Will a Maine court enforce this clause capping or excluding our liability for our own negligence?
Yes, but only if it says so in terms. Doyle v. Bowdoin College holds that "[c]ourts have traditionally disfavored contractual exclusions of negligence liability and have exercised a heightened degree of judicial scrutiny when interpreting contractual language which allegedly exempts a party from liability for his own negligence", and struck two forms that said the college would "accept no responsibility" because "[t]he text of the executed documents falls far short of the requirement that releases absolving a defendant of liability for his own negligence must expressly spell out 'with the greatest particularity' the intention of the parties contractually to extinguish negligence liability"; the appeal was denied and the judgment affirmed. Hardy v. St. Clair shows what does satisfy the standard: an all-capitals release covering "ALL LIABILITY ... WHETHER CAUSED BY THE NEGLIGENCE OF THE RELEASEES OR OTHERWISE", extending "to all acts of negligence" and "as broad and inclusive as is permitted by the laws", of which the Court held "[e]ven when strictly construed against Wiscasset Raceway, the Agreement 'expressly spell[s] out with the greatest particularity the intention of the parties contractually to extinguish negligence liability'" and barred the signer's own negligence claim. Lloyd v. Sugarloaf Mountain Corp. is to the same effect: "[w]e conclude that the membership release, with its express reference to negligence, sufficiently spells out the parties' intent to extinguish the negligence liability of NORBA and Sugarloaf." The Court also records the construction rule: "[w]e strictly construe such releases against the party seeking immunity from liability."
The trap
Maine has never decided the question most limitation clauses actually turn on. Doyle's own footnote says: "we have no occasion to reach the further issue whether contractual provisions which relieve a party from liability for that party's own negligence would be unenforceable and void as contravening public policy", so this rule gives you the drafting standard, not a public-policy ceiling. None of the decisions read for this answer reaches gross negligence, wilful misconduct, or a cap on economic loss in a commercial contract; the Maine decisions located that speak of limiting liability at all are insurance-policy limits and early common-carrier and telegraph cases, not modern commercial caps, so treat the point as unsettled rather than as settled either way. Three limits the authorities cited here DO establish. First, a parent cannot sign a minor's claim away: "[t]his Court has held that a parent, or guardian, cannot release the child's or ward's, cause of action." Second, a release does not reach a third party's independent claim: in Hardy the same all-capitals release that barred the signer's claim "failed to bar Carie's consortium claim", because "[a] consortium claim is an independent cause of action". Third, in a sale of consumer goods or services 11 M.R.S. § 2-316(5) makes any attempt to modify the consumer's remedies for breach of the implied warranties unenforceable, and the same subsection defines consumer goods and services as those "used or bought primarily for personal, family or household purposes", with one express exception, that a "seller or manufacturer of a motor vehicle may indicate that, to the extent permitted by law, the seller or manufacturer is excluding or modifying implied warranties".
14 authorities
The words that state the rule
Courts have traditionally disfavored contractual exclusions of negligence liability and have exercised a heightened degree of judicial scrutiny when interpreting contractual language which allegedly exempts a party from liability for his own negligence.
The words that state the rule
The text of the executed documents falls far short of the requirement that releases absolving a defendant of liability for his own negligence must expressly spell out “with the greatest particularity” the intention of the parties contractually to extinguish negligence liability.
The words that state the rule
we have no occasion to reach the further issue whether contractual provisions which relieve a party from liability for that party’s own negligence would be unenforceable and void as contravening public policy.
The words that state the rule
This Court has held that a parent, or guardian, cannot release the child’s or ward’s, cause of action.
The words that state the rule
The entry is: Appeal denied. Judgment affirmed. McKUSICK, C. J., and DELAHANTY, J., did not sit.
The words that state the rule
Accordingly, a release must “expressly spell out with the greatest particularity the intention of the parties contractually to extinguish negligence liability.”
The words that state the rule
HEREBY RELEASES, WAIVES, DISCHARGES AND COVENANTS NOT TO SUE [Wiscasset Raceway] FROM ALL LIABILITY [sic] ... FOR ANY AND ALL LOSS OR DAMAGE, AND ANY CLAIM OR DEMANDS THEREFOR ON ACCOUNT OF INJURY TO THE PERSON OR PROPERTY ... ARISING OUT OF OR RELATED TO THE EVENT(S), WHETHER CAUSED BY THE NEGLIGENCE OF THE RELEASEES OR OTHERWISE. *370 4. HEREBY ASSUMES FULL RESPONSIBILITY FOR ANY RISK OF BODILY INJURY, DEATH OR PROPERTY DAMAGE arising out of or related to the EVENT(S) whether caused by the NEGLIGENCE OF RELEASEES or otherwise. 6. HEREBY agrees that this Release and Waiver of Liability, Assumption of Risk and Indemnity Agreement extends to all acts of negligence by the Releas-ees ... and is intended to be as broad and inclusive as is permitted by the laws
The words that state the rule
Even when strictly construed against Wiscasset Raceway, the Agreement “expressly spell[s] out with the greatest particularity the intention of the parties contractually to extinguish negligence liability.” Doyle, 403 A.2d at 1207 (internal quotations omitted). In light of the plain language of the Agreement, the trial court did not err in concluding that the Agreement barred Brent’s negligence claim.
The words that state the rule
Each claim is independent of the other and the pre- or post-injury release of one spouse’s claim does not bar the other spouse’s claim. A consortium claim is an independent cause ■ of action, and, therefore, the trial court committed no error in ruling that the Agreement failed to bar Carie’s consortium claim. 6 The entry is: Judgment affirmed.
The words that state the rule
In order for the releases signed by Lloyd to absolve Sugarloaf and NORBA of their own negligence, they must "expressly spell out with the greatest particularity the intention of the parties contractually to extinguish negligence liability." Doyle v. Bowdoin Coll., 403 A.2d 1206, 1208 (Me.1979) (internal quotation marks omitted). We strictly construe such releases against the party seeking immunity from liability.
The words that state the rule
We conclude that the membership release, with its express reference to negligence, sufficiently spells out the parties' intent to extinguish the negligence liability of NORBA and Sugarloaf.
- statute11 M.R.S. § 2-316enactment date not established
The words that state the rule
The provisions of subsections (2) , (3) and (4) do not apply to sales of consumer goods or services. Any language, oral or written, used by a seller or manufacturer of consumer goods and services that attempts to exclude or modify any implied warranties of merchantability and fitness for a particular purpose or to exclude or modify the consumer's remedies for breach of those warranties is unenforceable.
- statute11 M.R.S. § 2-316enactment date not established
The words that state the rule
A seller or manufacturer of a motor vehicle may indicate that, to the extent permitted by law, the seller or manufacturer is excluding or modifying implied warranties. Any language, oral or written, used by a prior seller or manufacturer of consumer goods and services that attempts to exclude or modify the warranty or reimbursement remedy of a retail seller of consumer goods and services who provides reimbursement or return to a consumer as required to honor an implied warranty of merchantability due to a defect for which that prior seller or manufacturer is liable under section 2‑314 or 2‑315 is unenforceable. Consumer goods and services are those new or used goods and services, including mobile homes, that are used or bought primarily for personal, family or household purposes.
The words that state the rule
I fully understand that Bowdoin College, its employees or servants will accept no responsibility for or on account of any injury or damage sustained by Brian arising out of the activities of the said THE CLINIC.
“Defective” means that reading found something to correct. What you are reading is the rule as it stands after that reading.