Limitations period

The following must be commenced within six years: (1) Actions for any trespass to person or liberty, such as false imprisonment or assault and battery; (2) Actions for any trespass to real or personal property; (3) Actions for the detention or conversion of personal property; (4) Actions founded on promises in writing not under seal; (5) Actions for the recovery of money upon a loan, upon a stated or liquidated account or for arrears of rent due upon a parol demise; (6) Actions for the use and occupation of land; (7) Motions and other actions against the sureties of any sheriff, coroner, constable, or any public officer and actions against the sureties of executors, administrators, or guardians for any nonfeasance, misfeasance, or malfeasance, whatsoever, of their principal, the time to be computed from the act done or omitted by their principal which fixes the liability of the surety; (8) Motions and other actions against attorneys-at-law for failure to pay over money of their clients or for neglect or omission of duty; and (9) Actions upon any simple contract or speciality not specifically enumerated in this section.

An action for breach of any contract for sale must be commenced within four years after the cause of action has accrued. By the original agreement the parties may reduce the period of limitation to not less than one year but may not extend it.

A cause of action accrues when the breach occurs, regardless of the aggrieved party’s lack of knowledge of the breach. A breach of warranty occurs when tender of delivery is made, except that where a warranty explicitly extends to future performance of the goods and discovery of the breach must await the time of such performance the cause of action accrues when the breach is or should have been discovered; however, a cause of action for damages for injury to the person in the case of consumer goods shall accrue when the injury occurs.

(3) Where an action commenced within the time limited by subsection (1) is so terminated as to leave available a remedy by another action for the same breach such other action may be commenced after the expiration of the time limited and within six months after the termination of the first action unless the termination resulted from voluntary discontinuance or from dismissal for failure or neglect to prosecute. (4) This section does not alter the law on tolling of the statute of limitations nor does it apply to causes of action which have accrued before midnight, December 31, 1966.

Except as may be otherwise provided by the Uniform Commercial Code, any agreement or stipulation, verbal or written, whereby the time for the commencement of any action is limited to a time less than that prescribed by law for the commencement of such action is void.

Unless the action is commenced within three years, a person may not bring an action upon a contract or liability, express or implied, except as provided in AS 09.10.040 , or as otherwise provided by law, or, except if the provisions of this section are waived by contract.

A person may not bring an action upon a judgment or decree of a court of the United States, or of a state or territory within the United States, and an action may not be brought upon a sealed instrument, unless the action is commenced within 10 years.

In our view, public policy bars enforcement of the clause at issue here because Holland America has failed to allege or show that enforcement of the clause is necessary to avoid prejudice.

It noted that the tour contract set a specific limitations period, barring all claims for personal injury unless the claimant provided notice to Holland America within six months of the alleged injury and filed suit within one year after the trip was completed.

Honoring the contract's choice of Washington law, the superior court upheld the limitations clause and dismissed Long's suit as untimely. We reverse. Because this case raises fundamental policy issues that are materially more interesting to Alaska than Washington, Alaska law applies. Under our law, the limitations clause was unenforceable without a showing of prejudice.

In analogous settings, we have recognized the need to preserve the policy balance of our time bar statutes against unlimited contractual revision. For example, in Johnson v. City of Fairbanks we invalidated a municipal ordinance that established a four month notice-of-claim requirement for tort suits, holding that it violated the "statewide legislative policy" of providing uniform limitation periods. 25 And in Alaska Emergy Authority v. Fairmont Insurance Co., we held that a filing limit imposed in an insurance policy was unenforceable absent an affirmative showing of prejudice to the insurer.

Because the record fails to establish prejudice to Holland America, we hold that it was error to grant summary judgment by enforcing the contractual limitations clause.

Within four years: (a) An action upon any contract, obligation or liability founded upon an instrument in writing, except as provided in Section 336a; provided, that the time within which any action for a money judgment for the balance due upon an obligation for the payment of which a deed of trust or mortgage with power of sale upon real property or any interest therein was given as security, following the exercise of the power of sale in such deed of trust or mortgage, may be brought shall not extend beyond three months after the time of sale under such deed of trust or mortgage.

No waiver shall bar a defense to any action that the action was not commenced within the time limited by this title unless the waiver is in writing and signed by the person obligated. No waiver executed prior to the expiration of the time limited for the commencement of the action by this title shall be effective for a period exceeding four years from the date of expiration of the time limited for commencement of the action by this title and no waiver executed after the expiration of such time shall be effective for a period exceeding four years from the date thereof, but any such waiver may be renewed for a further period of not exceeding four years from the expiration of the immediately preceding waiver. Such waivers may be made successively. The provisions of this section shall not be applicable to any acknowledgment, promise or any form of waiver which is in writing and signed by the person obligated and given to any county to secure repayment of indigent aid or the repayment of moneys fraudulently or illegally obtained from the county.

Within six years: (a) An action upon any bonds, notes, or debentures issued by any corporation or pursuant to permit of the Commissioner of Financial Protection and Innovation, or upon any coupons issued with the bonds, notes, or debentures, if those bonds, notes, or debentures shall have been issued to or held by the public. (b) An action upon any mortgage, trust deed, or other agreement pursuant to which the bonds, notes, or debentures were issued. This section does not apply to bonds or other evidences of indebtedness of a public district or corporation.

(c) An action based upon the rescission of a contract in writing. The time begins to run from the date upon which the facts that entitle the aggrieved party to rescind occurred. Where the ground for rescission is fraud or mistake, the time shall not begin to run until the discovery by the aggrieved party of the facts constituting the fraud or mistake. Where the ground for rescission is misrepresentation under Section 359 of the Insurance Code, the time shall not begin to run until the representation becomes false.

(d) When the period in which an action must be commenced under this section has run, a person shall not bring suit or initiate an arbitration or other legal proceeding to collect the debt. The period in which an action may be commenced under this section shall only be extended pursuant to Section 360.

No acknowledgment or promise is sufficient evidence of a new or continuing contract, by which to take the case out of the operation of this title, unless the same is contained in some writing, signed by the party to be charged thereby, provided that any payment on account of principal or interest due on a promissory note made by the party to be charged shall be deemed a sufficient acknowledgment or promise of a continuing contract to stop, from time to time as any such payment is made, the running of the time within which an action may be commenced upon the principal sum or upon any installment of principal or interest due on such note, and to start the running of a new period of time, but no such payment of itself shall revive a cause of action once barred.

Within two years: 1. An action upon a contract, obligation or liability not founded upon an instrument of writing, except as provided in Section 2725 of the Commercial Code or subdivision 2 of Section 337 of this code; or an action founded upon a contract, obligation or liability, evidenced by a certificate, or abstract or guaranty of title of real property, or by a policy of title insurance; provided, that the cause of action upon a contract, obligation or liability evidenced by a certificate, or abstract or guaranty of title of real property or policy of title insurance shall not be deemed to have accrued until the discovery of the loss or damage suffered by the aggrieved party thereunder.

(1) An action for breach of any contract for sale must be commenced within four years after the cause of action has accrued. By the original agreement the parties may reduce the period of limitation to not less than one year but may not extend it. (2) A cause of action accrues when the breach occurs, regardless of the aggrieved party’s lack of knowledge of the breach. A breach of warranty occurs when tender of delivery is made, except that where a warranty explicitly extends to future performance of the goods and discovery of the breach must await the time of such performance the cause of action accrues when the breach is or should have been discovered. (3) Where an action commenced within the time limited by subdivision (1) is so terminated as to leave available a remedy by another action for the same breach such other action may be commenced after the expiration of the time limited and within six months after the termination of the first action unless the termination resulted from voluntary discontinuance or from dismissal for failure or neglect to prosecute. (4) This section does not alter the law on tolling of the statute of limitations nor does it apply to causes of action which have accrued before this code becomes effective.

(b) An action to recover (1) upon a book account whether consisting of one or more entries; (2) upon an account stated based upon an account in writing, but the acknowledgment of the account stated need not be in writing; (3) a balance due upon a mutual, open and current account, the items of which are in writing; provided, however, that if an account stated is based upon an account of one item, the time shall begin to run from the date of the item, and if an account stated is based upon an account of more than one item, the time shall begin to run from the date of the last item.

It is settled that parties may agree, in an arbitration agreement or otherwise, to shorten the limitations period applicable to a claim. [Citations.] However, the shortened limitations period must be reasonable.

No action for an account, or on any simple or implied contract, or on any contract in writing, shall be brought but within six years after the right of action accrues, except as provided in subsection (b) of this section.

The provisions of this section shall not apply to actions upon judgments of any court of the United States or of any court of any state within the United States, or to any cause of action governed by article 2 of title 42a.

No action founded upon any express contract or agreement which is not reduced to writing, or of which some note or memorandum is not made in writing and signed by the party to be charged therewith or his agent, shall be brought but within three years after the right of action accrues. (b) This section shall not apply to causes of action governed by article 2 of title 42a.

An action under this section may not be brought more than three years after the occurrence of a violation of this chapter.

Any person legally incapable of bringing any such action at the accruing of the right of action may sue at any time within three years after becoming legally capable of bringing the action.

Since the plaintiff’s performance was alleged to have been completely executed, § 52-576 established the applicable limitation period.

If §§ 6005 [now § 52-576] and 6010 [now § 52-581] are to be construed to make a harmonious body of law, it is necessary to restrict the latter, as was suggested in Baker v. Lee . . . [ 52 Conn. 145 ], to executory contracts.

A contract is executory when neither party has fully performed its contractual obligations and is executed when one party has fully performed its contractual obligations.

It is well established, therefore, that the issue of whether a contract is oral is not dispositive of which statute applies. Thus, the defendant’s argument that § 52-581 automatically applies to the oral contract between the parties is incorrect. The determinative question is whether the contract was executed.

If any person, liable to an action by another, fraudulently conceals from him the existence of the cause of such action, such cause of action shall be deemed to accrue against such person so liable therefor at the time when the person entitled to sue thereon first discovers its existence.

In computing the time limited in the period of limitation prescribed under any provision of chapter 925 or this chapter, the time during which the party, against whom there may be any such cause of action, is without this state shall be excluded from the computation, except that the time so excluded shall not exceed seven years.

General Statutes § 42a-2-725 (1) provides in relevant part: “An action for breach of any contract for sale must be commenced within four years after the cause of action has accrued. . . .”

General Statutes § 42a-2-725 provides in relevant part: “(1) An action for breach of any contract for sale must be commenced within four years after the cause of action has accrued. . . .”

“[t]o determine whether a contract including both goods and services is governed by the [UCC], the court must determine whether the dominant factor or essence of the transaction is the sale of the materials or the services”

Therefore, we conclude that the court correctly determined that the contract was primarily one for services, not goods, and that determination was supported by the parties’ written agreement and their testimony at trial.11 Accordingly, the UCC does not govern the plaintiff’s action, and we reject the defendants’ first claim.

(c) Notwithstanding anything to the contrary in this chapter (other than subsection (b) of this section) or in § 2-725 of Title 6, an action based on a written contract, agreement or undertaking involving at least $100,000 may be brought within a period specified in such written contract, agreement or undertaking provided it is brought prior to the expiration of 20 years from the accruing of the cause of such action.

§ 2-725. Statute of limitations in contracts for sale. (1) An action for breach of any contract for sale must be commenced within 4 years after the cause of action has accrued. By the original agreement the parties may reduce the period of limitations to not less than one year but may not extend it.

§ 8106. Actions subject to 3-year limitation. (a) No action to recover damages for trespass, no action to regain possession of personal chattels, no action to recover damages for the detention of personal chattels, no action to recover a debt not evidenced by a record or by an instrument under seal, no action based on a detailed statement of the mutual demands in the nature of debit and credit between parties arising out of contractual or fiduciary relations, no action based on a promise, no action based on a statute, and no action to recover damages caused by an injury unaccompanied with force or resulting indirectly from the act of the defendant shall be brought after the expiration of 3 years from the accruing of the cause of such action; subject, however, to the provisions of §§ 8108-8110, 8119 and 8127 of this title.

(2) A cause of action accrues when the breach occurs, regardless of the aggrieved party’s lack of knowledge of the breach. A breach of warranty occurs when tender of delivery is made, except that where a warranty explicitly extends to future performance of the goods and discovery of the breach must await the time of such performance the cause of action accrues when the breach is or should have been discovered.

(3) Where an action commenced within the time limited by subsection (1) is so terminated as to leave available a remedy by another action for the same breach such other action may be commenced after the expiration of the time limited and within 6 months after the termination of the first action unless the termination resulted from voluntary discontinuance or from dismissal for failure or neglect to prosecute.

(b) Contractual limitations. — Notwithstanding any other provision of this section, a property insurance contract subject to subchapter III of Chapter 41 of Title 18: (1) May not require that an action for a claim made under the contract be filed less than 1 year from the date of the denial of the claim by the insurer; and (2) May permit an action for a claim made under the contract to be filed more than 1 year from the date of the denial of the claim by the insurer.

(4) This section does not alter the law on tolling of the statute of limitations nor does it apply to causes of action which have accrued before this subtitle becomes effective.

§ 8109. Bills and notes. When a cause of action arises from a promissory note, bill of exchange, or an acknowledgment under the hand of the party of a subsisting demand, the action may be commenced at any time within 6 years from the accruing of such cause of action.

§ 8108. Mutual running accounts. In the case of a mutual and running account between parties, the limitation, specified in § 8106 of this title, shall not begin to run while such account continues open and current.

(b) No action, whether in or based upon a contract (oral or written, sealed or unsealed), in tort, or otherwise, to recover damages or for indemnification or contribution for damages, resulting: (1) From any alleged deficiency in the construction or manner of construction of an improvement to real property and/or in the designing, planning, supervision and/or observation of any such construction or manner of construction; or (2) From any alleged injury to property, real, personal or mixed, arising out of any such alleged deficiency; or (3) From any alleged personal injuries arising out of any such alleged deficiency; or (4) From any alleged wrongful death arising out of any such alleged deficiency; or (5) From any alleged trespass arising out of any such alleged deficiency; or (6) From any alleged injury unaccompanied with force or resulting indirectly from any such alleged deficiency; shall be brought against any person performing or furnishing, or causing the performance or furnishing of, any such construction of such an improvement or against any person performing or furnishing, or causing the performing or furnishing of, any such designing, planning, supervision, and/or observation of any such construction or manner of construction of such an improvement, after the expiration of 6 years from whichever of the following dates shall be earliest: a. The date of purported completion of all the work called for by the contract as provided by the contract if such date has been agreed to in the contract itself; b. The date when the statute of limitations commences to run in relation to the particular phase or segment of work performed pursuant to the contract in which the alleged deficiency occurred, where such date for such phase or segment of work has been specifically provided for in the contract itself; c. The date when the statute of limitations commences to run in relation to the contract itself where such date has been specifically provided for in the contract itself; d. The date when payment in full has been received by the person against whom the action is brought for the particular phase of such construction or for the particular phase of such designing, planning, supervision, and/or observation of such construction or manner of such construction, as the case may be, in which such alleged deficiency occurred; e. The date the person against whom the action is brought has received final payment in full, under the contract for the construction or for the designing, planning, supervision, and/or observation of construction, as the case may be, called for by contract; f. The date when the construction of such an improvement as called for by the contract has been substantially completed; g. The date when an improvement has been accepted, as provided in the contract, by the owner or occupant thereof following the commencement of such construction; h. For alleged personal injuries also, the date upon which it is claimed that such alleged injuries were sustained; or after the period of limitations provided in the contract, if the contract provides such a period and if such period expires prior to the expiration of 2 years from whichever of the foregoing dates is earliest.

(c) Nothing in this section shall extend or lengthen, nor shall anything in this section be construed or interpreted as extending or lengthening, the period otherwise prescribed by the laws of this State for the bringing of any action covered by this section.

(a) As used in this section: (1) “Action” shall include actions at law or in equity, or otherwise, instituted and/or prosecuted by or on behalf of this State, any of its agencies, commissions, departments or political subdivisions, and by or on behalf of any other governmental subdivision, agency, department or body, as well as by or on behalf of private individuals, persons, parties, corporations, partnerships, associations and other entities. (2) “Construction” shall include construction, erection, building, alteration, reconstruction and destruction of improvements to real property. (3) “Contract” shall mean the prime or general contract between the general contractor, on the one hand, and the owner or agent of the owner of the real property upon which or to which the construction is to be performed or the owner or agent of the owner of the improvement to be constructed, on the other hand. (4) “Deficiency” shall include acts and actions performed and failures to act and omissions. (5) “Improvement” shall include buildings, highways, roads, streets, bridges, entrances and walkways of any type constructed thereon, and other structures affixed to and on land, as well as the land itself, except that such term shall not include buildings, entrances, walkways and structures used or intended to be used at the time of such construction primarily for residential purposes and uses.

(d) The limitations prescribed by this section shall not be available by way of a defense to any person in actual possession or actual control, as owner, tenant or otherwise, of such an improvement at the time when the alleged deficiency in such an improvement constitutes the proximate cause of the injury or death for which it is proposed to bring an action.

No action for recovery upon a claim for wages, salary, or overtime for work, labor, or personal services performed, or for damages (actual, compensatory, or punitive, liquidated or otherwise), or for interest or penalties resulting from the failure to pay any such claim, or for any other benefits arising from such work, labor, or personal services performed or in connection with any such action, shall be brought after the expiration of 2 years from the accruing of the cause of action on which such action is based.

If at the time when a cause of action accrues against any person, such person is out of the State, the action may be commenced, within the time limited therefor in this chapter, after such person comes into the State in such manner that by reasonable diligence, such person may be served with process. If, after a cause of action shall have accrued against any person, such person departs from and resides or remains out of the State, the time of such person’s absence until such person shall have returned into the State in the manner provided in this section, shall not be taken as any part of the time limited for the commencement of the action.

(a) If in any action duly commenced within the time limited therefor in this chapter, the writ fails of a sufficient service or return by any unavoidable accident, or by any default or neglect of the officer to whom it is committed; or if the writ is abated, or the action otherwise avoided or defeated by the death of any party thereto, or for any matter of form; or if after a verdict for the plaintiff, the judgment shall not be given for the plaintiff because of some error appearing on the face of the record which vitiates the proceedings; or if a judgment for the plaintiff is reversed on appeal or a writ of error; a new action may be commenced, for the same cause of action, at any time within 1 year after the abatement or other determination of the original action, or after the reversal of the judgment therein. (b) If in the original action, the benefit of this chapter is pleaded, and a verdict upon such defense is found for the plaintiff, such verdict shall be conclusive evidence that the original action was commenced within the time limited therefor.

Where a cause of action arises outside of this State, an action cannot be brought in a court of this State to enforce such cause of action after the expiration of whichever is shorter, the time limited by the law of this State, or the time limited by the law of the state or country where the cause of action arose, for bringing an action upon such cause of action. Where the cause of action originally accrued in favor of a person who at the time of such accrual was a resident of this State, the time limited by the law of this State shall apply.

95.03 Contracts shortening time.—Any provision in a contract fixing the period of time within which an action arising out of the contract may be begun at a time less than that provided by the applicable statute of limitations is void.

(2) WITHIN FIVE YEARS.—(a) An action on a judgment or decree of any court, not of record, of this state or any court of the United States, any other state or territory in the United States, or a foreign country. (b) A legal or equitable action on a contract, obligation, or liability founded on a written instrument, except for an action to enforce a claim against a payment bond, which shall be governed by the applicable provisions of paragraph (6)(e), s. 255.05(10), s. 337.18(1), or s. 713.23(1)(e), and except for an action for a deficiency judgment governed by paragraph (6)(g). (c) An action to foreclose a mortgage. (d) An action alleging a willful violation of s. 448.110. (e) Notwithstanding paragraph (b), an action for breach of a property insurance contract, with the period running from the date of loss.

(3) WITHIN FOUR YEARS.—(a) An action relating to the determination of paternity, with the time running from the date the child reaches the age of majority.

(i) A legal or equitable action founded on fraud. (j) A legal or equitable action on a contract, obligation, or liability not founded on a written instrument, including an action for the sale and delivery of goods, wares, and merchandise, and on store accounts. (k) An action to rescind a contract.

(7) LACHES.—Laches shall bar any action unless it is commenced within the time provided for legal actions concerning the same subject matter regardless of lack of knowledge by the person sought to be held liable that the person alleging liability would assert his or her rights and whether the person sought to be held liable is injured or prejudiced by the delay. This subsection shall not affect application of laches at an earlier time in accordance with law.

(1) Except as provided in this section, when a transaction bears a reasonable relation to this state and also to another state or nation, the parties may agree that the law either of this state or of such other state or nation will govern their rights and duties. Failing such agreement, this code applies to transactions bearing an appropriate relation to this state.

The sales contract contained a provision designating the law of Michigan as the law governing resolution of any legal dispute between the parties under the contract. The sales contract also contained a limitation-of-action provision requiring that any action arising from a claim of breach of the contract be brought within two years of the accrual of the cause of action.

Under this Florida statute the two-year period provided in the contract would be held void because it is shorter than the five-year period provided for actions based on written contracts under section 95.11(2)(b), Florida Statutes (1975). However, the parties stipulated in their contract that the law of Michigan should govern its effect and interpretation. Michigan law permits the parties to a contract to designate a limitation period within which a lawsuit must be brought, even though shorter than any otherwise applicable statute of limitations, so long as they do not establish a time period of less than one year. Mich. Comp. Laws. § 440.2725 (1970).

Because the defendant, Burroughs, is a Michigan corporation with its principal place of business in Michigan, the sale of the computer to Suntogs bears a reasonable relation to that state.

First, we find the policy enunciated by section 95.03 to be riddled with exceptions. The courts of this state have refused to apply an earlier, even more stringent, [*] version of this section in actions controlled by maritime law, Arrow Beef Corp. v. South Atlantic & Caribbean Lines, Inc., 280 So.2d 43 (Fla. 3d DCA 1973); Coquette Originals, Inc. v. Canadian Gulf Line of Florida, Inc., 240 So.2d 847 (Fla. 3d DCA 1970); Foresman v. Eastern Steamship Corp., 177 So.2d 887 (Fla. 3d DCA 1965), and in actions where the only connection Florida had to the suit was the fact that the plaintiff resided here when the suit was filed, Aetna Casualty & Surety Co. v. Enright, 258 So.2d 472 (Fla. 3d DCA 1972); Quarty v. Insurance Co. of North America, 244 So.2d 181 (Fla. 2d DCA 1971). Second, the legislature has frequently amended the provisions controlling the statutory periods of limitation, demonstrating the flexibility of this public policy. Third, we do not consider the protections offered by a statute of limitations to be fundamental to a legal system. Before this section was originally enacted, contractual provisions shortening the period of time to bring a suit were valid and enforceable. National Surety Co. v. Williams, 74 Fla. 446 , 77 So. 212 (1918). Finally, the laws governing the time to bring a suit have a limited effect upon a contract insofar as they do not invalidate the contract, but merely allow the defendant to set up an affirmative defense.

We therefore conclude that the contractual provision shortening the period of time for filing a suit was not contrary to a strong public policy. We quash the decision of the district court and remand with instructions that the trial court's order dismissing the suit be affirmed as to the counts arising from the contract. Because of its decision that the time-limitation clause had no effect, the district court did not need to decide the question of whether the claim of negligent performance was contractually based and therefore governed by the clause. Having quashed the district court's holding on the enforceability of the limitation clause, we direct that on remand the district court decide this question. The district court's decision on the fraud count, reversing summary judgment and remanding for trial, is not questioned in this proceeding. The decision under review is quashed and the case remanded for proceedings consistent with this opinion. It is so ordered. ADKINS, OVERTON, ALDERMAN and SHAW, JJ., concur. McDONALD and EHRLICH, JJ., dissent.

(2) When one of the following provisions of this code specifies the applicable law, that provision governs; and a contrary agreement is effective only to the extent permitted by the law (including the conflict-of-laws rules) so specified:(a) Governing law in the chapter on controllable electronic records. (s. 669.107) (b) Governing law in the chapter on funds transfers. (s. 670.507) (c) Rights of sellers’ creditors against sold goods. (s. 672.402) (d) Applicability of the chapter on bank deposits and collections. (s. 674.102) (e) Applicability of the chapter on letters of credit. (s. 675.116) (f) Applicability of the chapter on investment securities. (s. 678.1101) (g) Law governing perfection, the effect of perfection or nonperfection, and the priority of security interests and agricultural liens. (ss. 679.3011-679.3071) (h) Applicability of the chapter on leases. (ss. 680.1051 and 680.1061)

Within five (5) years: An action upon any contract, obligation or liability founded upon an instrument in writing. The limitations prescribed by this section shall never apply to actions in the name or for the benefit of the state and shall never be asserted nor interposed as a defense to any action in the name or for the benefit of the state although such limitations may have become fully operative as a defense prior to the adoption of this amendment.

Within four (4) years: An action upon a contract, obligation or liability not founded upon an instrument of writing.

An action for breach of any contract for sale must be commenced within four (4) years after the cause of action has accrued. By the original agreement the parties may reduce the period of limitation to not less than one (1) year but may not extend it.

A cause of action accrues when the breach occurs, regardless of the aggrieved party’s lack of knowledge of the breach. A breach of warranty occurs when tender of delivery is made, except that where a warranty explicitly extends to future performance of the goods and discovery of the breach must await the time of such performance the cause of action accrues when the breach is or should have been discovered.

(3) Where an action commenced within the time limited by subsection (1) is so terminated as to leave available a remedy by another action for the same breach such other action may be commenced after the expiration of the time limited and within six (6) months after the termination of the first action unless the termination resulted from voluntary discontinuance or from dismissal for failure or neglect to prosecute.

(4) This section does not alter the law on tolling of the statute of limitations nor does it apply to causes of action which have accrued before this act becomes effective.

The applicable limitations periods under Idaho law for Farms’ claims are five years for Count I on the written lease, and four years for Counts II and III for contract actions “not founded upon an instrument in writing[,]” I.C. §§ 5-216, -217.

Idaho Code section 5-234 applies to establish the limitation period applicable to matters stayed by statute.

An automatic stay under 11 U.S.C. section 362 constitutes a statutory prohibition as envisioned by Idaho Code section 5-234. As a result, the limitations periods set forth in Idaho Code sections 5-216 and 5-217 were stayed from the date of the Isoms’ bankruptcy filing, July 31, 2015, to when the bankruptcy case was dismissed on June 13, 2019.

When the commencement of an action is stayed by injunction or statutory prohibition the time of the continuance of the injunction or prohibition is not part of the time limited for the commencement of the action.

The district court’s judgment as to Count III is affirmed. The district court’s judgment on Counts I and II is vacated. The case is remanded. Costs and attorney fees are awarded to Farms, LLC.

Except as provided in Section 2-725 of the "Uniform Commercial Code", actions on bonds, promissory notes, bills of exchange, written leases, written contracts, or other evidences of indebtedness in writing and actions brought under the Illinois Wage Payment and Collection Act shall be commenced within 10 years next after the cause of action accrued

Except as provided in Section 2-725 of the "Uniform Commercial Code", approved July 31, 1961, as amended, and Section 11-13 of "The Illinois Public Aid Code", approved April 11, 1967, as amended, actions on unwritten contracts, expressed or implied, or on awards of arbitration, or to recover damages for an injury done to property, real or personal, or to recover the possession of personal property or damages for the detention or conversion thereof, and all civil actions not otherwise provided for, shall be commenced within 5 years next after the cause of action accrued.

An action for breach of any contract for sale must be commenced within 4 years after the cause of action has accrued. By the original agreement the parties may reduce the period of limitation to not less than one year but may not extend it.

The parties to a contract may agree to a shortened contractual limitation period to replace a statute of limitations, so long as it is reasonable.

Statutes of limitations are procedural, merely fixing the time in which the remedy for a wrong may be sought, and do not alter substantive rights. Fredman Brothers 109 Ill.2d at 209 , 93 Ill.Dec. 360 , 486 N.E.2d 893 ; see also Cox, 212 Ill.App.3d at 1062 , 156 Ill.Dec. 1031 , 571 N.E.2d 1011 . Accordingly, Illinois law governs the timeliness of plaintiff's claim under the 1980 dealer agreement.

Any agreement, clause, covenant, or waiver that is a unilateral condition of employment or continued employment and requires the employee or prospective employee to waive, arbitrate, or otherwise diminish any existing or future claim, right, or benefit related to an unlawful employment practice to which the employee or prospective employee would otherwise be entitled under any provision of State or federal law, including that which purports to shorten the applicable statute of limitation, apply non-Illinois law to an Illinois employee's claim, or require a venue outside of Illinois to adjudicate an Illinois employee's claim, is against public policy, void to the extent it denies an employee or prospective employee a substantive or procedural right or remedy related to alleged unlawful employment practices

When a cause of action has arisen in a state or territory out of this State, or in a foreign country, and, by the laws thereof, an action thereon cannot be maintained by reason of the lapse of time, an action thereon shall not be maintained in this State.

Any agreement, clause, covenant, or waiver that is a mutual condition of employment or continued employment may include provisions that would otherwise be against public policy as a unilateral condition of employment or continued employment, but only if the agreement, clause, covenant, or waiver is in writing, demonstrates actual, knowing, and bargained-for consideration from both parties, and acknowledges the right of the employee or prospective employee to:

Failure to comply with the provisions of subsection (c) shall establish a rebuttable presumption that the agreement, clause, covenant, or waiver is a unilateral condition of employment or continued employment that is governed by subsection (a) or (b).

but if any payment or new promise to pay has been made, in writing, on any bond, note, bill, lease, contract, or other written evidence of indebtedness, within or after the period of 10 years, then an action may be commenced thereon at any time within 10 years after the time of such payment or promise to pay.

(2) A cause of action accrues when the breach occurs, regardless of the aggrieved party's lack of knowledge of the breach. A breach of warranty occurs when tender of delivery is made, except that where a warranty explicitly extends to future performance of the goods and discovery of the breach must await the time of such performance the cause of action accrues when the breach is or should have been discovered. (3) Where an action commenced within the time limited by subsection (1) is so terminated as to leave available a remedy by another action for the same breach such other action may be commenced after the expiration of the time limited and within 6 months after the termination of the first action unless the termination resulted from voluntary discontinuance or from dismissal for failure or neglect to prosecute.

A defendant may plead a set-off or counterclaim barred by the statute of limitation or the statute of repose, while held and owned by him or her, to any action, the cause of which was owned by the plaintiff or person under whom he or she claims, before such set-off or counterclaim was so barred, and not otherwise. This section shall not affect the right of a bona fide assignee of a negotiable instrument assigned before due.

In the absence of specific and clear provisions limiting the period within which suits must be filed, the 10-year statute of limitations for actions on written contracts is applicable to actions

(1) report any good faith allegation of unlawful employment practices to any appropriate federal, State, or local government agency enforcing discrimination laws; (2) report any good faith allegation of criminal conduct to any appropriate federal, State, or local official; (3) participate in a proceeding related to unlawful employment practices, including any litigation brought by any federal, State, or local government agency or any other person who alleges that the employer has violated any State, federal, or local law, regulation, or rule; (4) make any truthful statements or disclosures required by law, regulation, or legal process; (5) request or receive confidential legal advice; and (6) engage in concerted activity to address work-related issues.

For purposes of this Section, with regard to promissory notes dated on or after the effective date of this amendatory Act of 1997, a cause of action on a promissory note payable at a definite date accrues on the due date or date stated in the promissory note or the date upon which the promissory note is accelerated. With respect to a demand promissory note dated on or after the effective date of this amendatory Act of 1997, if a demand for payment is made to the maker of the demand promissory note, an action to enforce the obligation of a party to pay the demand promissory note must be commenced within 10 years after the demand. An action to enforce a demand promissory note is barred if neither principal nor interest on the demand promissory note has been paid for a continuous period of 10 years and no demand for payment has been made to the maker during that period.

(4) This Section does not alter the law on tolling of the statute of limitations nor does it apply to causes of action which have accrued before this Act becomes effective.

We agree with those appellate panels that have found this two-year contractual limitation does not violate Illinois public policy when applied to a legally competent plaintiff.

For the reasons stated, we reverse the judgment of the appellate court and affirm the judgment of the circuit court. We remand this matter to the circuit court for any further action, consistent with this opinion, on the remaining counts of Whitehead’s counterclaim. ¶ 42 Appellate court judgment reversed. ¶ 43 Circuit court judgment affirmed. ¶ 44 Cause remanded.

Actions may be brought within the times limited as follows, respectively, after their causes accrue, and not afterwards, except when otherwise specially declared:

a. Except as provided in paragraph “b”, those founded on written contracts, or on judgments of any courts except those provided for in subsection 6, and those brought for the recovery of real property, within ten years. b. Those founded on claims for rent, within five years.

Those founded on unwritten contracts, those brought for injuries to property, or for relief on the ground of fraud in cases heretofore solely cognizable in a court of chancery, and all other actions not otherwise provided for in this respect, within five years, except as provided by subsections 8 and 10.

In addition to limitations contained elsewhere in this section, an action arising out of the unsafe or defective condition of an improvement to real property based on tort and implied warranty and for contribution and indemnity, and founded on injury to property, real or personal, or injury to the person or wrongful death, shall not be brought more than the number of years specified below after the date on which occurred the act or omission of the defendant alleged in the action to have been the cause of the injury or death: (1) For an action arising from or related to a nuclear power plant licensed by the United States nuclear regulatory commission or an interstate pipeline licensed by the federal energy regulatory commission, fifteen years. (2) For an action arising from or related to residential construction, as defined in section 572.1, ten years. (3) For an action arising from or related to any other kind of improvement to real property, eight years.

By the original agreement the parties may reduce the period of limitation to not less than one year but may not extend it.

A cause of action accrues when the breach occurs, regardless of the aggrieved party’s lack of knowledge of the breach. A breach of warranty occurs when tender of delivery is made, except that where a warranty explicitly extends to future performance of the goods and discovery of the breach must await the time of such performance the cause of action accrues when the breach is or should have been discovered.

A five-year statute of limitations governs actions for breach of implied warranty. See City of Carlisle v. Fetzer, 381 N.W.2d 627, 628-29 (Iowa 1986).

Those founded on a judgment of a court of record, whether of this or of any other of the United States, or of the federal courts of the United States, within twenty years, except that a time period limitation shall not apply to an action to recover a judgment for child support, spousal support, or a judgment of distribution of marital assets.

Those founded on injuries to the person or reputation, including injuries to relative rights, whether based on contract or tort, or for a statute penalty, within two years.

Those founded on claims for wages or for a liability or penalty for failure to pay wages, within two years.

Those founded on a secured interest in farm products, within two years from the date of sale of the farm products against the secured interest of the creditor.

Where an action commenced within the time limited by law or by agreement as provided in subsection 1 is so terminated as to leave available a remedy by another action for the same breach such other action may be commenced after the expiration of the time limited and within six months after the termination of the first action unless the termination resulted from voluntary discontinuance or from dismissal for failure or neglect to prosecute.

An action for default under a lease contract, including breach of warranty or indemnity, must be commenced within four years after the cause of action accrued. By the original lease contract the parties may reduce the period of limitation to not less than one year.

The majority rule is that the UCC limitations period applies to all actions for breach of warranties, regardless of whether the plaintiff seeks personal injury damages or economic and contractual damages. A second approach distinguishes actions for personal injury damages, which are governed by general tort limitation periods, from actions seeking economic and contractual damages, which are governed by the UCC limitations period. A third view is that the UCC period governs breach of warranty actions unless there is no privity between the parties, in which case a tort limitations period applies. 596 F.Supp. 1473, 1475 (D.C.Colo.1984) (citations omitted). We think the majority view is the better one and adopt it.

Applying section 554.2725, we think the alleged breach of implied warranty here occurred in 1969 when the elevator' was delivered to Lewis Fell. So Anne’s cause of action for the alleged breach of implied warranty began to run in 1969. The statute of limitations expired in 1974, some thirteen years before Anne filed suit.

“Residential construction” means construction on single-family or two-family dwellings occupied or used, or intended to be occupied or used, primarily for residential purposes, and includes real property pursuant to chapter 499B.

The following actions shall be brought within five (5) years: (1) An action upon any agreement, contract or promise in writing.

An action upon the official bond or undertaking of an executor, administrator, conservator, sheriff, or any other officer, or upon the bond or undertaking given in attachment, injunction, arrest, or in any case required by statute. (5) An action for relief, other than the recovery of real property not provided for in this article.

The following actions shall be brought within three (3) years: (1) All actions upon contracts, obligations or liabilities expressed or implied but not in writing. (2) An action upon a liability created by a statute other than a penalty or forfeiture.

An action for breach of any contract for sale must be commenced within four years after the cause of action has accrued. By the original agreement the parties may reduce the period of limitation to not less than one year but may not extend it.

A cause of action accrues when the breach occurs, regardless of the aggrieved party's lack of knowledge of the breach. A breach of warranty occurs when tender of delivery is made, except that where a warranty explicitly extends to future performance of the goods and discovery of the breach must await the time of such performance the cause of action accrues when the breach is or should have been discovered.

Our answer: K.S.A. 60-501 contains no express or implied prohibition against contractual agreements limiting the time in which to sue. But the public policy recognizing that injured workers should be protected from retaliation when exercising rights under the Workers Compensation Act, K.S.A. 44-501 *549 et seq., invalidates the contractual provision at issue because it impairs enforcement of that protection. 2. If no such prohibition exists, is the 6-month limitations period agreed to by the private parties in this action unreasonable? Our answer: Because we hold the contract provision at issue is void, it is unnecessary to consider whether its 6-month term is reasonable.

The remainder of Article 5 sets various statutes of limitations for actions brought under Chapter 60. See, e.g., K.S.A. 60-506 (actions for forcible entry and detention limited to 2 years from date action occurred), K.S.A. 60-511 (certain actions must be brought within 5 years), K.S.A. 60-512 (certain actions must be brought within 3 years).

We hold that die private contract entered into between FedEx and Pfeifer violates public policy and is invalid to the extent it limits the applicable 2-year statute of limitations under K.S.A. 60-513(a)(4) for filing a retaliatory discharge claim based on her exercise of rights under the workers compensation laws. This holding is limited to the circumstances in which there is a strongly held public policy interest at issue.

The provisions of this article govern the limitation of time for commencing civil actions, except where a different limitation is specifically provided by statute.

(3) Where an action commenced within the time limited by subsection (1) is so terminated as to leave available a remedy by another action for the same breach such other action may be commenced after the expiration of the time limited and within six months after the termination of the first action unless the termination resulted from voluntary discontinuance or from dismissal for failure or neglect to prosecute.

Unless otherwise provided by legislation, a personal action is subject to a liberative prescription of ten years.

Delictual actions are subject to a liberative prescription of two years. This prescription commences to run from the day that injury or damage is sustained. It does not run against minors or interdicts in actions involving permanent disability and brought pursuant to the Louisiana Products Liability Act or state law governing product liability actions in effect at the time of the injury or damage.

but as a personal action is subject to liberative prescription of ten years under La. C.C. art. 3499.

Actions on instruments, whether negotiable or not, and on promissory notes, whether negotiable or not, are subject to a liberative prescription of five years. This prescription commences to run from the day payment is exigible.

we find this action is not governed by the Louisiana UCC. Therefore, we conclude the district court erred in finding this action was prescribed under La. R.S. 10:3-420 and La. R.S. 10:4-406.

Because this action arises from the terms of the promissory note itself, in view of Ott, we also find that this action should be subject to the prescriptive period of five years under La. C.C. art. 3498. We decline to ultimately decide the issue of prescription here because that peremptory exception was not pleaded below or on appeal.

The following actions are subject to a liberative prescription of three years: (1) An action for the recovery of compensation for services rendered, including payment of salaries, wages, commissions, professional fees, fees and emoluments of public officials, freight, passage, money, lodging, and board; (2) An action for arrearages of rent and annuities; (3) An action on money lent; (4) An action on an open account; and (5) An action to recover underpayments or overpayments of royalties from the production of minerals, provided that nothing herein applies to any payments, rent, or royalties derived from state-owned properties.

Art. 3492. Repealed by Acts 2024, No. 423, §2, eff. July 1, 2024.

For the foregoing reasons, we reverse the district court’s July 14, 2016 judgment granting Omni’s motion for summary judgment on the basis of prescription and remand the case for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. REVERSED; REMANDED

All civil actions shall be commenced within 6 years after the cause of action accrues and not afterwards, except actions on a judgment or decree of any court of record of the United States, or of any state, or of a justice of the peace in this State, and except as otherwise specially provided.

All civil actions for property damage, bodily injury or death against a ski area owner or operator or tramway owner or operator or its employees, as defined under Title 32, chapter 133 , whether based on tort or breach of contract or otherwise, arising out of participation in skiing or hang gliding or the use of a tramway associated with skiing or hang gliding must be commenced within 2 years after the cause of action accrues.

Except as provided in Title 11, sections 2‑725 and 3‑1118, subsection (1) , personal actions on contracts or liabilities under seal, promissory notes signed in the presence of an attesting witness, or on the bills, notes or other evidences of debt issued by a bank must be commenced within 20 years after the cause of action accrues.

An action for breach of any contract for sale must be commenced within 4 years after the cause of action has accrued. By the original agreement the parties may reduce the period of limitation to not less than one year but may not extend it.

A cause of action accrues when the breach occurs, regardless of the aggrieved party's lack of knowledge of the breach. A breach of warranty occurs when tender of delivery is made, except that where a warranty explicitly extends to future performance of the goods and discovery of the breach must await the time of such performance the cause of action accrues when the breach is or should have been discovered.

A cause of action for personal injuries arising under this Article for breach of warranty occurs when the injury takes place and is governed by the limitation of action period under Title 14, section 752 .

Where an action commenced within the time limited by subsection (1) is so terminated as to leave available a remedy by another action for the same breach such other action may be commenced after the expiration of the time limited and within 6 months after the termination of the first action unless the termination resulted from voluntary discontinuance or from dismissal for failure or neglect to prosecute.

This section does not alter the law on tolling of the statute of limitations nor does it apply to causes of action which have accrued before this Title becomes effective.

In Maine, unless another statute of limitations applies to a particular action, civil actions must commence within six years “after the cause of action accrues.” 14 M.R.S. § 752.

Generally, a cause of action for breach of contract accrues at the time of breach.

But parties are free to contract for conditions precedent to action and even, in certain circumstances, for a limitations period to commence before a cause of action accrues.

In conclusion, under the terms of the contract, the Estate’s cause of action accrued at the earliest on September 25, 2014, when Bankers Life denied the Estate’s internal appeal. The Estate then timely filed its complaint on September 4, 2020, within the six-year limitations period. The entry is: Judgment vacated. Case remanded to the trial court to proceed on the complaint.

All civil actions for malpractice or professional negligence against architects or engineers duly licensed or registered under Title 32 shall be commenced within 4 years after such malpractice or negligence is discovered

All civil actions for professional negligence against a professional land surveyor duly licensed or registered under Title 32 must be commenced within 4 years after the negligence is discovered

Except where the Uniform Commercial Code otherwise prescribes, the following actions shall be commenced within six years: (1) upon a contract or other obligation, express or implied, as to which no other limitation is expressly prescribed;

Except where fraud is involved, no action by any person in contract, tort, or otherwise to recover damages for any injury to property, real or personal, or for bodily injury or wrongful death, arising out of the defective and unsafe condition of an improvement to real property, shall be brought against any person performing or furnishing the design, planning, supervision, materials, or observation of construction or construction of the improvement to real property or against the owner of the real property more than two years after the cause of action accrues, as specified in paragraph (c), nor in any event shall such a cause of action accrue more than ten years after substantial completion of the construction. Date of substantial completion shall be determined by the date when construction is sufficiently completed so that the owner or the owner's representative can occupy or use the improvement for the intended purpose.

(a) Except as provided by subdivision 2 and section 541.33 , if a claim is substantively based: (1) upon the law of one other state, the limitation period of that state applies; or (2) upon the law of more than one state, the limitation period of one of those states chosen by the law of conflict of laws of this state applies. (b) The limitation period of this state applies to all other claims.

If the statute of limitations of another state applies to the assertion of a claim in this state, the other state's relevant statutes and other rules of law governing tolling and accrual apply in computing the limitation period, but its statutes and other rules of law governing conflict of laws do not apply.

If the court determines that the limitation period of another state applicable under sections 541.31 and 541.32 is substantially different from the limitation period of this state and has not afforded a fair opportunity to sue upon, or imposes an unfair burden in defending against, the claim, the limitation period of this state applies.

Sections 541.30 to 541.35 apply to claims arising from incidents occurring on or after August 1, 2004.

(d) Nothing in this section shall apply to actions for damages resulting from negligence in the maintenance, operation or inspection of the real property improvement against the owner or other person in possession.

Notwithstanding the provisions of subdivision 1, paragraph (a), in the case of a cause of action described in subdivision 1, paragraph (a), which accrues during the ninth or tenth year after substantial completion of the construction, an action to recover damages may be brought within two years after the date on which the cause of action accrued, but in no event may such an action be brought more than 12 years after substantial completion of the construction. Nothing in this subdivision shall limit the time for bringing an action for contribution or indemnity.

(b) Notwithstanding paragraph (a), an action for contribution or indemnity arising out of the defective and unsafe condition of an improvement to real property may be brought no later than two years after the cause of action for contribution or indemnity has accrued, regardless of whether it accrued before or after the ten-year period referenced in paragraph (a), provided that in no event may an action for contribution or indemnity be brought more than 14 years after substantial completion of the construction.

(e) The limitations prescribed in this section do not apply to the manufacturer or supplier of any equipment or machinery installed upon real property.

If a cause of action arises outside of this state and the action is barred under the applicable statute of limitations of the place where it arose, the action may be maintained in this state if the plaintiff is a resident of this state who has owned the cause of action since it accrued and the cause of action is not barred under the applicable statute of limitations of this state.

For the purposes of sections 541.30 to 541.35 , the following terms have the meanings given them: (1) "claim" means a right of action that may be asserted in a civil action or proceeding and includes a right of action created by statute; and (2) "state" means a state, commonwealth, territory, or possession of the United States, the District of Columbia, the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, a foreign country, or a political subdivision of any of them.

The proper analysis for a court in examining whether the parties to a contract can validly shorten the statutorily prescribed limitation period is twofold. The court must first look to see if a specific statute prohibits the use of a different limitation period in the particular case. See Gendreau, 206 Minn, at 239, 288 N.W. at 226 . If no such statute exists, the parties are then free to shorten the limitations period as long as the contractual period is not unreasonable in length. Id. Whether a contractual limitation is reasonable or not is to be decided on a case-by-case basis, looking at the particular facts of each ease.

Such provisions, however, are not generally favored and are strictly construed against the party invoking them.

The period prescribed for the commencement of an action on any contract, covenant, obligation, or liability founded on an instrument in writing is within 6 years.

The period prescribed for the commencement of an action on a contract, account, or promise not founded on an instrument in writing is within 5 years.

An action for breach of any contract for sale must be commenced within 4 years after the cause of action has accrued. By the original agreement the parties may reduce the period of limitation to not less than 1 year but may not extend it.

“The period prescribed for the commencement of an action on any contract, covenant, obligation, or liability founded on an instrument in writing is within 8 years.” Section 27-2-202(1), MCA.

statute of limitations in contracts for sale. (1) An action for breach of any contract for sale must be commenced within 4 years after the cause of action has accrued. . . . Section 30-2-725(1), MCA.

Appellant then contends that one of the longer contract statute of limitations, SS 27-2-202 (2), 27-2-202 (1), or 30-2-725, MCk, instead of the tort statute of limitations should apply to his brea.ch of warranty claims.

We therefore affirm the District Court's conclusion that appellant's breach of warranty claims are barred by the three-year tort statute of limitations.

The period prescribed for the commencement of an action upon a contract, account, or promise not founded on an instrument in writing is within 5 years.

A cause of action accrues when the breach occurs, regardless of the aggrieved party's lack of knowledge of the breach. A breach of warranty occurs when tender of delivery is made, except that where a warranty explicitly extends to future performance of the goods and discovery of the breach must await the time of such performance the cause of action accrues when the breach is or should have been discovered.

The period prescribed for the commencement of an action on an obligation or liability, other than a contract, account, or promise, not founded on an instrument in writing is within 3 years.

Where an action commenced within the time limited by subsection (1) is so terminated as to leave available a remedy by another action for the same breach such other action may be commenced after the expiration of the time limited and within 6 months after the termination of the first action unless the termination resulted from voluntary discontinuance or from dismissal for failure or neglect to prosecute.

27-2-204 . (Effective October 1, 2026) Tort actions -- general and personal injury. (1) Except as provided in 27-2-216 and 27-2-219 , the period prescribed for the commencement of an action on a liability not founded on an instrument in writing is within 3 years.

Sloway then followed up by filing suit approximately six months after the Extremes took title to Tract 1-A, well within the eight-year statute of limitations for actions based on written covenants

Except as provided in subsection (2) of this section, an action upon a specialty, or any agreement, contract, or promise in writing, or foreign judgment, can only be brought within five years.

An action upon a contract, not in writing, expressed or implied, or an action upon a liability created by statute, other than a forfeiture or penalty, can only be brought within four years.

Any action to recover damages based on alleged professional negligence or upon alleged breach of warranty in rendering or failure to render professional services shall be commenced within two years next after the alleged act or omission in rendering or failure to render professional services providing the basis for such action; Provided, if the cause of action is not discovered and could not be reasonably discovered within such two-year period, then the action may be commenced within one year from the date of such discovery or from the date of discovery of facts which would reasonably lead to such discovery, whichever is earlier; and provided further, that in no event may any action be commenced to recover damages for professional negligence or breach of warranty in rendering or failure to render professional services more than ten years after the date of rendering or failure to render such professional service which provides the basis for the cause of action.

Any action to recover damages based on any alleged breach of warranty on improvements to real property or based on any alleged deficiency in the design, planning, supervision, or observation of construction, or construction of an improvement to real property, except improvements to real property subject to the Nebraska Condominium Act, shall be commenced within four years after any alleged act or omission constituting such breach of warranty or deficiency. If such cause of action is not discovered and could not be reasonably discovered within such four-year period, or within one year preceding the expiration of such four-year period, then the cause of action may be commenced within two years from the date of such discovery or from the date of discovery of facts which would reasonably lead to such discovery, whichever is earlier. In no event may any action be commenced to recover damages for an alleged breach of warranty on improvements to real property or deficiency in the design, planning, supervision, or observation of construction, or construction of an improvement to real property more than ten years beyond the time of the act giving rise to the cause of action.

Any action to recover damages based on any act or omission of a real estate licensee relating to real estate brokerage services shall be commenced within two years after whichever of the following occurs first with respect to such brokerage services: (a) A transaction is completed or closed; (b) an agency agreement is terminated; or (c) an unconsummated transaction is terminated or expires. Such two-year period shall not be reduced by agreement and shall not apply to disciplinary actions initiated by the State Real Estate Commission.

A judicial proceeding for breach of any obligation arising under section 76-887 or 76-888 must be commenced within two years after the cause of action accrues, but the parties may agree to reduce the period of limitation to not less than one year. With respect to a unit that may be occupied for residential use, an agreement to reduce the period of limitation must be evidenced by an instrument executed by the purchaser.

A judicial proceeding in which the accuracy of the public-offering statement or validity of any contract of purchase is in issue or in which a rescission of the contract or damages is sought shall be commenced within four years after the date of the contract of purchase, notwithstanding that the purchaser's terms of payments may extend beyond the period of limitation except that, with respect to the enforcement of provisions in the contract of purchase which require the continued furnishing of services and the reciprocal payments to be made by the purchaser, the period for bringing a judicial proceeding will continue for a period of four years for each breach, but the parties may agree in writing to reduce the period of limitation to not less than two years.

No insurance company shall issue in this state any policy or contract of insurance containing a provision, stipulation or agreement that such policy shall be construed according to the laws of any other state or country, or any provision limiting the time within which an action may be brought to less than the regular period of time prescribed by the statutes of limitations of this state, unless otherwise prescribed by this chapter.

action shall be brought thereon, or for a breach thereof, unless within a time therein specified, which is different from the time which the statute fixes for bringing an action on such contract, or for a breach thereof, is against public policy, and will not be enforced by the courts of this state.

We are entirely satisfied with both the reasoning and conclusions in those cases. A man may not by contract deprive himself of the right to apply to the courts for the protection of his person, property or liberty in the manner or within the time prescribed by public law. Otherwise he might be permitted to sell himself into servitude.

By the petition was pleaded a cause of action based upon a written guaranty entered into in the State of Nebraska seeking in the courts of Nebraska enforcement of an obligation pursuant to an agreement which extended the limitation upon the right to maintain action for recovery beyond the period fixed by the statutes of Nebraska. The attempt to so extend the right was void.

This rule of course does not apply to a valid contract entered into in a foreign state.

It therefore becomes abundantly clear that the limitation period with reference to the other coverages besides fire and lightning contravenes the prohibition of section 44-357, R. R. S. 1943, and any such provision limiting the time within which an action may be brought to less than the regular period of time prescribed by the statute of limitations in this state is invalid.

we conclude in this case that the general 5-year statute of limitations must yield to the 3-year provision in the Blue Cross policy because such provision is authorized by the statutes regulating health insurance policies.

Therefore, if Reinke’s claims are for professional malpractice, whether pled in tort or contract, the statute of limitations for professional negligence contained in § 25-222 applies.

If all of Reinke’s claims are based on a single professional relationship, however, they may not be separated into various parts to allow different periods of limitation to be applied.

A cause of action in contract accrues at the time of the breach or failure to do the thing agreed to, irrespective of any knowledge on the part of the plaintiff or of any actual injury occasioned to him or her.

Although we have determined that contractual limita- tion periods shorter than Nebraska statutory periods are not enforceable for policies issued in Nebraska, such provisions will be enforced in Nebraska when they appear in contracts entered into in other states.

Each defendant in the action must be properly served within one hundred eighty days of the commencement of the action.

If any defendant is not properly served within the time specified by subsection (2) of this section then the action against that defendant is dismissed by operation of law. The dismissal is without prejudice and becomes effective on the day after the time for service expires.

The policy provided that the insurance company should not be liable for any loss thereunder unless a suit for such loss was brought within six months of the date of the loss or damage, any statute of limitations to the contrary notwithstanding.

Any action to recover damages based on any alleged breach of warranty on improvements to real property or based on any alleged deficiency in the design, planning, supervision, or observation of construction, or construction of an improvement to real property that is a condominium or part of a condominium project subject to the Nebraska Condominium Act shall be commenced within two years after any alleged act or omission constituting such breach of warranty or deficiency.

The statutes of this state provide in what time actions may be brought; and a contract which provides that no action shall be brought thereon, or for a breach thereof, unless within a time therein specified, which is different from the time which the statute fixes for bringing an action on such contract or for a breach thereof, is against public policy

The limitation of the Nebraska statute is 5 years and the pleaded limitation of the New York statute is 6 years.

However, we must interpret this state’s prescription on contractual modifications to statutes of limitations literally and narrowly in light of Nebraska’s strong general rule that courts will not “‘“‘“emasculate the liberty of contract by enabling parties to escape their con- tractual obligations on the pretext of public policy unless the - 366 - Decisions of the Nebraska Court of A ppeals 23 Nebraska A ppellate R eports INTERVISION SYS. TECHS. v. INTERCALL Cite as 23 Neb. App. 360 preservation of the public welfare imperatively so demands. . . .”’”’” Jeffrey Lake Dev. v. Central Neb. Pub. Power, 262 Neb. 515, 523, 633 N.W.2d 102, 109 (2001). Accordingly, we do not find the Nebraska Supreme Court’s policy pronounce- ment against contractual modifications to statutes of limita- tions to be broad enough to encompass the notice provision at issue here.

We find that the notice of claim clause in the contract is not a statute of limitations clause and is valid and enforceable.

(1) An action for breach of any contract for sale must be commenced within four years after the cause of action has accrued. By the original agreement the parties may reduce the period of limitation to not less than one year but may not extend it.

We hold that a private agreement that frustrates the LAD’s public-purpose imperative by shortening the two-year limitations period for private LAD claims cannot be enforced.

A provision in any employment contract that waives any substantive or procedural right or remedy relating to a claim of discrimination, retaliation, or harassment shall be deemed against public policy and unenforceable.

(2) A cause of action accrues when the breach occurs, regardless of the aggrieved party's lack of knowledge of the breach. A breach of warranty occurs when tender of delivery is made, except that where a warranty explicitly extends to future performance of the goods and discovery of the breach must await the time of such performance the cause of action accrues when the breach is or should have been discovered. (3) Where an action commenced within the time limited by subsection (1) is so terminated as to leave available a remedy by another action for the same breach such other action may be commenced after the expiration of the time limited and within six months after the termination of the first action unless the termination resulted from voluntary discontinuance or from dismissal for failure or neglect to prosecute. (4) This section does not alter the law on tolling of the statute of limitations nor does it apply to causes of action which have accrued before this Act becomes effective.

b. No right or remedy under the "Law Against Discrimination," P.L.1945, c.169 (C.10:5-1 et seq.) or any other statute or case law shall be prospectively waived.

Here an employment application contained a provision requiring the applicant, if hired, to agree to bring any employment-related cause of action against the employer within six months of the challenged employment action and waive any statute of limitations to the contrary. After being hired and employed for a period of time, plaintiff filed a complaint in Superior Court against his former employer, claiming among other 2 things an LAD violation premised on disability discrimination. The trial court dismissed the action, enforcing the six-month limitations period for filing that employment-related claim, and the Appellate Division affirmed. We reverse.

c. This section shall not apply to the terms of any collective bargaining agreement between an employer and the collective bargaining representative of the employees.

Explicitly then, the Legislature understood and accepted that public policy requires a more lengthy period of time to obtain LAD relief through that permissible combination of avenues. The Legislature’s tacit approval of the two-year limitations period accommodates the two processes available under the LAD. A shortening of the limitations period applicable under law undermines and thwarts the legislative scheme that includes the DCR remedy as a meaningful option. In fact, the instant contractual limitations period works as an effective divestiture of the right to pursue an administrative 26 remedy. The two forums that the LAD makes available both protect the public interest in identifying, rectifying, and eliminating discrimination. That public interest in rooting out forbidden discrimination may not be lightly contracted away by private arrangement.

Second, a statute of limitations period short of two years effectively eliminates claims. As a practical matter, it takes time for an individual to bring his or her claim to an attorney. The individual may not immediately realize that he or she has been a victim of discrimination.

The challenged provision cannot be viewed as a private contractual agreement by which private parties contract to limit private claims by shortening the generally applicable statute of limitations for such actions.

An action, including one brought in the name or for the benefit of the state, must be commenced within the time specified in this article unless a different time is prescribed by law or a shorter time is prescribed by written agreement. No court shall extend the time limited by law for the commencement of an action.

2. an action upon a contractual obligation or liability, express or implied, except as provided in section two hundred thirteen-a or two hundred fourteen-i of this article or article 2 of the uniform commercial code or article 36-B of the general business law;

The parties may cut back on the Statute of Limita *551 tions by agreeing that any suit must be commenced within a shorter period than is prescribed by law. Such an agreement does not conflict with public policy but, in fact, "more effectively secures the end sought to be attained by the statute of limitations” (Ripley v Aetna Ins. Co., 30 NY 136, 163 ). Thus an agreement which modifies the Statute of Limitations by specifying a shorter, but reasonable, period within which to commence an action is enforceable (Sapinkopf v Cunard S.S. Co., 254 NY 111 ) provided it is in writing (CPLR 201).

The validity of this type of agreement depends initially on the time at which it was made. If the agreement to "waive” or extend the Statute of Limitations is made at the inception of liability it is unenforceable because a party cannot "in advance, make a valid promise that a statute founded in public policy shall be inoperative” (Shapley v Abbott, 42 NY 443, 452 ; Croker v Ireland, 235 App Div 760 ; Pine v Okoniewski, 256 App Div 519 ; cf. Wood Co. v Horgan, . 291 NY 422, 426 ; see, also, Simpson, Contracts, § 41, pp 128-129). Of course at that stage there is a greater likelihood that a "waiver” or extension of the defense, as part of the initial contract or obligation, was the result of ignorance, improvidence, an unequal bargaining position or was simply unintended. But if the agreement is made after the cause of action has accrued the Legislature has provided that it may be enforceable under certain circumstances.

The statute, it should be noted, is exclusive (see General Obligations Law, § 17-103, *552 subd 3). Thus extension agreements made prior to the accrual of the cause of action continue to have "no effect” (General Obligations Law, § 17-103, subd 3).

We conclude that the contractual period at issue here—two years from the date of “direct physical loss or damage” (i.e., from the date of the fire)—is not reasonable if, as the Second Circuit’s question requires us to assume, the property cannot reasonably be replaced within two years. It is true, as the District Court pointed out, that there is nothing inherently unreasonable about a two-year period of limitation. In fact, we have enforced contractual limitation periods of one year (Blitman Constr. Corp. v Insurance Co. of N. Am., 66 NY2d 820 [1985]; Sapinkopf v Cunard S.S. Co., Ltd., 254 NY 111, 114 [1930]) and six months (Continental Leather Co. v Liverpool, Brazil & Riv. Plate Steam Nav. Co., 259 NY 621 [1932]; Aron & Co. v Panama R.R. Co., 255 NY 513, 519 [1931]; see also John J. Kassner, 46 NY2d at 552 ). The problem with the limitation period in this case is not its duration, but its accrual date. It is neither fair nor reasonable to require a suit within two years from the date of the loss, while imposing a condition precedent to the suit—in this case, completion of replacement of the property—that cannot be met within that two-year period. A “limitation period” that expires before suit can be brought is not really a limitation period at all, but simply a nullification of the claim.

We have found no case in which we have squarely held that an otherwise reasonable limitation period may be rendered unreasonable by an inappropriate accrual date. We think, however, that the law was correctly stated in Judge Crane’s dissenting opinion in Continental Leather Co.: “[T]he period of time within which an action must be brought . . . should be fair and reasonable, in view of the circumstances of each particular case. . . . The circumstances, not the time, must be the determining factor” ( 259 NY at 622-623 ).

Answering a question from the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, we hold that such a contractual limitation period, applied to a case in which the property cannot reasonably be replaced in two years, is unreasonable and unenforceable.

Accordingly, the question certified should be answered in the affirmative. Chief Judge Lippman and Judges Graffeo, Read, Pigott, Rivera and Abdus-Salaam concur. Following certification of a question by the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit and acceptance of the question by this Court pursuant to section 500.27 of this Court’s Rules of Practice, and after hearing argument by counsel for the parties and consideration of the briefs and the record submitted, certified question answered in the affirmative.

An action based upon a cause of action accruing without the state cannot be commenced after the expiration of the time limited by the laws of either the state or the place without the state where the cause of action accrued, except that where the cause of action accrued in favor of a resident of the state the time limited by the laws of the state shall apply.

The following actions must be commenced within six years: 1. an action for which no limitation is specifically prescribed by law;

Upon audit, however, the comptroller disallowed $38,423.69 claimed for "technical services” and only authorized a final payment of $1,100. The record does not indicate the date the plaintiff was informed of the comptroller’s decision. It is evident though that the plaintiff was aware of the results of the audit by July 1, 1968 when it sent a letter of protest demanding payment of the full amount.

The controlling statute (General Obligations Law, § 17-103, subd 1) is applicable only to actions arising out of a contract and requires that the agreement or promise "to waive, to extend, or not to plead the statute of limitation” be in writing and signed by the promisor "after the accrual of the cause of action”. If these requirements are met the agreement or promise has the effect of renewing the Statute of Limitations for the applicable period, unless a shorter period is specified.

The agreement also provides that "No action shall be * * * maintained against the City upon any claim based upon this contract or arising out of this contract * * * unless such action shall be commenced within six (6) months after the date of filing in the office of the Comptroller of the City of the certificate for the final payment hereunder * * * None of the provisions of Article 2 of the Civil Practice Laws and Rules shall apply to any action against the City arising out of this contract.”

The breach, if any, occurred at this point because the comptroller — the only official responsible and specifically designated in the contract to authorize payment on behalf of the city — unequivocally refused to pay the full amount demanded and allegedly due on the contract. Therefore the cause of action for breach of contract accrued, within the meaning of the Statute of Limitations, no later than July 1, 1968.

In any event, since it was adopted at the inception of the contract and not after the cause of action had accrued, it may not serve to extend the Statute of Limitations (General Obligations Law, § 17-103, subds 1, 3).

Accordingly, the order of the Appellate Division should be reversed, with costs, the plaintiff’s motion to dismiss the second affirmative defense should be denied, and the defendant’s cross motion for summary judgment should be granted. The certified question should be answered in the negative.

Within three years an action - (1) Upon a contract, obligation or liability arising out of a contract, express or implied, except those mentioned in the preceding sections or in G.S. 1-53(1).

Within ten years an action - (1) Upon a judgment or decree of any court of the United States, or of any state or territory thereof, from the date of its entry. No such action may be brought more than once, or have the effect to continue the lien of the original judgment. (1a) Upon a judgment rendered by a justice of the peace, from its date. (2) Upon a sealed instrument or an instrument of conveyance of an interest in real property, against the principal thereto. Provided, however, that if action on an instrument is filed, the defendant or defendants in such action may file a counterclaim arising out of the same transaction or transactions as are the subject of plaintiff's claim, although a shorter statute of limitations would otherwise apply to defendant's counterclaim.

An action for breach of any contract for sale must be commenced within four years after the cause of action has accrued. By the original agreement the parties may reduce the period of limitation to not less than one year but may not extend it.

(b) A cause of action accrues when the breach occurs, regardless of the aggrieved party's lack of knowledge of the breach. A breach of warranty occurs when tender of delivery is made, except that where a warranty explicitly extends to future performance of the goods and discovery of the breach must await the time of such performance the cause of action accrues when the breach is or should have been discovered.

No action to recover damages based upon or arising out of the defective or unsafe condition of an improvement to real property shall be brought more than six years from the later of the specific last act or omission of the defendant giving rise to the cause of action or substantial completion of the improvement.

b. For purposes of this subdivision, an action based upon or arising out of the defective or unsafe condition of an improvement to real property includes: 1. Actions to recover damages for breach of a contract to construct or repair an improvement to real property; 2. Actions to recover damages for the negligent construction or repair of an improvement to real property; 3. Actions to recover damages for personal injury, death or damage to property; 4. Actions to recover damages for economic or monetary loss; 5. Actions in contract or in tort or otherwise; 6. Actions for contribution indemnification for damages sustained on account of an action described in this subdivision; 7. Actions against a surety or guarantor of a defendant described in this subdivision; 8. Actions brought against any current or prior owner of the real property or improvement, or against any other person having a current or prior interest therein; 9. Actions against any person furnishing materials, or against any person who develops real property or who performs or furnishes the design, plans, specifications, surveying, supervision, testing or observation of construction, or construction of an improvement to real property, or a repair to an improvement to real property.

g. The limitation prescribed by this subdivision shall apply to the exclusion of G.S. 1-15(c), G.S. 1-52(16) and G.S. 1-47(2).

Thus, parties may agree to decrease the general limitation period for bringing claims if: (1) no statute forbids a shorter period, and (2) the shorter period is reasonable.

Though statutes of limitations establish the maximum amount of time that can elapse between the accrual of a claim and the filing of that claim, this Court acknowledged more than a century ago that individuals may agree to contractually shorten the time to bring claims arising out of the subject matter of that contract. See Muse v. London Assurance Corp., 108 N.C. 240, 241–42 (1891) (“It seems to be established that a provision in a policy that the insured may bring suit within 12 months after the less, and not later, . . . is not in contravention of the policy of statutes of limitation, and will be upheld by the courts.”).

The legislature has not prohibited downward adjustment of the limitation period for UDTPA claims, and plaintiffs have failed to demonstrate the provision is unreasonable. Accordingly, the trial court did not err in concluding defendant was entitled to judgment as a matter of law on plaintiffs’ UDTPA claim. We reverse the decision of the Court of Appeals. REVERSED.

Plaintiffs also argued that “precedent rejects one-year limitation clauses for UDTPA claims as unreasonable,” and the Court of Appeals rejected that argument. Warren v. Cielo Ventures, Inc., 293 N.C. App. 784, 786–87 (2024). As we did not grant discretionary review on this issue, we do not address it.

Any civil action brought under this Chapter to enforce the provisions thereof shall be barred unless commenced within four years after the cause of action accrues. When any civil or criminal proceeding shall be commenced by the Attorney General or by any of the district attorneys of the State to prevent, restrain or punish a violation of Chapter 75, the running of the period of limitation with respect to every private right of action arising under Chapter 75 and based in whole or in part on any matter complained of in said proceeding shall be suspended during the pendency thereof and for one year thereafter; provided that when the running of the period of limitation with respect to a cause of action arising under Chapter 75 shall be suspended hereunder, any action to enforce such cause of action shall be barred unless commenced either within the period of suspension or within four years after the cause of action accrued, whichever is later.

f. This subdivision prescribes an outside limitation of six years from the later of the specific last act or omission or substantial completion, within which the limitations prescribed by G.S. 1-52 and 1-53 continue to run. For purposes of the three-year limitation prescribed by G.S. 1-52, a cause of action based upon or arising out of the defective or unsafe condition of an improvement to real property shall not accrue until the injury, loss, defect or damage becomes apparent or ought reasonably to have become apparent to the claimant. However, as provided in this subdivision, no action may be brought more than six years from the later of the specific last act or omission or substantial completion.

The following actions must be commenced within six years after the claim for relief has accrued: - An action upon a contract, obligation, or liability, express or implied, subject to the provisions of sections 28-01-15 and 41-02-104.

An action for breach of any contract for sale must be commenced within four years after the claim for relief has accrued. By the original agreement the parties may reduce the period of limitation to not less than one year but may not extend it.

A claim for relief accrues when the breach occurs, regardless of the aggrieved party's lack of knowledge of the breach. A breach of warranty occurs when tender of delivery is made, except that if a warranty explicitly extends to future performance of the goods and discovery of the breach must await the time of such performance the claim for relief accrues when the breach is or should have been discovered.

This section does not alter the law on tolling of the statute of limitations nor does it apply to claims for relief which have accrued before this title becomes effective.

Every stipulation or condition in a contract by which any party thereto is restricted from enforcing that party's rights under the contract by the usual legal proceedings in the ordinary tribunals or which limits the time within which that party thus may enforce that party's rights is void, except as otherwise specifically permitted by the laws of this state.

The following actions must be commenced within ten years after the claim for relief has accrued: - An action upon a judgment or decree of any court of the United States or of any state or territory within the United States; - An action upon a contract contained in any conveyance or mortgage of or instrument affecting the title to real property except a covenant of warranty, an action upon which must be commenced within ten years after the final decision against the title of the covenantor; and - Any action or proceeding for the foreclosure of a mortgage upon real estate.

A surety cannot be held beyond the express terms of the surety's contract and if such contract prescribes a penalty for its breach, the surety cannot be liable in any case for more than the penalty.

Section 9-08-05, N.D.C.C., does void all provisions in a contract which limit the time within which a party can enforce their rights, but specifically allows for parties to limit the time for asserting a claim if another North Dakota law permits the limitation.

The language of the statute provides a surety cannot be held beyond the terms in the contract nor held beyond the amount of liability provided for in the contract. A contract provision which limits the amount of time a party is allowed to bring suit is an express provision of the contract. Therefore, N.D.C.C. § 22-03-03 provides that if the parties contractually agree to a limitation on the time to bring a claim, the surety cannot be held beyond that limitation. N.D.C.C. § 22-03-03 serves as an exception under N.D.C.C. § 9-08-05.

The two year limitation for asserting a claim provided for in the performance bond is enforceable, L&C failed to bring suit within two years, and L&C is barred from asserting its claims against IFIC. We affirm.

The primary difference between the two statutes is the addition of the phrase “except as otherwise specifically permitted by the laws of this state[]” in N.D.C.C. § 9-08-05. As discussed above, N.D.C.C. § 22-03-03 serves as an exception to Section 9-08-05. The statute analyzed in Storing did not provide for any exceptions. Storing is not controlling.

Under R.C. 2305.11(A), a claim for legal malpractice “shall be commenced within one year after the cause of action accrued.” A breach of contract claim “shall be brought within six years after the cause of action accrued.” R.C. 2305.06.

the original agreement the parties may reduce the period of limitation to not less than one year * * *.” (Emphasis added.) R.C. 1302.98(A).

The trial court correctly noted that, under Ohio law, “a cause of action will be subsumed into a malpractice claim if it arises out of the matter in which the attorney represented the client.” (Internal quotation marks deleted & citation omitted.) (Decision & Entry at 2, quoting Creech v. Gaba, 2017-Ohio-195, ¶ 10 (10th Dist.).)

As a result, the 12-month limitations period contained within the LWAs could not be considered part of the “original agreement” for purposes of reducing the four-year statute of limitations under R.C. 1302.93(A).

It is the actual nature of the dispute or subject matter of the case, rather than the form of the pleading, that determines which statute of limitations should apply to a cause of action. Lawyers Coop. Publishing Co. v. Muething, 65 Ohio St.3d 273, 277 (1992). “A party cannot transform one cause of action into another through clever pleading or an alternate theory of law in order to avail itself of a more satisfactory statute of limitations.”

In 2010, R.C. 2305.06 provided a 15-year limitations period for commencing a claim upon a written contract: “Except as provided in sections 126.301 and 1302.98 of the Revised Code, an action upon a specialty or an agreement, contract, or promise in writing shall be brought within fifteen years after the cause thereof accrued.” 1992 Am.Sub.H.B. No. 152.

The General Assembly amended R.C. 2305.06 in 2012 to reduce the limitations period for commencing a claim upon a written contract from 15 years to 8 years. As amended in 2012, R.C. 2305.06 stated, “Except as provided in sections 126.301 and 1302.98 of the Revised Code, an action upon a specialty or an agreement, contract, or promise in writing shall be brought within eight years after the cause of action accrued.”

The General Assembly again amended R.C. 2305.06 in 2021 S.B. 13 (“S.B. 13”) to further reduce the limitations period for commencing a claim upon a written contract from eight years to six years. The 2021 version of R.C. 2305.06 states, “Except as provided in sections 126.301, 1302.98, 1303.16, 1345.10, and 2305.04 of the Revised Code, an action upon a specialty or an agreement, contract, or promise in writing shall be brought within six years after the cause of action accrued.”

Uncodified language in Section 4 of S.B. 13 mirrored the language in Section 4 of S.B. 224. It stated that, for causes of action that accrued prior to the effective date of S.B. 13, the limitations period would be the shorter of six years from the effective date of S.B. 13 or the expiration of the limitations period in effect prior to the effective date.

An action upon a contract or liability, express or implied, excepting those mentioned in ORS 12.070, 12.110 and 12.135 and except as otherwise provided in ORS 72.7250; (2) An action upon a liability created by statute, other than a penalty or forfeiture, excepting those mentioned in ORS 12.110; (3) An action for waste or trespass upon or for interference with or injury to any interest of another in real property, excepting those mentioned in ORS 12.050, 12.060, 12.135, 12.137 and 273.241; or (4) An action for taking, detaining or injuring personal property, including an action for the specific recovery thereof, excepting an action mentioned in ORS 12.137; shall be commenced within six years.

An action upon a judgment or decree of any court of the United States, or of any state or territory within the United States; or (2) An action upon a sealed instrument entered into before August 13, 1965, shall be commenced within 10 years.

An action against a person by a plaintiff who is not a public body, whether in contract, tort or otherwise, arising from the person having performed the construction, alteration or repair of any improvement to real property or the supervision or inspection thereof, or from the person having furnished design, planning, surveying, architectural or engineering services for the improvement, must be commenced before the earliest of: (a) The applicable period of limitation otherwise established by law; (b) Ten years after substantial completion or abandonment of the construction, alteration or repair of a small commercial structure or residential structure; or (c) Six years after substantial completion or abandonment of the construction, alteration or repair of a large commercial structure.

An action for breach of any contract for sale must be commenced within four years after the cause of action has accrued. By the original agreement the parties may reduce the period of limitation to not less than one year but may not extend it. (2) A cause of action accrues when the breach occurs, regardless of the aggrieved party’s lack of knowledge of the breach. A breach of warranty occurs when tender of delivery is made, except that where a warranty explicitly extends to future performance of the goods and discovery of the breach must await the time of such performance the cause of action accrues when the breach is or should have been discovered.

Where an action commenced within the time limited by subsection (1) of this section is so terminated as to leave available a remedy by another action for the same breach such other action may be commenced after the expiration of the time limited and within six months after the termination of the first action unless the termination resulted from voluntary discontinuance or from dismissal for failure or neglect to prosecute.

(a) Except as otherwise specially provided, all civil actions shall be commenced within ten (10) years next after the cause of action shall accrue, and not after.

an action for the recovery of damages for personal injury, death, or damage to real or personal property, including any action based upon implied warranties arising out of an alleged design, inspection, listing, or manufacturing defect, or any other alleged defect of whatsoever kind or nature in a product, or arising out of any alleged failure to warn regarding a product, or arising out of any alleged failure to properly instruct in the use of a product, shall be commenced within ten (10) years after the date the product was first purchased for use or consumption.

The following actions shall be commenced and sued within twenty (20) years next after the cause of action shall accrue and not after: actions on contracts or liabilities under seal; and actions on judgments or decrees of any court of record of the United States, or of any state.

§ 9-1-24. Special limitations provisions unaffected. The provisions of §§ 9-1-14 — 9-1-23 shall not apply to any case in which a different time is limited by special provisions.

An action is commenced for purposes of the statute of limitations when the complaint is either filed with the court, deposited in the mail addressed to the clerk, or delivered to an officer for service.

If any person, liable to an action by another, shall fraudulently, by actual misrepresentation, conceal from him or her the existence of the cause of action, the cause of action shall be deemed to accrue against the person so liable at the time when the person entitled to sue thereon shall first discover its existence.

If an action is timely commenced and is terminated in any other manner than by a voluntary discontinuance, a dismissal of the complaint for neglect to prosecute the action, or a final judgment upon the merits, the plaintiff, or if he or she dies and the claim survives, his or her executor or administrator, may commence a new action upon the same claim within one year after the termination.

The following compilation of statutes of limitation for civil actions is set forth as an aid to the public and is not intended to replace the specific statutes referred to herein. The omission of any statute of limitation from this list shall in no way affect the validity of that statute.

6A-2-725(1) Breach of contracts for sale of goods 4 years 6A-2-725(5) Breach of warranty in products liability actions 10 years

We have referred to this particular provision as the "catchall ten-year statute of limitations for civil actions."

Additionally, as we explained in Pickering, 109 R.I. at 150, 282 A.2d at 588, an insured‟s action against his or her UM/UIM carrier is an action for breach of contract: “Although a tortious injury is an incidental element in the insured‟s suit against his [or her] insurer over a policy contract, the action is fundamentally one in contract. The plaintiff here would have no action if it were not for the coverage provided by her insurance policy. The insurer‟s liability rises solely from the insurance contract and nothing else.”

The provision under review, which both shortens the period in which a UM/UIM claim may be asserted from the ten-year statute of limitations and fixes a date on which that shortened period begins to run that is earlier than the accrual date for the cause of action, is void and unenforceable as against the public policy that underlies § 27-7-2.1.

Accordingly, we express no opinion as to whether an insurer may permissibly narrow the limitations period from the statutory ten-year period when the limitations period under the policy begins to run on the date of the insurer‟s alleged breach of the UM/UIM policy.

This Court has routinely upheld provisions in insurance contracts that require the insured to commence legal actions within a time period that is less than the legislatively enacted statute of limitations.

A contractual limitation found in an insurance policy which prescribes a shorter time for the bringing of suit than the applicable statute of limitations, has been upheld if the interval between the loss and the mandatory institution of litigation is reasonable.

Section 6A-2-725 reads as follows: “Statute of limitations in contracts for sale. — (1) *251 An action for breach of any contract for sale must be commenced within four (4) years after the cause of action has accrued. By the original agreement the parties may reduce the period of limitation to not less than one (1) year but may not extend it.

The plaintiff, for his part, argued to the hearing justice that defendant should be estopped from enforcing the contractual two-year limitations provision. However, he offered nothing to support that argument.

For the reasons set forth in this opinion, we affirm the judgment of the Superior Court.

The defendant Chrysler Corporation’s position is that since this is an action for personal injuries, it is governed by G. L. 1956, §9-1-14, and is barred because it was not commenced within two years after its accrual. We agree.

Since we have decided that the Uniform Commercial Code does not apply to the facts of this case, we do not reach the question whether §6A-2-725 impliedly repeals §9-1-14. On this record the trial justice correctly applied the two-year statute of limitations. The order entered in the Superior Court is affirmed.

Conclusion For the reasons articulated above, we answer the certified question in the negative. The papers in this case are remanded to the United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit.

the contractually imposed two-year limitation period to bring suit should not begin to run until defendant breached the contract by refusing to pay the claim. We are not persuaded by either of plaintiff’s arguments.

Except where, in special cases, a different limitation is prescribed by statute, the following civil actions other than for the recovery of real property can be commenced only within six years after the cause of action shall have accrued: (1) An action upon a contract, obligation, or liability, express or implied, excepting those mentioned in §§ 15-2-6 to 15-2-8 , inclusive, and subdivisions 15-2-15(3) and (4);

A cause of action accrues when the breach occurs, regardless of the aggrieved party's lack of knowledge of the breach. A breach of warranty occurs when tender of delivery is made, except that where a warranty explicitly extends to future performance of the goods and discovery of the breach must await the time of such performance the cause of action accrues when the breach is or should have been discovered.

(1) An action for breach of any contract for sale must be commenced within four years after the cause of action has accrued.

(3) Where an action commenced within the time limited by subsection (1) is so terminated as to leave available a remedy by another action for the same breach such other action may be commenced after the expiration of the time limited and within six months after the termination of the first action unless the termination resulted from voluntary discontinuance or from dismissal for failure or neglect to prosecute.

(a) Except as provided by Subsection (b), a person may not enter a stipulation, contract, or agreement that purports to limit the time in which to bring suit on the stipulation, contract, or agreement to a period shorter than two years. A stipulation, contract, or agreement that establishes a limitations period that is shorter than two years is void in this state. (b) This section does not apply to a stipulation, contract, or agreement relating to the sale or purchase of a business entity if a party to the stipulation, contract, or agreement pays or receives or is obligated to pay or entitled to receive consideration under the stipulation, contract, or agreement having an aggregate value of not less than $500,000.

Every action for which there is no express limitations period, except an action for the recovery of real property, must be brought not later than four years after the day the cause of action accrues.

(a) A contract stipulation that requires a claimant to give notice of a claim for damages as a condition precedent to the right to sue on the contract is not valid unless the stipulation is reasonable. A stipulation that requires notification within less than 90 days is void. (b) If notice is required, the claimant may notify any convenient agent of the company that requires the notice. (c) A contract stipulation between the operator of a railroad, street railway, or interurban railroad and an employee or servant of the operator is void if it requires as a condition precedent to liability: (1) the employee or servant to notify the system of a claim for damages for personal injury caused by negligence; or (2) the spouse, parent, or child of a deceased employee or servant to notify the system of a claim of death caused by negligence. (d) This section applies to a contract between a federal prime contractor and a subcontractor, except that the notice period stipulated in the subcontract may be for a period not less than the period stipulated in the prime contract, minus seven days. (e) In a suit covered by this section or Section 16.070 , it is presumed that any required notice has been given unless lack of notice is specifically pleaded under oath. (f) This section does not apply to a contract relating to the sale or purchase of a business entity if a party to the contract pays or receives or is obligated to pay or receive consideration under the contract having an aggregate value of not less than $500,000.

(a) A person must bring suit on the following actions not later than four years after the day the cause of action accrues: (1) specific performance of a contract for the conveyance of real property; (2) penalty or damages on the penal clause of a bond to convey real property; (3) debt; (4) fraud; or (5) breach of fiduciary duty.

Every action for which there is no express limitations period, except an action for the recovery of real property, must be brought not later than four years after the day the cause of action accrues.

(c) A person must bring suit against his partner for a settlement of partnership accounts, and must bring an action on an open or stated account, or on a mutual and current account concerning the trade of merchandise between merchants or their agents or factors, not later than four years after the day that the cause of action accrues. For purposes of this subsection, the cause of action accrues on the day that the dealings in which the parties were interested together cease.

(a) Except as provided by Subsection (b), a person may not enter a stipulation, contract, or agreement that purports to limit the time in which to bring suit on the stipulation, contract, or agreement to a period shorter than two years. A stipulation, contract, or agreement that establishes a limitations period that is shorter than two years is void in this state. (b) This section does not apply to a stipulation, contract, or agreement relating to the sale or purchase of a business entity if a party to the stipulation, contract, or agreement pays or receives or is obligated to pay or entitled to receive consideration under the stipulation, contract, or agreement having an aggregate value of not less than $500,000.

(a) An action for breach of any contract for sale must be commenced within four years after the cause of action has accrued. By the original agreement the parties may reduce the period of limitation to not less than one year but may not extend it. (b) A cause of action accrues when the breach occurs, regardless of the aggrieved party's lack of knowledge of the breach. A breach of warranty occurs when tender of delivery is made, except that where a warranty explicitly extends to future performance of the goods and discovery of the breach must await the time of such performance the cause of action accrues when the breach is or should have been discovered.

The four-year residual limitations period of Civil Practice and Remedies Code § 16.051 applies to a breach of contract action.

An action may be brought within six years: for the mesne profits of real property; subject to Subsection (2) , upon any contract, obligation, or liability founded upon an instrument in writing, except those mentioned in Section 78B-2-311

An action for breach of any contract for sale must be commenced within four years after the cause of action has accrued. By the original agreement the parties may reduce the period of limitation to not less than one year but may not extend it.

A cause of action accrues when the breach occurs, regardless of the aggrieved party's lack of knowledge of the breach. A breach of warranty occurs when tender of delivery is made, except that where a warranty explicitly extends to future performance of the goods and discovery of the breach must await the time of such performance the cause of action accrues when the breach is or should have been discovered.

For a credit agreement, as defined in Section 25-5-4 , the six-year period described in Subsection (1) begins the later of the day on which: the debt arose; the debtor makes a written acknowledgment of the debt or a promise to pay the debt; or the debtor or a third party makes a payment on the debt.

Where an action commenced within the time limited by Subsection (1) is so terminated as to leave available a remedy by another action for the same breach such other action may be commenced after the expiration of the time limited and within six months after the termination of the first action unless the termination resulted from voluntary discontinuance or from dismissal for failure or neglect to prosecute. This section does not alter the law on tolling of the statute of limitations nor does it apply to causes of action which have accrued before December 31, 1965.

2. In actions on any contract that is not otherwise specified and that is in writing and signed by the party to be charged thereby, or by his agent, within five years whether such writing be under seal or not;

4. In actions upon (i) any contract that is not otherwise specified and that is in writing and not signed by the party to be charged, or by his agent, or (ii) any unwritten contract, express or implied, within three years.

C. In the case of any action to which § 8.2-725 of the Uniform Commercial Code is applicable, that section shall be controlling except that in products liability actions for injury to person and for injury to property, other than the property subject to contract, the limitation prescribed in § 8.01-243 shall apply.

§ 8.01-230 . Accrual of right of action. In every action for which a limitation period is prescribed, the right of action shall be deemed to accrue and the prescribed limitation period shall begin to run from the date the injury is sustained in the case of injury to the person or damage to property, when the breach of contract occurs in actions ex contractu and not when the resulting damage is discovered, except where the relief sought is solely equitable or where otherwise provided under § 8.01-233 , subsection C of § 8.01-245 , §§ 8.01-249 , 8.01-250 or other statute.

In all other cases, an unwritten promise not to plead the statute shall be void, and a written promise not to plead such statute shall be valid and enforceable to prevent assertion of the defense of the statute only when (i) the written promise is made to avoid or defer litigation pending settlement of any cause of action that has accrued in favor of the promisee against the promisor, (ii) the written promise is signed by the promisor or his agent, and (iii) the promisee commences an action asserting such cause of action within the earlier of (a) the applicable limitations period running from the date the written promise is made or (b) any shorter time as may be provided in the written promise. No provision of this subsection shall operate contrary to subsections B and C.

In addition, Hensel Phelps points to specific phrases in the subcontract that it alleges unambiguously demonstrate intent to waive the statute of limitations, such as the statement that “[t]he Subcontractor is bound to the Contractor by the same terms and conditions by which Contractor is bound to [Virginia Tech] under the Contract,” and that the subcontractor’s warranty period covers any time “prior to Contractor’s release from responsibility to [Virginia Tech] therefor as required by the Contract Documents.” These provisions similarly fail to expressly indicate “knowledge of” and “intent to relinquish” the subcontractors’ right to a limitations period. May, 205 Va. at 404, 137 S.E.2d at 865 (internal citation omitted). We therefore hold that the various identified phrases do not demonstrate sufficient intent to incorporate a waiver of the statute of limitations.

B. In any action, including those brought by the Commonwealth, upon any contract under subdivision A 2 or 4 to collect medical debt, such an action is barred if not commenced within three years from the due date applicable to the final invoice for a health care service unless the contract with a hospital or health care provider is for a payment plan that allows for a longer period of time for the collection of debt by the hospital or health care provider.

For the purposes of this subsection, "medical debt" means a debt arising directly from the receipt of a health care service and originally owed directly to a health care service provider. The provisions of this subsection shall not apply to medical debt arising from services paid for under programs administered by the Department of Medical Assistance Services.

3. In actions by a partner against another for settlement of the partnership account or in actions upon accounts concerning the trade of merchandise between merchant and merchant, their factors, or servants, within five years from the cessation of the dealings in which they are interested together;

A. Whenever the failure to enforce a promise, written or unwritten, not to plead the statute of limitations would operate as a fraud on the promisee, the promisor shall be estopped to plead the statute.

D. Subsections A and C shall not apply to, limit, or prohibit written promises to waive or not to plead the statute of limitations that are made in, or contemporaneously with, subcontracts of any tier that are related to contracts for construction, construction management, design-build, architecture, or engineering under Chapter 43 (§ 2.2-4300 et seq.) or 43.1 (§ 2.2-4378 et seq.) of Title 2.2; under the policies and procedures adopted by any county, city, or town or school board; under Title 23.1; or under authorizing provisions, policies, or procedures for procurement of such contracts by any public body exempted from the foregoing; however, such waiver or promise not to plead applies only to demands, claims, or actions asserted under such contracts by a public body. As used in this subsection, "subcontract" includes any contract or purchase order to supply labor, equipment, materials, or services to an entity awarded a contract with a public body or to any lower-tier entity performing work provided for in such a contract.

A. Subject to the provisions of § 8.01-243 regarding injuries to person and property and of § 8.01-245 regarding the application of limitations to fiduciaries, and their bonds, actions founded upon a contract, other than actions on a judgment or decree, shall be brought within the following number of years next after the cause of action shall have accrued:

In the event of breach of a payment plan, an action is barred if not commenced within three years from the date of breach by the debtor.

An express waiver must reflect both elements: knowledge of the right’s existence and the intent to relinquish it. While the subcontracts incorporate the prime 4 contract by reference, a general incorporation provision is insufficient to expressly waive a limitations period, as it does not expressly acknowledge the right to a limitations period or intent to waive that right.

Furthermore, the prime contract itself did not expressly waive the statute of limitations by contracting for an unlimited limitations period. Rather, it is Code § 8.01-231, applicable to the Commonwealth and its agency, Virginia Tech, and not any of the contract documents that provided that no limitations period could be applicable as against the Commonwealth.

We therefore conclude that the right of action accrued upon breach of the performance provisions of the contract at some point between the commencement of construction in 1997 and completion of the project in 1998, or the repair work in the year 2000, and that the statute of limitations had thus long run by the filing of the suit in 2014. Because any breach by the subcontractors occurred at the time of their respective performances, the statute of limitations has similarly run against their sureties. III. CONCLUSION For the aforementioned reasons, we will affirm the judgment of the circuit court. Affirmed.

1. In actions for fraud or mistake, in actions for violations of the Consumer Protection Act (§ 59.1-196 et seq.) based upon any misrepresentation, deception, or fraud, and in actions for rescission of contract for undue influence, when such fraud, mistake, misrepresentation, deception, or undue influence is discovered or by the exercise of due diligence reasonably should have been discovered;

5. In actions for contribution or for indemnification, when the contributee or the indemnitee has paid or discharged the obligation.

Today’s ruling is consistent with the Commonwealth’s larger statutory scheme, which relies on accrual of a right of action upon breach rather than upon discovery on most contract actions in the interest of finality. See Code § 8.01-230. Specific indemnification language within a subcontract would result in a later-accruing statute of limitations, as expressed in Code § 8.01-249(5).

The following actions shall be commenced within six years: (1) An action upon a contract in writing, or liability express or implied arising out of a written agreement, except as provided for in RCW 64.04.007(2). (2) An action upon an account receivable. For purposes of this section, an account receivable is any obligation for payment incurred in the ordinary course of the claimant's business or profession, whether arising from one or more transactions and whether or not earned by performance. (3) An action for the rents and profits or for the use and occupation of real estate. [ 2012 c 185 s 3; 2007 c 124 s 1; 1989 c 38 s 1; 1980 c 105 s 2; 1927 c 137 s 1; Code 1881 s 27; 1854 p 363 s 3; RRS s 157.] Notes: Application—2007 c 124: "This act applies to all causes of action on accounts receivable, whether commenced before or after July 22, 2007." [ 2007 c 124 s 2.]

The following actions shall be commenced within three years: (1) An action for waste or trespass upon real property; (2) An action for taking, detaining, or injuring personal property, including an action for the specific recovery thereof, or for any other injury to the person or rights of another not hereinafter enumerated; (3) Except as provided in RCW 4.16.040(2), an action upon a contract or liability, express or implied, which is not in writing, and does not arise out of any written instrument; (4) An action for relief upon the ground of fraud, the cause of action in such case not to be deemed to have accrued until the discovery by the aggrieved party of the facts constituting the fraud; (5) An action against a sheriff, coroner, or constable upon a liability incurred by the doing of an act in his or her official capacity and by virtue of his or her office, or by the omission of an official duty, including the nonpayment of money collected upon an execution; but this subsection shall not apply to action for an escape; (6) An action against an officer charged with misappropriation or a failure to properly account for public funds intrusted to his or her custody; an action upon a statute for penalty or forfeiture, where an action is given to the party aggrieved, or to such party and the state, except when the statute imposing it prescribed a different limitation: PROVIDED, HOWEVER, The cause of action for such misappropriation, penalty, or forfeiture, whether for acts heretofore or hereafter done, and regardless of lapse of time or existing statutes of limitations, or the bar thereof, even though complete, shall not be deemed to accrue or to have accrued until discovery by the aggrieved party of the act or acts from which such liability has arisen or shall arise, and such liability, whether for acts heretofore or hereafter done, and regardless of lapse of time or existing statute of limitation, or the bar thereof, even though complete, shall exist and be enforceable for three years after discovery by aggrieved party of the act or acts from which such liability has arisen or shall arise. [ 2011 c 336 s 83; 1989 c 38 s 2; 1937 c 127 s 1; 1923 c 28 s 1; Code 1881 s 28; 1869 p 8 s 28; 1854 p 363 s 4; RRS s 159.]

A contract provision becomes substantively unconscionable when it eliminates otherwise established statutory rights and is one sided, benefiting the contract drafter, is also not prominently set out in the contract, is not negotiated or bargained for, and provides no benefit to the affected party. Based on this, we hold here that this limitation provision is void and unenforceable. We further hold that under chapter 4.16 RCW, the Tadychs’ suit is timely. We reverse the Court of Appeals and remand for trial.8 8 Based on this holding, we do not address the additional issues of procedural unconscionability and equitable estoppel.

In rejecting the Tadychs’ substantive unconscionability claim, the Court of Appeals reasoned that Adler and Gandee do not support the Tadychs’ position because the one-year provision at issue here is “twelve times longer” than the limitation provision at issue in Gandee and “at least twice as long as that in Adler.” Tadych, No. 81948-8-I, slip op. at 15. This is an erroneous application of this analysis. The proper assessment requires a comparison of the contractual period with the statutorily established period at issue in the particular case.

Therefore, we hold that the 180-day limitations provision in the agreement unreasonably favors Fred Lind Manor and thus is substantively unconscionable.

We reject Adler’s claims that the WLAD entitles him to a judicial forum, that Fred Lind Manor has waived its right to arbitrate this dispute, and/or that Fred Lind Manor should be equitably estopped from asserting arbitration. However, we conclude that the attorney fees and limitations provisions of the arbitration agreement are substantively unconscionable but sever these provisions from the agreement thus preserving the parties’ intent to arbitrate their disputes. We remand to the trial court for determination, consistent with this opinion, of Adler’s claims of procedural unconscionability, including whether Adler implicitly waived his right to a jury trial and the substantive conscionability of the fee-splitting provision.

Generally, a private statute of limitations will control over general statutes of limitation “ ‘ “unless prohibited by statute or public policy, or unless [it is] unreasonable.” ’ ” Adler, 153 Wn.2d at 356 (quoting Resp’ts’ *607 Br. at 43 (quoting Ashburn v. Safeco Ins. Co. of Am., 42 Wn. App. 692, 696 , 713 P.2d 742 (1986))). Here, the provision shortens the statute of limitations from the four years provided by the CPA to 30 days. In Adler , we held a shortening of the statute of limitations from three years to 180 days to be substantively unconscionable. Adler, 153 Wn.2d at 355-58 . Consistent with Adler’s holding, we find the statute of limitations provision here to be substantively unconscionable.

We affirm the trial court’s denial of the motion to compel arbitration. The arbitration clause itself is so permeated with unconscionable provisions as to make severance impossible. Without an enforceable arbitration clause, the plaintiff cannot be compelled to arbitrate. Accordingly, we remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

(1) If the beneficiary or mortgagee, or its assignees, of debt secured by owner-occupied real property intends to release its deed of trust or mortgage in the real property for less than full payment of the secured debt, it shall provide upon its first written notice to the borrower the following information in substantially the following form: "To: [Name of borrower] DATE: Please take note that [name of beneficiary or mortgagee, or its assignees], in releasing its security interest in this owner-occupied real property, [waives or reserves] the right to collect that amount that constitutes full payment of the secured debt. The amount of debt outstanding as of the date of this letter is $. . . . . .. However, nothing in this letter precludes the borrower from negotiating with the [name of beneficiary or mortgagee, or its assignees] for a full release of this outstanding debt. If [name of beneficiary or mortgagee, or its assignees] does not initiate a court action to collect the outstanding debt within three years on the date which it released its security interest, the right to collect the outstanding debt is forfeited." (2) If the beneficiary or mortgagee, or its assignees, of debt secured by owner-occupied real property intends to pursue collection of the outstanding debt, it must initiate a court action to collect the remaining debt within three years from the date on which it released its deed of trust or mortgage in the owner-occupied real property or else it forfeits any right to collect the remaining debt. (3) This section applies only to debts incurred by individuals primarily for personal, family, or household purposes. This section does not apply to debts for business, commercial, or agricultural purposes. (4) For the purposes of this section, "owner-occupied real property" means real property consisting solely of a single-family residence, a residential condominium unit, or a residential cooperative unit that is the principal residence of the borrower. [ 2012 c 185 s 1.]

Similar to the provision in Adler and Gandee, this limitation provision effectively abolishes a plaintiff’s statutory right under RCW 4.16.310 to bring a claim.

The unconscionability issue in this case centers on one sentence in a “warranty” paragraph on the 10th page of a 14-page boilerplate contract drafted by the respondent-contractor

The Tadychs entered into a written contract with Noble Ridge Construction Inc. to build a custom home.

Except as otherwise provided in this chapter, and except when in special cases a different limitation is prescribed by a statute not contained in this chapter, actions can only be commenced within the periods provided in this chapter after the cause of action has accrued. [ 1989 c 14 s 1.]

An action for relief not hereinbefore provided for, shall be commenced within two years after the cause of action shall have accrued. [Code 1881 s 33; 1877 p 9 s 32; 1854 p 364 s 7; RRS s 165.]

We hold that under sec. 893.43, a contract cause of action accrues at the moment the contract is breached, regardless of whether the injured party knew or should have known that the breach occurred.

There is one issue presented in this case. When does a contract cause of action "accrue," as that term is used in sec. 893.43, Stats., 1 Wisconsin's six-year statute of limitations for contract actions?

In Wisconsin, a 90-year line of precedent holds that " [i]n an action for breach of contract, the cause of action accrues and the statute of limitations begins to run from the moment the breach occurs. This is true whether or not the facts of, the breach are known by the party having the right to the action." State v. Holland Plastics Co., 111 Wis. 2d 497, 506 , 331 N.W.2d 320 (1983) (citations omitted)

An action upon a motor vehicle insurance policy described in s. 632.32 (1) shall be commenced within 3 years after the cause of action accrues or be barred.

Section 893.43, Stats., provides as follows: Action on contract. An action upon any contract, obligation or liability, express or implied, including an action to recover fees for professional services, except those mentioned in s. 893.40, shall be commenced within 6 years after the cause of action accrues or be barred.

However, it must be emphasized that sec. 893.43, Stats., applies to contracts in general, as opposed to one distinct type of transaction.

The widely adopted Uniform Commercial Code creates a statute of limitations for sales contracts which runs from the time of breach, regardless of when discovery occurs. Wisconsin's version of this law, codified in sec. 402.725(2), Stats. 1991-92, contains the recommended language of the uniform act: "A cause of action accrues when the breach occurs, regardless of the aggrieved party's lack of knowledge of the breach."

We recognize that a contract breach may sometimes be latent and, in practical terms, undetectable.

For the foregoing reasons, we decline to apply the discovery rule to sec. 893.43, Stats. Under that section, a cause of action accrues at the time the contract is breached, regardless of whether the injured party knew or should have known that the breach occurred. By the Court. — The judgment of the Dane county circuit court is affirmed.