Does this Kansas agreement have to be in writing?
For the listed categories, yes. No action shall be brought to charge a party upon any special promise to answer for the debt, default or miscarriage of another person; to charge an executor or administrator upon a special promise to answer damages out of his own estate; to charge any person upon an agreement made upon consideration of marriage; upon any contract for the sale of lands, tenements or hereditaments, or any interest in or concerning them; or upon any agreement that is not to be performed within the space of one year from the making of it, unless the agreement, or some memorandum or note of it, is in writing and signed by the party to be charged or by some other person lawfully authorized by him or her in writing (K.S.A. 33-106). Leases, estates or interests of, in or out of lands exceeding one year in duration must be assigned or granted by deed or note in writing signed by the assigning or granting party or their agent authorized in writing, or by act and operation of law (K.S.A. 33-105). The one-year clause is far narrower than its words. The syllabus Monarch Build v. DLH Holdings wrote for its own opinion states that "[i]f the performance of the agreement is possible within the time of one year, then K.S.A. 33-106 does not apply", and the opinion records that the Supreme Court has found the section applies "[o]nly when the terms of the alleged agreement demonstrate that it is impossible in both fact and law for the parties to complete the agreement within one year" and that "Contracts of uncertain duration are simply excluded." That construction is the Supreme Court's own, in Ed Dewitte Ins. Agency v. Fin. Assocs. Midwest: "Under the statute of frauds, courts narrowly construe oral contracts that purportedly extend beyond one year." The same decision supplies the exception a drafter is likeliest to meet - "When one party to an oral agreement has completed his or her performance, the one-year provision of the statute of frauds does not prevent enforcement of the promises of other parties. The full-performance exception requires only complete performance by one party." - adopting Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 130 and reversing both courts below. For a sale of goods of $500 or more, the contract is not enforceable by way of action or defense unless there is some writing sufficient to indicate a contract for sale has been made and signed by the party against whom enforcement is sought, and it is not enforceable beyond the quantity of goods shown in that writing (K.S.A. 84-2-201(1)).
The trap
Three things the drafter should not assume. First, that a long job is a one-year agreement: the question is not whether the work in fact ran past a year but whether completion within a year was possible when the agreement was reached, and it is the party asserting the statute of frauds who has "the burden to prove that it was impossible for the contract to be completed within a year's time". In Monarch Build they "failed to do so", and a design and construction agreement the parties never signed was enforced. K.S.A. 33-106 requires that the agent's authority itself be in writing, "or some other person thereunto by him or her lawfully authorized in writing", so an oral authorisation to sign a land contract or a suretyship undertaking does not satisfy the section. And the quantity term in a sale-of-goods writing is a ceiling: under K.S.A. 84-2-201(1) the writing is not insufficient because it omits or misstates a term agreed upon, but the contract is not enforceable beyond the quantity shown. The article 2 exceptions in subsection (3) are narrow and specific: specially manufactured goods on which the seller has substantially begun manufacture or made commitments for procurement; an admission in the pleading, testimony or otherwise in court by the party against whom enforcement is sought, and then only up to the quantity admitted; and goods for which payment has been made and accepted or which have been received and accepted. None of this is the end of the road for an unwritten agreement. Full performance by ONE party takes it out of K.S.A. 33-106 altogether, and the failure of separate unjust-enrichment and promissory-estoppel claims does not change that, because a party who fully performs "may sue upon the contract in a court of law; he is not compelled to abandon the contract and sue in equity or upon a quantum meruit."
13 authorities
- statuteK.S.A. 33-106enactment date not established
The words that state the rule
No action shall be brought whereby to charge a party upon any special promise to answer for the debt, default or miscarriage of another person; or to charge any executor or administrator upon any special promise to answer damages out of his own estate; or to charge any person upon any agreement made upon consideration of marriage; or upon any contract for the sale of lands, tenements, or hereditaments, or any interest in or concerning them; or upon any agreement that is not to be performed within the space of one year from the making thereof, unless the agreement upon which such action shall be brought, or some memorandum or note thereof, shall be in writing and signed by the party to be charged therewith, or some other person thereunto by him or her lawfully authorized in writing.
- statuteK.S.A. 33-105enactment date not established
The words that state the rule
No leases, estates or interests of, in or out of lands, exceeding one year in duration, shall at any time hereafter be assigned or granted, unless it be by deed or note, in writing, signed by the party so assigning or granting the same, or their agents thereunto lawfully authorized by writing, or by act and operation of law.
- statuteK.S.A. 84-2-201enactment date not established
The words that state the rule
Except as otherwise provided in this section a contract for the sale of goods for the price of $500 or more is not enforceable by way of action or defense unless there is some writing sufficient to indicate that a contract for sale has been made between the parties and signed by the party against whom enforcement is sought or by his authorized agent or broker. A writing is not insufficient because it omits or incorrectly states a term agreed upon but the contract is not enforceable under this paragraph beyond the quantity of goods shown in such writing.
- statuteK.S.A. 84-2-201enactment date not established
The words that state the rule
Between merchants if within a reasonable time a writing in confirmation of the contract and sufficient against the sender is received and the party receiving it has reason to know its contents, it satisfies the requirements of subsection (1) against such party unless written notice of objection to its contents is given within ten days after it is received.
- statuteK.S.A. 84-2-201enactment date not established
The words that state the rule
(3) A contract which does not satisfy the requirements of subsection (1) but which is valid in other respects is enforceable (a) if the goods are to be specially manufactured for the buyer and are not suitable for sale to others in the ordinary course of the seller's business and the seller, before notice of repudiation is received and under circumstances which reasonably indicate that the goods are for the buyer, has made either a substantial beginning of their manufacture or commitments for their procurement; or (b) if the party against whom enforcement is sought admits in his pleading, testimony or otherwise in court that a contract for sale was made, but the contract is not enforceable under this provision beyond the quantity of goods admitted; or (c) with respect to goods for which payment has been made and accepted or which have been received and accepted (section 84-2-606).
The words that state the rule
SYLLABUS BY THE COURT 1. Under K.S.A. 33-106, the statute of frauds prohibits the filing of an action to enforce an agreement that is not to be performed within one year unless it is in writing and signed by the party to be charged. 2. If the performance of the agreement is possible within the time of one year, then K.S.A. 33-106 does not apply.
The words that state the rule
The Kansas Supreme Court has found that K.S.A. 33-106 applies "[o]nly when the terms of the alleged agreement demonstrate that it is impossible in both fact and law for the parties to complete the agreement within one year." Ed DeWitte Ins. Agency v. Financial Assocs. Midwest, 308 Kan. 1065, Syl. ¶ 2, 427 P.3d 25 (2018).
The words that state the rule
In considering this issue, the court found that "'the enforceability of a contract under the one-year provision does not turn on the actual course of subsequent events, nor on the expectations of the parties as to the probabilities. Contracts of uncertain duration are simply excluded.'" 231 Kan. at 59 (citing Restatement [Second] of Contracts § 130, comment a [1981]). As a result, K.S.A. 33-106 applies only to those agreements where performance cannot be completed within one year. 231 Kan. at 60.
The words that state the rule
Moreover, it was the appellants who had the burden to prove that it was impossible for the contract to be completed within a year's time, but they failed to do so. Consequently, based on our review of the record, we conclude that there was substantial competent evidence presented at trial to support the district court's 25 determination that K.S.A. 33-106 does not bar the claims asserted by Monarch Build in this case.
- case427 P.3d 25Ed Dewitte Ins. Agency, Inc. v. Fin. Assocs. Midwest, Inc.Kan.decided 2018read it at the source ↗
The words that state the rule
SYLLABUS BY THE COURT 1. The Legislature's failure to change a law after it has received specific judicial construction for a long period of time can be construed as legislative approval of the court's interpretation. 2. Under the statute of frauds, courts narrowly construe oral contracts that purportedly extend beyond one year. Only when the terms of the alleged agreement demonstrate that it is impossible in both fact and law for the parties to complete the agreement within one year will the agreement come within the statute of frauds. 3. When one party to an oral agreement has completed his or her performance, the one-year provision of the statute of frauds does not prevent enforcement of the promises of other parties. The full-performance exception requires only complete performance by one party.
- case427 P.3d 25Ed Dewitte Ins. Agency, Inc. v. Fin. Assocs. Midwest, Inc.Kan.decided 2018read it at the source ↗
The words that state the rule
This appeal presents us with an opportunity to explore the rich history of the statute of frauds and the full-performance exception. We do so, and, in the end, we adopt the rule set forth in Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 130 (1981), holding that full performance by one party alone is sufficient to remove the agreement from the statute. As a result, we reverse the Court of Appeals and district court and remand this case to the district court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
- case427 P.3d 25Ed Dewitte Ins. Agency, Inc. v. Fin. Assocs. Midwest, Inc.Kan.decided 2018read it at the source ↗
The words that state the rule
We side with these courts. The full-performance exception merely requires the full performance of one party. Simply because the policyholders may choose not to renew their policies places no additional obligation on the area managers—they have fully performed their end of the bargain. To this end, we formally adopt the full performance exception provided in §130 of the Restatement (Second) of Contracts.
- case427 P.3d 25Ed Dewitte Ins. Agency, Inc. v. Fin. Assocs. Midwest, Inc.Kan.decided 2018read it at the source ↗
The words that state the rule
Next, Blue Cross and Financial Associates contend that because the district court denied the area managers' separate claims of unjust enrichment and promissory estoppel, we should not apply the full-performance exception. But a party who fully performs "may sue upon the contract in a court of law; he is not compelled to abandon the contract and sue in equity or upon a quantum meruit.
“Defective” means that reading found something to correct. What you are reading is the rule as it stands after that reading.