How long does our counterparty have to sue on this contract in Rhode Island, and can the contract shorten it?
Ten years, twenty under seal, and a contractual shortening is established in the case law located only for insurance policies. R.I. Gen. Laws § 9-1-13(a): "Except as otherwise specially provided, all civil actions shall be commenced within ten (10) years next after the cause of action shall accrue, and not after." The Supreme Court calls this "the 'catchall ten-year statute of limitations for civil actions'" (Harodite Industries, Inc. v. Warren Electric Corp.) and applies it to contract claims, including a suit on an insurance policy: American States Insurance Co. v. LaFlam, quoting Pickering, holds that "[a]lthough a tortious injury is an incidental element in the insured's suit against his [or her] insurer over a policy contract, the action is fundamentally one in contract." Under seal the period is twenty years: § 9-1-17 gives twenty years to "actions on contracts or liabilities under seal; and actions on judgments or decrees of any court of record of the United States, or of any state." Section 9-1-12 fixes commencement ("when the complaint is either filed with the court, deposited in the mail addressed to the clerk, or delivered to an officer for service") § 9-1-20 postpones accrual where the defendant "shall fraudulently, by actual misrepresentation, conceal from him or her the existence of the cause of action", and § 9-1-22 gives one year to refile after a timely action is terminated other than by voluntary discontinuance, dismissal for want of prosecution, or final judgment on the merits. ON SHORTENING BY CONTRACT: "This Court has routinely upheld provisions in insurance contracts that require the insured to commence legal actions within a time period that is less than the legislatively enacted statute of limitations" (Chase v. Nationwide Mutual Fire Insurance Co.). Every Rhode Island decision we could find enforcing such a clause is an insurance case, and no Rhode Island holding enforcing a shortened period in an ordinary commercial contract was found.
The trap
The adjacent section is the trap, and it does not say what it looks like it says. Section 9-1-24 is titled "Special limitations provisions unaffected" and reads in full: "The provisions of §§ 9-1-14 — 9-1-23 shall not apply to any case in which a different time is limited by special provisions." That range BEGINS AT § 9-1-14. It does not reach § 9-1-13, the ten-year contract period (whose own opening words, "Except as otherwise specially provided", do that work instead), and it does not reach the tolling and refiling sections that sit below § 9-1-14 only in number. Do not cite § 9-1-24 for the proposition that a special period displaces § 9-1-13. A second trap: LaFlam is routinely read as Rhode Island refusing to let a contract shorten the ten-year period, and it holds nothing so broad. It voided a UM/UIM clause because it BOTH shortened the period AND started the clock on the date of the accident rather than on the insurer's breach, and the Court then reserved the question in terms: "we express no opinion as to whether an insurer may permissibly narrow the limitations period from the statutory ten-year period when the limitations period under the policy begins to run on the date of the insurer's alleged breach". Four years later Chase enforced a two-year suit clause. Third: for a sale of goods the period is four years, not ten, except where the claim is for personal injury, which International Union of Operating Engineers Local 57 v. Chrysler Motors Corp. held is governed by the two-year section instead: the defendant's position "that since this is an action for personal injuries, it is governed by G. L. 1956, §9-1-14, and is barred because it was not commenced within two years after its accrual" drew the answer "We agree", and the Court expressly did "not reach the question whether §6A-2-725 impliedly repeals §9-1-14", and the governing section, R.I. Gen. Laws § 6A-2-725, is ABSENT from the Rhode Island statutes we publish, although § 9-1-36, Rhode Island's own published index of limitations periods, lists it ("6A-2-725(1) Breach of contracts for sale of goods 4 years"). Its text could be located only through a 1969 opinion setting out the then-current version, under which "the parties may reduce the period of limitation to not less than one (1) year but may not extend it" - nine Rhode Island opinions mention the section and the rest were not read for this rule.
22 authorities
- statuteR.I. Gen. Laws § 9-1-13enactment date not established
The words that state the rule
(a) Except as otherwise specially provided, all civil actions shall be commenced within ten (10) years next after the cause of action shall accrue, and not after.
- statuteR.I. Gen. Laws § 9-1-13enactment date not established
The words that state the rule
an action for the recovery of damages for personal injury, death, or damage to real or personal property, including any action based upon implied warranties arising out of an alleged design, inspection, listing, or manufacturing defect, or any other alleged defect of whatsoever kind or nature in a product, or arising out of any alleged failure to warn regarding a product, or arising out of any alleged failure to properly instruct in the use of a product, shall be commenced within ten (10) years after the date the product was first purchased for use or consumption.
- statuteR.I. Gen. Laws § 9-1-17enactment date not established
The words that state the rule
The following actions shall be commenced and sued within twenty (20) years next after the cause of action shall accrue and not after: actions on contracts or liabilities under seal; and actions on judgments or decrees of any court of record of the United States, or of any state.
- statuteR.I. Gen. Laws § 9-1-24enactment date not established
The words that state the rule
§ 9-1-24. Special limitations provisions unaffected. The provisions of §§ 9-1-14 — 9-1-23 shall not apply to any case in which a different time is limited by special provisions.
- statuteR.I. Gen. Laws § 9-1-12enactment date not established
The words that state the rule
An action is commenced for purposes of the statute of limitations when the complaint is either filed with the court, deposited in the mail addressed to the clerk, or delivered to an officer for service.
- statuteR.I. Gen. Laws § 9-1-20enactment date not established
The words that state the rule
If any person, liable to an action by another, shall fraudulently, by actual misrepresentation, conceal from him or her the existence of the cause of action, the cause of action shall be deemed to accrue against the person so liable at the time when the person entitled to sue thereon shall first discover its existence.
- statuteR.I. Gen. Laws § 9-1-22enactment date not established
The words that state the rule
If an action is timely commenced and is terminated in any other manner than by a voluntary discontinuance, a dismissal of the complaint for neglect to prosecute the action, or a final judgment upon the merits, the plaintiff, or if he or she dies and the claim survives, his or her executor or administrator, may commence a new action upon the same claim within one year after the termination.
- statuteR.I. Gen. Laws § 9-1-36enactment date not established
The words that state the rule
The following compilation of statutes of limitation for civil actions is set forth as an aid to the public and is not intended to replace the specific statutes referred to herein. The omission of any statute of limitation from this list shall in no way affect the validity of that statute.
- statuteR.I. Gen. Laws § 9-1-36enactment date not established
The words that state the rule
6A-2-725(1) Breach of contracts for sale of goods 4 years 6A-2-725(5) Breach of warranty in products liability actions 10 years
- case24 A.3d 514Harodite Industries, Inc. v. Warren Electric Corp.R.I.decided 2011read it at the source ↗
The words that state the rule
We have referred to this particular provision as the "catchall ten-year statute of limitations for civil actions."
The words that state the rule
Additionally, as we explained in Pickering, 109 R.I. at 150, 282 A.2d at 588, an insured‟s action against his or her UM/UIM carrier is an action for breach of contract: “Although a tortious injury is an incidental element in the insured‟s suit against his [or her] insurer over a policy contract, the action is fundamentally one in contract. The plaintiff here would have no action if it were not for the coverage provided by her insurance policy. The insurer‟s liability rises solely from the insurance contract and nothing else.”
The words that state the rule
The provision under review, which both shortens the period in which a UM/UIM claim may be asserted from the ten-year statute of limitations and fixes a date on which that shortened period begins to run that is earlier than the accrual date for the cause of action, is void and unenforceable as against the public policy that underlies § 27-7-2.1.
The words that state the rule
Accordingly, we express no opinion as to whether an insurer may permissibly narrow the limitations period from the statutory ten-year period when the limitations period under the policy begins to run on the date of the insurer‟s alleged breach of the UM/UIM policy.
- case160 A.3d 970Chase v. Nationwide Mutual Fire Insurance Co.R.I.decided 2017read it at the source ↗
The words that state the rule
This Court has routinely upheld provisions in insurance contracts that require the insured to commence legal actions within a time period that is less than the legislatively enacted statute of limitations.
The words that state the rule
A contractual limitation found in an insurance policy which prescribes a shorter time for the bringing of suit than the applicable statute of limitations, has been upheld if the interval between the loss and the mandatory institution of litigation is reasonable.
- case255 A.2d 170International Union of Operating Engineers Local 57 v. Chrysler Motors Corp.R.I.decided 1969read it at the source ↗
The words that state the rule
Section 6A-2-725 reads as follows: “Statute of limitations in contracts for sale. — (1) *251 An action for breach of any contract for sale must be commenced within four (4) years after the cause of action has accrued. By the original agreement the parties may reduce the period of limitation to not less than one (1) year but may not extend it.
- case160 A.3d 970Chase v. Nationwide Mutual Fire Insurance Co.R.I.decided 2017read it at the source ↗
The words that state the rule
The plaintiff, for his part, argued to the hearing justice that defendant should be estopped from enforcing the contractual two-year limitations provision. However, he offered nothing to support that argument.
- case160 A.3d 970Chase v. Nationwide Mutual Fire Insurance Co.R.I.decided 2017read it at the source ↗
The words that state the rule
For the reasons set forth in this opinion, we affirm the judgment of the Superior Court.
- case255 A.2d 170International Union of Operating Engineers Local 57 v. Chrysler Motors Corp.R.I.decided 1969read it at the source ↗
The words that state the rule
The defendant Chrysler Corporation’s position is that since this is an action for personal injuries, it is governed by G. L. 1956, §9-1-14, and is barred because it was not commenced within two years after its accrual. We agree.
- case255 A.2d 170International Union of Operating Engineers Local 57 v. Chrysler Motors Corp.R.I.decided 1969read it at the source ↗
The words that state the rule
Since we have decided that the Uniform Commercial Code does not apply to the facts of this case, we do not reach the question whether §6A-2-725 impliedly repeals §9-1-14. On this record the trial justice correctly applied the two-year statute of limitations. The order entered in the Superior Court is affirmed.
The words that state the rule
Conclusion For the reasons articulated above, we answer the certified question in the negative. The papers in this case are remanded to the United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit.
- case160 A.3d 970Chase v. Nationwide Mutual Fire Insurance Co.R.I.decided 2017read it at the source ↗
The words that state the rule
the contractually imposed two-year limitation period to bring suit should not begin to run until defendant breached the contract by refusing to pay the claim. We are not persuaded by either of plaintiff’s arguments.
“Defective” means that reading found something to correct. What you are reading is the rule as it stands after that reading.