A.909), the Act Against Unfair Discrimination and Competition (sections 325D.01 to 325D.07), the Unlawful Trade Practices Act (sections 325D.09 to 325D.16), the Antitrust Act (sections 325D.49 to 325D.66), section 325F.67 and other laws against false or fraudulent advertising, the antidiscrimination acts contained in section 325D.67 , the act against monopolization of food products (section 325D.68), the act regulating telephone advertising services (section 325E.39), the Prevention of Consumer Fraud Act (sections 325F.68 to 325F.70), and chapter 53A regulating currency exchanges and assist in the enforcement of those laws as in this section provided.

In addition to the remedies otherwise provided by law, any person injured by a violation of any of the laws referred to in subdivision 1 may bring a civil action and recover damages, together with costs and disbursements, including costs of investigation and reasonable attorney's fees, and receive other equitable relief as determined by the court. The court may, as appropriate, enter a consent judgment or decree without the finding of illegality. In any action brought by the attorney general pursuant to this section, the court may award any of the remedies allowable under this subdivision.

Based on these considerations we hold that the Private AG Statute applies only to those claimants who demonstrate that their cause of action benefits the public.

Appellant was defrauded in a single one-on-one transaction in which the fraudulent misrepresentation, while evincing reprehensible conduct, was made only to appellant. A successful prosecution of his fraud claim does not advance state interests and enforcement has no public benefit, and is not a claim that could be considered to be within the duties and responsibilities of the attorney general to investigate and enjoin.

During negotiations between appellant Hoang Minh Ly and respondent Kim Nystrom for the purchase of respondent's restaurant, respondent made misrepresentations to appellant relating to monthly profits and the condition of the restaurant and its inventory.

We conclude that the unlawful practices here, occurring while engaging in a one-on-one transaction for the purchase of a business for operation and not resale, fall within the trade practices prohibited by section 325F.69, subdivision 1.

Any permanent injunction, judgment or order of the court made pursuant to subdivision 3 shall be prima facie evidence in an action brought under subdivision 3a that the defendant used or employed an act or practice in violation of the laws referred to in subdivision 1, provided that this subdivision shall not apply to consent judgments or decrees where the court makes no finding of illegality, including assurances of discontinuance pursuant to subdivision 2b.

A successful prosecution of his fraud claim does not advance state interests and enforcement has no public benefit, and is not a claim that could be considered to be within the duties and responsibilities of the attorney general to investigate and enjoin. [25] Affirmed in part and reversed in part.

Unfair methods of competition and unfair or deceptive acts or practices in the conduct of any trade or commerce are unlawful.

Nothing in this part precludes a consumer from making any claim or raising any defense that would have been available to the consumer if this part were not in effect.

A consumer may not waive the rights provided by this part, and any such waiver is void.

This part does not apply to: (1) actions or transactions permitted under laws administered by the Montana public service commission or the state auditor; or (2) acts of a retail merchant, publisher, owner, agent, or employee of a newspaper, periodical, or radio or television station or advertising agency in the publication or dissemination of an advertisement when the merchant, publisher, owner, agent, or employee did not have knowledge of the false, misleading, or deceptive character of the advertisement.

The MCPA prohibits “[u]nfair methods of competition and unfair or deceptive acts or practices in the conduct of any trade or commerce[.]” Section 30-14-103, MCA. An unfair trade practice is one that is “contrary to established public policy and which is either immoral, unethical, oppressive, unscrupulous, or substantially injurious to consumers.”

Section 30-14-1103 does not apply to: (a) consumer contracts in which the value of the money, property, or services bought, leased, or borrowed exceeds $50,000 at the time of the contract; (b) consumer contracts in which securities or commodities accounts are bought, leased, or borrowed; (c) an insurance policy or contract that is subject to the provisions of Title 33; (d) a seller, lessor, or lender, if it is a government agency or instrumentality; (e) the provision of public utility service under tariffs approved by the public service commission; or (f) a transfer of real estate.

A consumer contract must be written in plain language. (2) A consumer contract is written in plain language if: (a) it is written in a clear and coherent manner using words with common and everyday meanings; (b) it is appropriately divided and captioned by its various sections; (c) it uses type of readable size; (d) it uses ink that contrasts with the paper.

Except as provided in subsection (2), 30-14-1103 applies to any agreement in connection with a consumer contract entered into in this state between a consumer who is a resident of this state at the time of the transaction and a seller, lessor, or lender.

The use of specific language expressly required or authorized by a court decision, state or federal statute or administrative rule, or governmental agency is not a violation of this part; nor is a legal description of real property a violation of this part.

Except as provided in subsection (2) of this section, the Consumer Protection Act shall not apply to actions or transactions otherwise permitted, prohibited, or regulated under laws administered by the Director of Insurance, the Public Service Commission, the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission, or any other regulatory body or officer acting under statutory authority of this state or the United States

No penalty or remedy shall result from a violation of the Consumer Protection Act except as expressly provided in such act.

Any person who is injured in his or her business or property by a violation of sections 59-1602 to 59-1606 , whether such injured person dealt directly or indirectly with the defendant, or any person so injured because he or she refuses to accede to a proposal for an arrangement which, if consummated, would be in violation of sections 59-1603 to 59-1606 , may bring a civil action in the district court to enjoin further violations, to recover the actual damages sustained by him or her, or both, together with the costs of the suit, including a reasonable attorney's fee, and the court may in its discretion, increase the award of damages to an amount which bears a reasonable relation to the actual damages which have been sustained and which damages are not susceptible of measurement by ordinary pecuniary standards

except that such increased award for violation of section 59-1602 shall not exceed one thousand dollars

The labor of a human being shall not be a commodity or article of commerce

For purposes of the Consumer Protection Act, unless the context otherwise requires: (1) Person shall mean natural persons, corporations, trusts, unincorporated associations, partnerships, and limited liability companies; (2) Trade and commerce shall mean the sale of assets or services and any commerce directly or indirectly affecting the people of the State of Nebraska

Any action to enforce a claim for damages under section 59-1609 shall be forever barred unless commenced within four years after the cause of action accrues; Provided, that whenever any action is brought by the Attorney General for a violation of sections 59-1602 to 59-1606 , except actions for the recovery of a civil penalty for violation of an injunction or actions under section 59-1609 , the running of such statute of limitations, with respect to every private right of action for damages under section 59-1609 which is based in whole or part on any matter complained of in the action by the Attorney General, shall be suspended during the pendency thereof.

When any provision of sections 59-801 to 59-831 and sections 84-211 to 84-214 or any provision of Chapter 59 is the same as or similar to the language of a federal antitrust law, the courts of this state in construing such sections or chapter shall follow the construction given to the federal law by the federal courts.

If a buyer or lessee is induced by a violation of section 87-302 or 87-303.01 to enter into a sale or lease, the agreement is unenforceable by the seller or lessor and the buyer or lessee, at his or her option, may rescind the agreement or retain the merchandise delivered and the benefit of any services performed without any obligation to pay for them.

To be actionable under the CPA, therefore, we conclude that the unfair or deceptive act or practice must have an impact upon the public interest. The act is not available to redress a private wrong where the public interest is unaffected.

We cannot ignore this language and apply the CPA to isolated transactions between individuals that do not have an impact on consumers at large.

We emphasize that we do not here hold that every entity within the jurisdiction of a regulatory agency is exempt from the Act. We only hold, as we must from a reading of the statute, that Avco is exempt from the Act by virtue of the regulation by the Department of Banking and Finance of the specific transaction involved herein.

The teaching of Kuntzelman is that while particular conduct is not immunized from the operation of the Consumer Protection Act merely because the actor comes within the jurisdiction of some regulatory body, immunity does arise if the conduct itself is also regulated.

Section 59-1617 exempts both Gateway and the Bank from the provisions of the Consumer Protection Act and therefore any award of attorney fees under that act was inappropriate.

Under the provisions of § 59-1617 an installment loan by an industrial loan and investment company, regulated by the Nebraska Department of Banking and Finance, is exempt from the Consumer Protection Act

Section 59-1609 provides both a private right of action and a public right. We find no limitation on who may sue for violations of §§ 59-1602 to 59-1606 except that such violations must *599 directly or indirectly affect the people of Nebraska.

Section 59-1609 permits indirect purchasers to bring a civil action under the terms of the Act.

No interpretation is necessary to ascertain the meaning of this plain, direct, and unambiguous statute. Therefore, we agree with the district court and find that because *405 the Act excepts the labor of a human being, Eggers failed to state a cause of action in alleging that Moore violated the Act by engaging in his employment recruiting business.

we hold that Salem’s claim that appellees violated the NCPA is barred under the immunities extended by the Noerr- Pennington doctrine.

The NCPA was intended to be an antitrust measure to protect Nebraska consumers from monopolies and price- fixing conspiracies.

Further, by its own terms, § 87-303(a) only provides for equitable relief consistent with general principles of equity.

The UDTPA, specifically § 87-303, does not provide a private right of action for damages.

Applying the principle here, the fact that § 87-303.07 specifically lists buyers and lessees as those protected leads us to conclude that other cat- egories of individuals—such as guarantors like Wegener and Pribil—are not.

We hold that the CPA does not apply to transactions that do not affect the public interest. However, we affirm the jury verdict because we find no reversible error in submitting the fraudulent misrepresentation and fraudulent concealment theories to the jury.

Under the facts of this case, the transfer of the Jeep from appellants to appellee affected no one other than the parties to the transaction, and appellee has not shown a sufficient impact indirectly or directly on the public to qualify the transaction as an act or practice which is prohibited under § 59-1602.

Here, not only was the Bank of Gibbon heavily regulated by the state, but the form of certificate used was at least indirectly approved by virtue of the authority of the state, through the director of the Department of Banking and Finance, to constructively aid banks in maintaining proper banking standards and efficiency.

(2) Actions and transactions prohibited or regulated under the laws administered by the Director of Insurance shall be subject to section 59-1602 and all statutes which provide for the implementation and enforcement of section 59-1602 . Actions and transactions prohibited or regulated under the laws administered by the Board of Funeral Directing and Embalming or administered by the Department of Agriculture and actions and transactions relating to loan brokers which are prohibited or regulated pursuant to sections 45-189 to 45-191.11 and administered by the Department of Banking and Finance shall be subject to the Consumer Protection Act.

Case No. 83-686 presents the question of whether the appellee’s attorney was properly awarded fees of $10,900 under the Nebraska Consumer Protection Act, § 59-1609.

Because issuance of the certificate was exempted from the purview of the Consumer Protection Act, the district court, if for no other reason, correctly determined that there had been no violation of the act.

No consumer contract, warranty, notice or sign, as provided for in this act, shall contain any provision by which the consumer waives his rights under this act. Any such provision shall be null and void. No consumer contract, notice or sign shall state that any of its provisions is or may be void, unenforceable or inapplicable in some jurisdictions without specifying which provisions are or are not void, unenforceable or inapplicable within the State of New Jersey; provided, however, that this shall not apply to warranties.

No seller, lessor, creditor, lender or bailee shall in the course of his business offer to any consumer or prospective consumer or enter into any written consumer contract or give or display any written consumer warranty, notice or sign after the effective date of this act which includes any provision that violates any clearly established legal right of a consumer or responsibility of a seller, lessor, creditor, lender or bailee as established by State or Federal law at the time the offer is made or the consumer contract is signed or the warranty, notice or sign is given or displayed. Consumer means any individual who buys, leases, borrows, or bails any money, property or service which is primarily for personal, family or household purposes. The provisions of this act shall not apply to residential leases or to the sale of real estate, whether improved or not, or to the construction of new homes subject to "The New Home Warranty and Builders' Registration Act," P.L.1977, c. 467 (C. 46:3B-1 et seq.).

Any person who suffers any ascertainable loss of moneys or property, real or personal, as a result of the use or employment by another person of any method, act, or practice declared unlawful under this act or the act hereby amended and supplemented may bring an action or assert a counterclaim therefor in any court of competent jurisdiction. In any action under this section the court shall, in addition to any other appropriate legal or equitable relief, award threefold the damages sustained by any person in interest. In all actions under this section, including those brought by the Attorney General, the court shall also award reasonable attorneys' fees, filing fees and reasonable costs of suit.

Any person who violates the provisions of this act shall be liable to the aggrieved consumer for a civil penalty of not less than $100.00 or for actual damages, or both at the election of the consumer, together with reasonable attorney's fees and court costs. This may be recoverable by the consumer in a civil action in a court of competent jurisdiction or as part of a counterclaim by the consumer against the seller, lessor, creditor, lender or bailee or assignee of any of the aforesaid, who aggrieved him. A consumer also shall have the right to petition the court to terminate a contract which violates the provisions of section 2 of this act and the court in its discretion may void the contract.

This act shall be known and may be cited as the "Truth-in-Consumer Contract, Warranty and Notice Act."

The rights, remedies and prohibitions accorded by the provisions of this act are hereby declared to be in addition to and cumulative of any other right, remedy or prohibition accorded by common law, Federal law or statutes of this State, and nothing contained herein shall be construed to deny, abrogate or impair any such common law or statutory right, remedy or prohibition.

Unfair methods of competition in or affecting commerce, and unfair or deceptive acts or practices in or affecting commerce, are declared unlawful. (b) For purposes of this section, "commerce" includes all business activities, however denominated, but does not include professional services rendered by a member of a learned profession.

(c) Nothing in this section shall apply to acts done by the publisher, owner, agent, or employee of a newspaper, periodical or radio or television station, or other advertising medium in the publication or dissemination of an advertisement, when the owner, agent or employee did not have knowledge of the false, misleading or deceptive character of the advertisement and when the newspaper, periodical or radio or television station, or other advertising medium did not have a direct financial interest in the sale or distribution of the advertised product or service.

If any person shall be injured or the business of any person, firm or corporation shall be broken up, destroyed or injured by reason of any act or thing done by any other person, firm or corporation in violation of the provisions of this Chapter, such person, firm or corporation so injured shall have a right of action on account of such injury done, and if damages are assessed in such case judgment shall be rendered in favor of the plaintiff and against the defendant for treble the amount fixed by the verdict.

In any suit instituted by a person who alleges that the defendant violated G.S. 75-1.1, the presiding judge may, in his discretion, allow a reasonable attorney fee to the duly licensed attorney representing the prevailing party, such attorney fee to be taxed as a part of the court costs and payable by the losing party, upon a finding by the presiding judge that:

Any civil action brought under this Chapter to enforce the provisions thereof shall be barred unless commenced within four years after the cause of action accrues.

When any civil or criminal proceeding shall be commenced by the Attorney General or by any of the district attorneys of the State to prevent, restrain or punish a violation of Chapter 75, the running of the period of limitation with respect to every private right of action arising under Chapter 75 and based in whole or in part on any matter complained of in said proceeding shall be suspended during the pendency thereof and for one year thereafter; provided that when the running of the period of limitation with respect to a cause of action arising under Chapter 75 shall be suspended hereunder, any action to enforce such cause of action shall be barred unless commenced either within the period of suspension or within four years after the cause of action accrued, whichever is later.

Careful examination of the applicable precedent in this jurisdiction and our interpretation of the intent of the Legislature leads us to conclude that, in determining whether a violation of G.S. 75-1.1 has occurred, the question of whether the defendant acted in bad faith is not pertinent.

A practice is unfair when it offends established public policy as well as when the practice is immoral, unethical, oppressive, unscrupulous, or substantially injurious to consumers.

Thus any possible implication in Smith that a party must show bad faith in order to recover treble damages for a violation of G.S. 75-1.1 is expressly overruled.

Thus, parties may agree to decrease the general limitation period for bringing claims if: (1) no statute forbids a shorter period, and (2) the shorter period is reasonable. The legislature has established a four-year limitation period for bringing UDTPA claims, N.C.G.S. § 75-16.2 (2025), and in the absence of an agreement to the contrary, this limitation period controls.

(1) The party charged with the violation has willfully engaged in the act or practice, and there was an unwarranted refusal by such party to fully resolve the matter which constitutes the basis of such suit; or (2) The party instituting the action knew, or should have known, the action was frivolous and malicious.

Any party claiming to be exempt from the provisions of this section shall have the burden of proof with respect to such claim.

Though the parties’ agreement provided for a one-year contractual limitation period to bring any claim arising from the subject matter of the contract, plaintiffs filed an unfair and deceptive trade practices claim against defendant nearly three years after plaintiffs knew of defendant’s wrongful conduct.

The legislature has not prohibited downward adjustment of the limitation period for UDTPA claims, and plaintiffs have failed to demonstrate the provision is unreasonable. Accordingly, the trial court did not err in concluding defendant was entitled to judgment as a matter of law on plaintiffs’ UDTPA claim. We reverse the decision of the Court of Appeals. REVERSED.

The act, use, or employment by any person of any deceptive act or practice, fraud, false pretense, false promise, or misrepresentation, with the intent that others rely thereon in connection with the sale or advertisement of any merchandise, whether or not any person has in fact been misled, deceived, or damaged thereby, is declared to be an unlawful practice. The act, use, or employment by any person of any act or practice, in connection with the sale or advertisement of any merchandise, which is unconscionable or which causes or is likely to cause substantial injury to a person which is not reasonably avoidable by the injured person and not outweighed by countervailing benefits to consumers or to competition, is declared to be an unlawful practice.

The Act authorizes a private cause of action “by any person against any person who has acquired any moneys or property by means of any practice declared to be unlawful in this chapter.”

We construed the Act to apply “only to the conduct of the person who sells or advertises merchandise.” Benz Farm, LLP , at ¶ 20. “The statute prohibits deceptive or fraudulent acts ‘in connection with the sale’ of merchandise.” Id. (quoting N.D.C.C. § 51-15-02).

Thimjon and Hagemeister argue First International made deceptive statements to Northern Grain by representing First International would provide future financing if Northern Grain paid down its line of credit. However, these statements were not made to Thimjon or Hagemeister, nor were they made “in connection with the sale or advertisement of any merchandise” by First International to Thimjon or Hagemeister. N.D.C.C. § 51-15-02. Therefore, the provisions of the Act creating a private cause of action are inapplicable, and the district court properly dismissed the claim.

"Merchandise" means any objects, wares, goods, commodities, intangibles, real estate, charitable contributions, or services. - "Person" means any natural person or the person's legal representative, partnership, corporation, limited liability company, company, trust, business entity, or association, and any agent, employee, salesman, partner, officer, director, member, stockholder, associate, trustee, or cestui que trust thereof. - "Sale" means any charitable solicitation or any sale, offer for sale, or attempt to sell any merchandise for any consideration.

We construe the Act to apply only to the conduct of the person who sells or advertises merchandise. The statute prohibits deceptive or fraudulent acts “in connection with the sale” of merchandise. The Act defines “sale” as “any sale, offer for sale, or attempt to sell any merchandise for any consideration.” N.D.C.C. § 51-15-01(5). It does not define sale in terms of a purchase, offer to purchase, or attempt to purchase. Rather, the language of the Act, and particularly the definition of “sale” applicable to the Act, focuses upon the conduct of the seller. We conclude the Act does not apply to, or create a cause of action against, a purchaser of merchandise.

Absent fraud, mistake, or other invalidating cause, a final written agreement may not be contradicted by evidence of a prior or contemporaneous oral agreement, and therefore a consumer may not use parol evidence to contradict the final written agreement to prove a violation of the Consumer Sales Practices Act.

The trial court rejected appellees’ request for treble damages under R.C. 1345.09(B) and further rejected any claim for noneconomic damages under R.C. 1345.09(A).

The trial court found an award of attorney fees appropriate, as authorized by R.C. 1345.09(F)(2).

The purchase agreement specified that appellee would receive a trade-in allowance of $15,500 for his 2003 Ford Explorer and also contained a merger clause, providing that it comprised the entire agreement between the parties.

Although he admitted at trial that on the final written purchase agreement, the “trade allowance is about as bold of print there as anywhere on that form,”

This transaction also falls under the Uniform Commercial Code (“UCC”), which regulates the sale of goods. The UCC’s parol evidence rule provides, “Terms with respect to which the confirmatory memoranda of the parties agree or which are otherwise set forth in a writing intended by the parties as a final expression of their agreement with respect to such terms as are included therein may not be contradicted by evidence of any prior agreement or of a contemporaneous oral agreement * * *.” R.C. 1302.05.

the attorney general has promulgated Ohio Adm.Code 109:4-3-16(B)(22), which makes it a violation of the CSPA for a “dealer * * * in connection with the advertisement or sale of a motor vehicle, to * * * [flail to integrate into any written sales contract, all material statements, representations or promises, oral or written, made prior to obtaining the consumer’s signature on the written contract with the dealer.”

Thus, the administrative rule promulgated by the attorney general is not enforceable because it is in conflict with a statute, and the parol evidence rule applies to claims alleging violations of the CSPA. Accordingly, we reverse the judgment of the court of appeals. Judgment reversed.

When the HCSSA was enacted, the legislature amended the CSPA to exclude “transactions involving a home construction service contract as defined in [R.C. 4722.01].” R.C. 1345.01(A). “As a result, transactions that may have met the definition of ‘consumer transaction’ were now exempted from the CSPA if they involved transactions involving a ‘home construction service contract.’”

Waiver of the provisions of ORS 72.8010 to 72.8200 by a buyer of consumer goods is void except where such a waiver is expressly allowed by ORS 72.8010 to 72.8200.

“Consumer good” means a new consumer good as defined in ORS 79A.1020 and includes, but is not limited to, a new motor vehicle, new manufactured dwelling, new modular home, new machine, new appliance or new like product used or bought for use primarily for personal family or household purposes. However, “consumer good” does not include a soft good or a consumable.

A buyer of a consumer good on an “as is” or “with all faults” basis under effective disclaimer of the implied warranty of merchantability or the implied warranty of fitness waives the implied warranty so effectively disclaimed.

ORS 72.8010 to 72.8200 do not apply to any defect or nonconformity in a consumer good caused by the unauthorized or unreasonable use of the good after sale.

The remedies provided by ORS 72.8010 to 72.8200 are cumulative and shall not be construed as restricting any remedy otherwise available including the remedies provided by ORS chapter 72.

ORS 72.8010 to 72.8200 apply to a consumer good sold on or after January 1, 1974. However, ORS 72.8020, 72.8030, 72.8040 and 72.8090 only apply to a consumer good manufactured on or after January 1, 1974.

Unfair methods of competition and unfair or deceptive acts or practices in the conduct of any trade or commerce are declared unlawful.

This chapter shall be known and designated as the “Unfair Trade Practice and Consumer Protection Act.”

Nothing in this chapter shall apply to actions or transactions permitted under laws administered by the department of business regulation or other regulatory body or officer acting under statutory authority of this state or the United States.

For actions brought by the attorney general, the exemption in subsection (a) applies only if the person claiming the exemption shows that: (1) The person’s business activities are subject to regulation by a state or federal agency; and (2) The activity or conduct is in compliance with orders, including insurance bulletins, or rules of, or a statute administered by, a federal or state government agency.

Any person who purchases or leases goods or services primarily for personal, family, or household purposes and thereby suffers any ascertainable loss of money or property, real or personal, as a result of the use or employment by another person of a method, act, or practice declared unlawful by § 6-13.1-2, may bring an action under the rules of civil procedure in the superior court of the county in which the seller or lessor resides; is found; has his or her principal place of business or is doing business; or in the superior court of the county as is otherwise provided by law, to recover actual damages or five hundred dollars ($500), whichever is greater.

The court may award damages equal to three (3) times the amount of actual damages and, in its discretion, provide other equitable relief that it deems necessary or proper.

Persons entitled to bring an action under subsection (a) of this section may, if the unlawful method, act, or practice has caused similar injury to numerous other persons similarly situated and if they adequately represent the similarly situated persons, bring an action on behalf of themselves and other similarly injured and situated persons

In any action brought by a person under this section, the court may award, in addition to the relief provided in this section, reasonable attorney’s fees and costs.

It is the intent of the legislature that in construing §§ 6-13.1-1 and 6-13.1-2 due consideration and great weight shall be given to the interpretations of the Federal Trade Commission and the federal courts relating to § 5(a) of the Federal Trade Commission Act.

“Trade” and “commerce” mean the advertising, offering for sale, sale, or distribution of any services and any property, tangible or intangible, real, personal, or mixed, and any other article, commodity, or thing of value wherever situate, and include any trade or commerce directly or indirectly affecting the people of this state.

(xiii) Engaging in any act or practice that is unfair or deceptive to the consumer; (xiv) Using any other methods, acts, or practices that mislead or deceive members of the public in a material respect;

Giving the language of §6-13.1-4 its plain meaning, we conclude that the Legislature clearly exempted from the Act all those activities and businesses which are subject to monitoring by state or federal regulatory bodies or officers.

When the party claiming exemption from the Act shows that the general activity in question is regulated by a “regulatory body or officer” within the meaning of §6-13.1-4, the opposing party, in this case the state of Rhode Island, then has the burden of showing that the specific acts at issue are not covered by the exemption.

Thus, step one of the exemption analysis reqinres the party claiming the exemption to demonstrate that the general activities complained of are subject to monitoring or regulation by a state or federal government agency. If a court determines that the activities are so regulated, the burden shifts to the party seeking to enforce the DTPA to establish that “the specific acts at issue are not covered by the exemption.

Our holdings on this issue have been uniform for more than twenty-five years, and we discern no reason to rule otherwise. Accordingly, consistent with the doctrine of stare decisis, we adhere to the analytical framework developed through our jurisprudence. Any argument in favor of amending the breadth and scope of the DTPA exemption should be made to the General Assembly and not this Court.

We are satisfied that the DTPA’s statutory exemption applies in this instance. Lead paint disclosure in connection with the sale of residential real estate, already is comprehensively regulated by the state and federal government.

Applying the two-step analysis set forth in Piedmont Funding and its progeny, it is clear that Fleet’s credit-card solicitations fall squarely within the exception to the DTPA.

The plaintiff, a Rhode Island corporation doing business as a video store, plainly does not have standing to bring a private action under this statute.

The plaintiff is a Rhode Island limited liability company. Therefore, the plaintiff did not have standing to bring this claim under the Act against the defendants, and we affirm the granting of the motion for judgment on the pleadings on this count alone.

The plaintiffs appeal is denied and dismissed and the judgment appealed from is affirmed. Mr. Justice Paolino participated in the decision but retired prior to its announcement.

Conclusion For the reasons stated herein, we affirm in part and reverse in part the judgment of the Superior Court. The record shall be remanded to the Superior Court for further proceedings on the plaintiffs’ breach of contract claim.

Assuming that plaintiff did have such standing, we conclude that the behavior complained of does not meet the definition of “ ‘[u]nfair methods of competition and unfair or deceptive acts or practices’ ” set forth in § 6-13.1-1(5) of the act.

Knowingly act, use, or employ any deceptive act or practice, fraud, false pretense, false promises, or misrepresentation or to conceal, suppress, or omit any material fact in connection with the sale or advertisement of any merchandise or the solicitation of contributions for charitable purposes, regardless of whether any person has in fact been misled, deceived, or damaged thereby;

It is a deceptive act or practice, within the meaning of § 37-24-6 , for any seller to include in any door to door contract or receipt any confession of judgment or any waiver of any of the rights to which the buyer is entitled under this chapter including specifically his right to cancel the sale in accordance with the provisions of this chapter.

While SDCL Chapter 37-24 obviously assists consumers seeking relief as victims of deceptive trade practices, the broad statutory language includes more than only consumers. The statute provides, “[a]ny person who claims to have been adversely affected by any act or a practice declared to be unlawful by § 37-24-6 shall be permitted to bring a civil action for the recovery of actual damages suffered as a result of such act or practice.”

In this chapter, unless the context otherwise requires, "door to door sale" means, except as provided by § 37-24-5.2 , any sale, lease, or rental of goods or services with a purchase price of twenty-five dollars or more, whether under single or multiple contracts, in which the seller or his representative personally solicits the sale, including those in response to or following an invitation by the buyer, and the buyer's agreement or offer to purchase is made at a place other than the place of business of the seller.

The term "door to door sale" shall not include any transaction: (1) Made pursuant to prior negotiations in the course of a visit by the buyer to a retail business establishment having a fixed permanent location where the goods are exhibited or the services are offered for sale on a continuing basis; or (2) In which the consumer is accorded the right of rescission by the provisions of the Consumer Credit Protection Act (15 U.S.C. 1635); or (3) In which the buyer has initiated the contact and the goods or services are needed to meet a bona fide immediate personal emergency of the buyer, and the buyer furnishes the seller with a separate dated and signed personal statement in the buyer's handwriting describing the situation requiring immediate remedy and expressly acknowledging and waiving the right to cancel the sale within three business days; or (4) Conducted and consummated entirely by mail or telephone, and without any other contact between the buyer and the seller or its representative prior to delivery of the goods or performance of the services; or (5) In which the buyer has initiated the contact and specifically requested the seller to visit his home for the purpose of repairing or performing maintenance upon the buyer's personal property. If in the course of such a visit, the seller sells the buyer the right to receive additional services or goods other than replacement parts necessarily used in performing the maintenance or in making the repairs, the sale of those additional goods or services would not fall within this exclusion; or (6) Pertaining to the sale or rental of real property, to the sale of insurance or to the sale of securities or commodities by a broker-dealer registered with the Division of Insurance, Department of Labor and Regulation; or (7) Pertaining to the sale, lease or repair of motor vehicles, metal buildings, farm machinery or implements, or mobile homes, by a dealer having a fixed permanent location and place of business in South Dakota where such goods and services are offered on a continuing basis.

A supplier that engages in a deceptive act or practice in connection with a consumer transaction violates this chapter, whether the deceptive act or practice occurs before, during, or after the transaction. Without limiting the scope of Subsection (1) , a supplier commits a deceptive act or practice if the supplier:

includes in any contract, receipt, or other written documentation of a consumer transaction, or any addendum to any contract, receipt, or other written documentation of a consumer transaction, any confession of judgment or any waiver of any of the rights to which a consumer is entitled under this chapter;

Any waiver by a consumer of rights under this chapter is void. A consumer may bring an action in a court with jurisdiction under Title 78A, Judiciary and Judicial Administration, to enforce the consumer's rights under this chapter.

This chapter shall not be construed as imposing any liability on an authorized dealer or lessor or as creating a cause of action by a consumer against a dealer or lessor, except regarding any express warranties made by the dealer or lessor apart from the manufacturer's warranties.

Nothing in this chapter shall limit or impair the rights or remedies which are otherwise available to a consumer under any other provision of law.

"Consumer transaction" means a sale, lease, assignment, award by chance, or other written or oral transfer or disposition of goods, services, or other property, both tangible and intangible (except securities and insurance) to, or apparently to, a person for: primarily personal, family, or household purposes; or purposes that relate to a business opportunity that requires: expenditure of money or property by the person described in Subsection (2)(a) ; and the person described in Subsection (2)(a) to perform personal services on a continuing basis and in which the person described in Subsection (2)(a) has not been previously engaged. "Consumer transaction" includes: any of the following with respect to a transfer or disposition described in Subsection (2)(a) : an offer; a solicitation; an agreement; or performance of an agreement; or a charitable solicitation.

"Supplier" means a seller, lessor, assignor, offeror, broker, or other person who regularly solicits, engages in, or enforces consumer transactions, whether or not the person deals directly with the consumer.

Any person who suffers loss as the result of a violation of this chapter shall be entitled to initiate an action to recover actual damages, or $500, whichever is greater. If the trier of fact finds that the violation was willful, it may increase damages to an amount not exceeding three times the actual damages sustained, or $1,000, whichever is greater.

Notwithstanding any other provision of law to the contrary, in addition to any damages awarded, such person also may be awarded reasonable attorneys' fees and court costs.

Nothing in this chapter shall apply to: 1. Any aspect of a consumer transaction which aspect is authorized under laws or regulations of the Commonwealth or the United States, or the formal advisory opinions of any regulatory body or official of the Commonwealth or the United States. 2. Acts done by the publisher, owner, agent, or employee of a newspaper, periodical, or radio or television station, or other advertising media such as outdoor advertising and advertising agencies, in the publication or dissemination of an advertisement in violation of § 59.1-200 , unless it be proved that such person knew that the advertisement was of a character prohibited by § 59.1-200 . 3. Those aspects of a consumer transaction that are regulated by the Federal Consumer Credit Protection Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1601 et seq. 4. Banks, savings institutions, credit unions, small loan companies, public service corporations, mortgage lenders as defined in § 6.2-1600 , broker-dealers as defined in § 13.1-501 , gas suppliers as defined in subsection E of § 56-235.8 , and insurance companies regulated and supervised by the State Corporation Commission or a comparable federal regulating body.

Any manufacturer's exclusion or limitation of the implied warranties or consumer remedies prescribed by this chapter shall be deemed void.

13. Using in any contract or lease any liquidated damage clause, penalty clause, or waiver of defense, or attempting to collect any liquidated damages or penalties under any clause, waiver, damages, or penalties that are void or unenforceable under any otherwise applicable laws of the Commonwealth, or under federal statutes or regulations;

Any person who accepts a cure offer under this chapter may not initiate or maintain any other or additional action based on any cause of action arising under any other statute or common law theory if such other action is substantially based on the same allegations of fact on which the action initiated under this chapter is based.

C. No cure offer shall be admissible in any proceeding initiated under this section, unless the cure offer is delivered by a supplier to the person claiming loss or to any attorney representing such person, prior to the filing of the supplier's initial responsive pleading in such proceeding. If the cure offer is timely delivered by the supplier, then the supplier may introduce the cure offer into evidence at trial. The supplier shall not be liable for such person's attorneys' fees and court costs incurred following delivery of the cure offer unless the actual damages found to have been sustained and awarded, without consideration of attorneys' fees and court costs, exceed the value of the cure offer.

B. Any purported waiver of rights to legal action or arbitration by a consumer within an assistive device purchase agreement shall be deemed void.

This section has more than one version with varying effective dates. Scroll down to see all versions. § 59.1-200 . (Effective until October 1, 2026) Prohibited practices.

C. In connection with any consumer transaction covered by subsection A, any provision in an agreement between the supplier of such services and the owner of such residential real property that requires the owner to submit to mandatory arbitration shall be null and void, and notwithstanding any such provisions, the owner of such residential real property shall have the rights and remedies under this chapter.

B. Nothing in this section shall be construed to invalidate or make unenforceable any contract or lease solely by reason of the failure of such contract or lease to comply with any other law of the Commonwealth or any federal statute or regulation, to the extent such other law, statute, or regulation provides that a violation of such law, statute, or regulation shall not invalidate or make unenforceable such contract or lease.

A. Any individual action pursuant to § 59.1-204 for which the right to bring such action first accrues on or after July 1, 1995, shall be commenced within two years after such accrual. The cause of action shall accrue as provided in § 8.01-230

In any case arising under this chapter, no liability shall be imposed upon a supplier who shows by a preponderance of the evidence that (i) the act or practice alleged to be in violation of § 59.1-200 or 59.1-200.1 was an act or practice of the manufacturer or distributor to the supplier over which the supplier had no control or (ii) the alleged violation resulted from a bona fide error notwithstanding the maintenance of procedures reasonably adopted to avoid a violation; however, nothing in this section shall prevent the court from ordering restitution and payment of reasonable attorney's fees and court costs pursuant to § 59.1-204 B to individuals aggrieved as a result of an unintentional violation of this chapter.

Unfair methods of competition and unfair or deceptive acts or practices in the conduct of any trade or commerce are hereby declared unlawful.

Any person who is injured in his or her business or property by a violation of RCW 19.86.020, 19.86.030, 19.86.040, 19.86.050, or 19.86.060, or any person so injured because he or she refuses to accede to a proposal for an arrangement which, if consummated, would be in violation of RCW 19.86.030, 19.86.040, 19.86.050, or 19.86.060, may bring a civil action in superior court to enjoin further violations, to recover the actual damages sustained by him or her, or both, together with the costs of the suit, including a reasonable attorney's fee. In addition, the court may, in its discretion, increase the award of damages up to an amount not to exceed three times the actual damages sustained: PROVIDED, That such increased damage award for violation of RCW 19.86.020 may not exceed twenty-five thousand dollars: PROVIDED FURTHER, That such person may bring a civil action in the district court to recover his or her actual damages, except for damages which exceed the amount specified in RCW 3.66.020, and the costs of the suit, including reasonable attorney's fees. The district court may, in its discretion, increase the award of damages to an amount not more than three times the actual damages sustained, but such increased damage award shall not exceed twenty-five thousand dollars. For the purpose of this section, "person" includes the counties, municipalities, and all political subdivisions of this state.

Although forum selection clauses are prima facie valid, a forum selection clause may be invalid if it violates the public policy of this state. A decision regarding the enforceability of a forum selection clause is evaluated for an abuse of discretion. If a forum selection clause precludes class actions and thereby significantly impairs Washington citizens’ ability to seek relief under the CPA for small-value claims, the clause violates the public policy underlying the CPA’s dual enforcement scheme expressed in the attorney general and private rights of action under the act. Because AOL’s forum selection clause precludes class actions for small-value CPA claims and there is no feasible alternative *843 avenue for seeking relief on such claims, the forum selection clause is invalid and unenforceable and dismissal was an abuse of discretion. We affirm the Court of Appeals.

The trial court dismissed the action on the basis that the forum selection *829 clause requires suit to be brought in Virginia. On appeal, the Court of Appeals reversed, holding that the forum selection clause is unenforceable because the selected forum does not permit class suits, thus violating public policy underlying the CPA. We affirm the Court of Appeals, but on narrower grounds.

We affirm the Court of Appeals’ holding that the forum selection clause in the AOL contract at issue is unenforceable on public policy grounds if the lack of a class action procedure leaves the plaintiff with no feasible avenue for seeking relief for violations of the CPA. Thus, for example, where the value of an individual claim is significant or the absence of a class action option would not, when viewed objectively, be likely to deter an individual action, public policy does not defeat a forum selection clause.

(1) [A] forum-selection clause is presumptively valid and enforceable and the party resisting it has the burden of demonstrating that it is unreasonable, (2) a court may deny enforcement of such a clause upon a clear showing that, in the particular circumstance, enforcement would be unreasonable, and (3) the clause may be found to be unreasonable if (i) it was induced by fraud or overreaching, (ii) the contractually selected forum is so unfair and inconvenient as, for all practical purposes, to deprive the plaintiff of a remedy or of its day in court, or (iii) enforcement would contravene a strong public policy of the State where the action is filed. Gilman v. Wheat, First Sec., Inc., 345 Md. 361, 378 , 692 A.2d 454 (1997) (discussing Bremen, Carnival Cruise Lines, and their progeny). *835 ¶17 We agree with this analysis, which is generally in agreement with statements in this state’s appellate decisions.

Application—2009 c 371: "This act applies to all causes of action that accrue on or after July 26, 2009." [ 2009 c 371 s 3.]

To this end this act shall be liberally construed that its beneficial purposes may be served. It is, however, the intent of the legislature that this act shall not be construed to prohibit acts or practices which are reasonable in relation to the development and preservation of business or which are not injurious to the public interest, nor be construed to authorize those acts or practices which unreasonably restrain trade or are unreasonable per se. [ 1985 c 401 s 1; 1983 c 288 s 4; 1983 c 3 s 25; 1961 c 216 s 20.]

AOL points out, however, that unlike California’s consumer protection law, which contains an antiwaiver provision applying to class actions, this state’s CPA does not contain an antiwaiver provision. We do not believe that the absence of an express class action antiwaiver provision in the CPA undercuts the public policy expressed in the dual enforcement scheme enacted by the legislature.

Except as otherwise provided in chs. 421 to 427 , a customer may not waive or agree to forego rights or benefits under chs. 421 to 427 .

A settlement in which the customer waives or agrees to forego rights or benefits under chs. 421 to 427 is invalid if the court as a matter of law finds the settlement to be unconscionable at the time it was made.

an advertisement, announcement, statement or representation of any kind to the public relating to such purchase, sale, hire, use or lease of such real estate, merchandise, securities, service or employment or to the terms or conditions thereof, which advertisement, announcement, statement or representation contains any assertion, representation or statement of fact which is untrue, deceptive or misleading.

This section does not apply to the owner, publisher, printer, agent or employee of a newspaper or other publication, periodical or circular, or of a radio or television station, who in good faith and without knowledge of the falsity or deceptive character thereof, publishes, causes to be published or takes part in the publication of such advertisement.

(a) This section does not apply to the insurance business. 100.18(12)(b) (b) This section does not apply to a person licensed as a broker or salesperson under s. 452.09 while that person is engaged in real estate practice, as defined in s. 452.01 (6) ,

A claim by a customer against a merchant for an excess charge, other violation of chs. 421 to 427 or civil penalty, or a claim against a customer for default or breach of a duty imposed by chs. 421 to 427 , if disputed in good faith, may be settled by agreement.

In this regard the court may consider the competence of the customer as measured by his or her education, ability to speak and read the language of the contract, and his or her prior consumer experience; any deception or coercion practiced upon the customer; the nature and extent of the legal advice received by the customer; and the value of the consideration.

No person, firm, corporation or association, or agent or employee thereof, with intent to sell, distribute, increase the consumption of or in any wise dispose of any real estate, merchandise, securities, employment, service, or anything offered by such person, firm, corporation or association, or agent or employee thereof, directly or indirectly, to the public for sale, hire, use or other distribution, or with intent to induce the public in any manner to enter into any contract or obligation relating to the purchase, sale, hire, use or lease of any real estate, merchandise, securities, employment or service, shall make, publish, disseminate, circulate, or place before the public, or cause, directly or indirectly, to be made, published, disseminated, circulated, or placed before the public, in this state, in a newspaper, magazine or other publication, or in the form of a book, notice, handbill, poster, bill, circular, pamphlet, letter, sign, placard, card, label, or over any radio or television station, or in any other way similar or dissimilar to the foregoing,

unless that person has directly made, published, disseminated, circulated or placed before the public an assertion, representation or statement of fact with the knowledge that the assertion, representation or statement of fact is untrue, deceptive or misleading.

No action may be commenced under this section more than 3 years after the occurrence of the unlawful act or practice which is the subject of the action.

Concepcion's holding is clear: the FAA preempts any state law that classifies an arbitration agreement as unconscionable, and therefore unenforceable, simply because the agreement prohibits an individual from proceeding as a member of a class. Accordingly, under Concepcion, the waiver of classwide proceedings *483 in Estes's arbitration agreement with Cottonwood does not render the agreement substantively unconscionable.