Grades, item by item

In the summer of 2025, the Texas [C] of Representatives lacked a quorum because several dozen members (the respondents, [C]) left the state in early August 2025 to prevent the [C] from functioning. They returned two weeks later, and a quorum was achieved in mid-August. The Governor ([A]) and the [B] ([B]), through [D] ([D]), each petitioned the Supreme Court of Texas for writs of quo warranto to remove the absent members from office, arguing that they abandoned or forfeited their offices. The respondents argued that quorum-breaking is a legitimate legislative tactic. The court noted its institutional reluctance to involve itself in contests of factional political power and that the political dynamics resolved the matter. The court denied the petitions, declining to exercise discretionary jurisdiction.

**MEMORANDUM**

**TO:** Appellate Practice Group  
**FROM:** Appellate Counsel  
**DATE:** March 30, 2026  
**SUBJECT:** Appellate Analysis: Supreme Court of Texas Discretionary Jurisdiction over Original Petitions for Writ of *Quo Warranto* Involving Legislative Quorum-Breaking  

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### 1. Dispositive Issue
Whether the Supreme Court of Texas properly declined to exercise original jurisdiction over petitions for writ of *quo warranto* seeking to remove state legislators for breaking quorum, where (a) the Court lacks original *quo warranto* jurisdiction to remove state legislators, (b) the Texas Constitution vests the exclusive authority to discipline or expel members in the Legislature itself, and (c) the dispute became moot or nonjusticiable once quorum was restored and the political branches resolved the standoff.

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### 2. Controlling Legal Standard and Authorities
* **Original Jurisdiction of the Supreme Court of Texas:**  
  The Texas Supreme Court is a court of limited original jurisdiction constrained by the Texas Constitution and statute. *See* Tex. Const. art. V, § 3(a); Tex. Gov't Code § 22.002. Under Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code Chapter 66 (*Quo Warranto*), an action in the nature of *quo warranto* must be brought in a **district court**, not directly as an original proceeding in the Texas Supreme Court. *See* Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code § 66.002(c) (mandating that *quo warranto* actions be brought in the district court of the proper county). The Supreme Court does not possess general original jurisdiction over *quo warranto* actions against state legislators.

* **Legislative Self-Governance & Separation of Powers:**  
  Article III, Section 11 of the Texas Constitution provides: *"Each House may determine the rules of its own proceedings, punish members for disorderly conduct, and, with the consent of two-thirds, expel a member..."* Furthermore, Article III, Section 10 explicitly empowers a smaller number than a quorum to *"compel the attendance of absent members, in such manner and under such penalties as each House may provide."* Under the Separation of Powers Clause (Tex. Const. art. II, § 1), the judiciary cannot usurp powers textually committed to the legislative branch. *See In re Abbott*, 628 S.W.3d 288 (Tex. 2021) (orig. proceeding); *State v. Ferguson*, 133 Tex. 60, 125 S.W.2d 272 (1939).

* **Mootness and Political Question Doctrine:**  
  A court will decline to issue extraordinary relief where the immediate controversy has ceased (mootness) or presents a nonjusticiable political question. *See Williams v. Lara*, 52 S.W.3d 171, 184 (Tex. 2001) (case is moot when issues presented are no longer "live" or parties lack a legally cognizable interest in the outcome); *Brown v. De La Cruz*, 156 S.W.3d 560, 566 (Tex. 2004).

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### 3. Application to Facts
1. **Lack of Original Subject-Matter Jurisdiction:**  
   The Governor and officials filed petitions for writ of *quo warranto* directly in the Texas Supreme Court. *Quo warranto* proceedings must originate in the district courts under Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code § 66.002; the Texas Supreme Court has no statutory or constitutional authority under Tex. Gov't Code § 22.002 to act as a court of first instance for *quo warranto* actions against state representatives.

2. **Exclusive Legislative Authority over Membership:**  
   The Texas Constitution expressly commits the discipline, compulsion of attendance, and expulsion of legislators to the respective legislative chambers (Tex. Const. art. III, §§ 10, 11). Deciding whether an unexcused absence/quorum-break constitutes "abandonment" or "forfeiture" of legislative office is a core legislative function. Judicial interference in this process would violate Article II, Section 1 (Separation of Powers).

3. **Mootness / Prudence:**  
   The respondents returned to the chamber and a quorum was restored. Because the legislative process resumed and the political mechanism provided in Article III, Section 10 operated to resolve the attendance issue, no live controversy remained requiring extraordinary judicial intervention.

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### 4. Correct Procedural Vehicle and Posture
* **Vehicle Filed:** Original Petition for Writ of *Quo Warranto* / Petition for Writ of Mandamus in the Supreme Court of Texas.
* **Proper Vehicle:** Any statutory *quo warranto* proceeding must be filed initially by the Attorney General or a local district/county attorney in a **Texas District Court** (Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code § 66.002). Even then, claims seeking to expel sitting legislators for legislative absences are subject to dismissal under Rule 91a / plea to the jurisdiction based on the political question doctrine and constitutional separation of powers.

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### 5. Predicted Disposition
**Petitions Denied / Dismissed for Lack of Jurisdiction.**

The Texas Supreme Court acted properly in declining to exercise jurisdiction and denying the petitions. The Court lacked original *quo warranto* jurisdiction, the dispute was rendered moot by the members' return, and the determination of internal legislative discipline and quorum enforcement is textually committed to the Legislature under Article III of the Texas Constitution.

In the summer of 2025, the Texas [C] of Representatives lacked a quorum because several dozen members (the respondents, [C]) left the state in early August 2025 to prevent the [C] from functioning. They returned two weeks later, and a quorum was achieved in mid-August. The Governor ([A]) and the [B] ([B]), through [D] ([D]), each petitioned the Supreme Court of Texas for writs of quo warranto to remove the absent members from office, arguing that they abandoned or forfeited their offices. The respondents argued that quorum-breaking is a legitimate legislative tactic. The court noted its institutional reluctance to involve itself in contests of factional political power and that the political dynamics resolved the matter. The court denied the petitions, declining to exercise discretionary jurisdiction.

Disposition · The Supreme Court properly declined to exercise discretionary jurisdiction over the quo‑warranto petitions; the denial is correct.  

Issue · Whether the Texas Supreme Court properly declined to exercise its discretionary jurisdiction over the petitions for writ of quo warranto filed by the Governor and the Board of Trustees, given that the political branches had resolved the dispute.  

Standard of review · The Supreme Court may decline to exercise discretionary jurisdiction under Tex. R. App. P. 67.  The Court’s discretion is exercised when the case is moot or when the political branches have resolved the dispute, as the Constitution and the Rules allow the Court to abstain from adjudicating matters that have been settled by the political process.  

Controlling authority · Texas Constitution Art. V §3(a); Tex. R. App. P. 67; Tex. R. App. P. 54.  

Application (short) · The petitions alleged that the absent members abandoned or forfeited their offices.  The dispute was effectively settled when the members returned, a quorum was restored, and the legislature and Governor acted to resolve the issue.  Because the political branches had already addressed the matter, the Supreme Court’s discretion to decline, as provided in Tex. R. App. P. 67, was properly exercised.  The Court’s denial of jurisdiction was therefore correct.  

Procedure · The petitions were filed for quo‑warranto under Article V §3(a).  The Supreme Court declined to exercise discretionary jurisdiction pursuant to Rule 67 and dismissed the petitions.  No further appellate action is available.

[C] is a special school district that was created in the 1960s under a since-repealed chapter of the Texas Education Code authorizing 'rehabilitation districts' to provide education, training, and special services for persons with disabilities. Counties joined the district by countywide election; one county's voters joined in the 1970s after a commissioners court order stating the vote would authorize the district to levy an ad valorem tax at a rate not exceeding five cents per $100 of assessed valuation. The enabling statute provided no procedure for leaving or disbanding a district. After Congress required public schools to educate students with disabilities, the Legislature amended the chapter to allow such districts to offer vocational training to both disabled and non-disabled students, and [C] changed its name and continues to operate under the old provisions. [C]'s board adopts a tax rate annually (below the statutory maximum). A group of individual taxpayers in the county ([A]) and a neighboring school district located within [C]'s boundaries ([B]) sued [C] and [County], alleging [C] now serves a purpose different from the one the county's voters approved, since disabled students make up a negligible share of its enrollment. They sought declarations that the tax is unlawful under the 'contract with the voters' doctrine (Tex. Const. art. I, § 16) and that levying a tax without voter approval violates Tex. Const. art. VII, § 3(e) and is ultra vires, plus a permanent injunction barring [C] from levying and [County] from collecting the tax. [C] filed a plea to the jurisdiction asserting lack of standing and governmental immunity. The trial court denied the plea and [C] took an interlocutory appeal under Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code § 51.014(a)(8). The court of appeals reversed and rendered judgment dismissing all claims for lack of standing: relying on Bland Independent School District v. Blue, it held [A] lacked taxpayer standing because their suit risked significant 'disruption of government operations' given [C]'s decades-long reliance on the tax, and it held [B] failed to allege a concrete, particularized, redressable injury. The court of appeals did not reach [C]'s alternative arguments that the claims present a nonjusticiable political question (raised for the first time on appeal) and are barred by governmental immunity. [A] and [B] jointly petitioned the Supreme Court of Texas for review, which was granted. Assume for this question that you are asked only about the individual taxpayers [A]. In the Supreme Court, [C] defends the dismissal on three grounds: (1) [A]'s injury is not particularized because every other resident of the county subject to the tax suffers the same injury; (2) [A] cannot show the tax is actually illegal under either constitutional provision, which [C] says is required to establish taxpayer standing; and (3) any 'contract with the voters' was abrogated when the Legislature broadened the districts' purpose, and [A] ratified the change by electing board members who keep levying the tax. [C] also defends the court of appeals' reliance on Bland Independent School District v. Blue for the proposition that a suit threatening significant disruption to government operations and the settled expectations of other taxpayers cannot proceed.

**Disposition**
Reverse and remand. Confidence: 95%.

**Issue**
Whether individual property owners challenging the direct levy and collection of an allegedly unconstitutional ad valorem tax against their property must satisfy the narrow "taxpayer standing" doctrine governing challenges to public expenditures, or whether they have standing under the general constitutional standing framework based on a direct, concrete financial injury.

**Standard of review**
De novo. Subject-matter jurisdiction and standing are questions of law reviewed de novo on appeal from a ruling on a plea to the jurisdiction. *Tex. Dep't of Parks & Wildlife v. Miranda*, 133 S.W.3d 217, 226 (Tex. 2004); *Heckman v. Williamson Cty.*, 369 S.W.3d 137, 149–50 (Tex. 2012).

**Controlling authority**
- *Heckman v. Williamson Cty.*, 369 S.W.3d 137 (Tex. 2012) (establishing Texas constitutional standing requirements: injury in fact, fairly traceable, and redressable; merits inquiries cannot be conflated with subject-matter jurisdiction).
- *Williams v. Lara*, 52 S.W.3d 171 (Tex. 2001) (differentiating direct, particularized injury standing from the taxpayer-standing exception applicable to public expenditures).
- *Bland Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Blue*, 34 S.W.3d 547 (Tex. 2000) (taxpayer standing is a narrow exception permitting challenges to illegal disbursements of public funds; potential disruption of government operations informs the policy limits of expenditure standing, not a direct-injury challenge).
- *Tex. Dep't of Parks & Wildlife v. Miranda*, 133 S.W.3d 217 (Tex. 2004).

**Application**
1. *Applicable Standing Framework*: The general constitutional standing framework applies, not the common-law "taxpayer standing" exception. Taxpayer standing is a limited exception created to allow citizens to challenge the unlawful *expenditure* or disbursement of public funds where no individual suffered a distinct injury. By contrast, when individual property owners challenge the direct, compulsory assessment and collection of a tax levied against their own property, they suffer a concrete, individualized economic injury (a direct pocketbook harm) sufficient to confer standing under general constitutional principles. *See Williams*, 52 S.W.3d at 178–79; *Heckman*, 369 S.W.3d at 154–56.

2. *Response to [C]'s Arguments*:
   - *Particularized injury*: An economic loss from paying an allegedly unlawful tax on one's own property is a concrete injury in fact. That many other property owners in the county are subject to the same tax does not convert an individualized financial injury into a generalized, nonjusticiable grievance. *Heckman*, 369 S.W.3d at 155.
   - *Requirement to prove illegality*: Standing does not require the plaintiff to prove prevailing on the merits of their constitutional claims at the jurisdictional stage. Conflating the merits of the statutory or constitutional claim with standing is improper. *Miranda*, 133 S.W.3d at 226–28.
   - *Abrogation and ratification*: Whether the Legislature's amendments abrogated the original voter authorization or whether subsequent elections constituted ratification are substantive defenses on the merits, not jurisdictional defects barring standing.

3. *The Bland "Disruption" Rationale*: The court of appeals erred in using *Bland*'s discussion of government disruption to bar [A]'s suit. *Bland* highlighted potential government disruption as the historical rationale for strictly limiting the *taxpayer expenditure* standing exception. It does not create a freestanding, substantive defense to jurisdiction that extinguishes a plaintiff's right to challenge an unlawful direct extraction of taxes.

**Procedure**
Interlocutory appeal under Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code § 51.014(a)(8) from the trial court's order denying [C]'s plea to the jurisdiction. The Supreme Court of Texas should reverse the court of appeals' judgment dismissing [A]'s claims for lack of standing and remand the cause to the court of appeals to consider the unresolved grounds (governmental immunity and the nonjusticiable political question doctrine).

[C] is a special school district that was created in the 1960s under a since-repealed chapter of the Texas Education Code authorizing 'rehabilitation districts' to provide education, training, and special services for persons with disabilities. Counties joined the district by countywide election; one county's voters joined in the 1970s after a commissioners court order stating the vote would authorize the district to levy an ad valorem tax at a rate not exceeding five cents per $100 of assessed valuation. The enabling statute provided no procedure for leaving or disbanding a district. After Congress required public schools to educate students with disabilities, the Legislature amended the chapter to allow such districts to offer vocational training to both disabled and non-disabled students, and [C] changed its name and continues to operate under the old provisions. [C]'s board adopts a tax rate annually (below the statutory maximum). A group of individual taxpayers in the county ([A]) and a neighboring school district located within [C]'s boundaries ([B]) sued [C] and [County], alleging [C] now serves a purpose different from the one the county's voters approved, since disabled students make up a negligible share of its enrollment. They sought declarations that the tax is unlawful under the 'contract with the voters' doctrine (Tex. Const. art. I, § 16) and that levying a tax without voter approval violates Tex. Const. art. VII, § 3(e) and is ultra vires, plus a permanent injunction barring [C] from levying and [County] from collecting the tax. [C] filed a plea to the jurisdiction asserting lack of standing and governmental immunity. The trial court denied the plea and [C] took an interlocutory appeal under Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code § 51.014(a)(8). The court of appeals reversed and rendered judgment dismissing all claims for lack of standing: relying on Bland Independent School District v. Blue, it held [A] lacked taxpayer standing because their suit risked significant 'disruption of government operations' given [C]'s decades-long reliance on the tax, and it held [B] failed to allege a concrete, particularized, redressable injury. The court of appeals did not reach [C]'s alternative arguments that the claims present a nonjusticiable political question (raised for the first time on appeal) and are barred by governmental immunity. [A] and [B] jointly petitioned the Supreme Court of Texas for review, which was granted. Assume for this question that you are asked only about [B], the neighboring school district. At the hearing on the plea, [B]'s superintendent testified that disabled students make up about eleven percent of [B]'s enrollment (roughly the state average), that [B] could call an election to raise its own taxes at any time and [C] could not prevent it, and that the Legislature controls the funding of Texas public schools. [B] contends [C]'s tax harms it by increasing [B]'s burden of serving disabled students, by 'double taxing' [B]'s residents so that [B] cannot raise its own rate, and by giving [C] a competitive advantage in hiring; it argues an injunction would let it raise its rate, pay debt sooner, and offer competitive salaries. [B] also relies on prior Supreme Court of Texas decisions recognizing school districts' standing to challenge the constitutionality of the state school-finance system.

**Disposition**
Affirm the court of appeals’ judgment dismissing [B]’s claims for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction. (Confidence: High).

**Issue**
Whether a neighboring independent school district ([B]) has constitutional standing to challenge a special district’s ([C]’s) authority to levy an ad valorem property tax based on allegations of indirect economic harm, political friction in raising its own tax rate, and increased service burdens.

**Standard of Review**
Standing is a component of subject-matter jurisdiction, reviewed de novo. *Tex. Ass’n of Bus. v. Tex. Air Control Bd.*, 852 S.W.2d 440, 445–46 (Tex. 1993). When a plea to the jurisdiction challenges the existence of jurisdictional facts with evidence, the court applies a standard that mirrors a traditional summary judgment: the court considers relevant evidence submitted by the parties, taking as true all evidence favorable to the nonmovant and indulging every reasonable inference in its favor. *Tex. Dep’t of Parks & Wildlife v. Miranda*, 133 S.W.3d 217, 227–28 (Tex. 2004). If the evidence creates a genuine fact issue regarding jurisdiction, the plea cannot be granted; if the relevant evidence is undisputed or fails to raise a fact issue, the court rules on the plea as a matter of law. *Id.*

**Controlling Authority**
- *Heckman v. Williamson County*, 369 S.W.3d 137, 154–55 (Tex. 2012) (adopting the constitutional standing requirements: injury in fact, traceability, and redressability).
- *DaimlerChrysler Corp. v. Inman*, 252 S.W.3d 299, 304–05 (Tex. 2008) (injury must be concrete, particularized, actual or imminent, and not hypothetical or conjectural).
- *Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife*, 504 U.S. 555, 560–61 (1992).
- *Tex. Dep’t of Parks & Wildlife v. Miranda*, 133 S.W.3d 217, 226–28 (Tex. 2004).

**Application**
Under the general test for standing, a plaintiff must demonstrate: (1) a concrete and particularized injury in fact that is actual or imminent, not conjectural or hypothetical; (2) that the injury is fairly traceable to the defendant's challenged action; and (3) that it is likely, not merely speculative, that the injury will be redressed by a favorable judicial decision.

1. *Injury in Fact:* [B] asserts three injuries: (a) educating a proportional share of disabled students, (b) taxpayer resistance to future tax rate increases by [B] due to [C]’s overlapping tax, and (c) competitive disadvantages in hiring staff. None constitutes a legally cognizable injury in fact. Educating resident disabled students is a statutory obligation mandated by federal and state law, not an injury inflicted by [C]. The alleged political reluctance of local voters to approve a hypothetical future tax increase is purely speculative, conjectural, and indirect.

2. *Traceability and Redressability:* As [B]’s superintendent conceded, [C] has no legal authority to prevent [B] from calling an election to raise its own tax rate, and the Texas Legislature sets the statutory framework and funding formulas. Whether enjoining [C]’s tax would lead [B]’s voters to approve higher taxes for [B], or whether [B] would successfully pay down debt or increase salaries, depends on the independent choices of third parties (voters, prospective employees) and is entirely speculative. Thus, the alleged injuries are neither fairly traceable to [C] nor redressable by an injunction against [C].

3. *School-Finance Precedents Distinguished:* [B]’s reliance on Texas school-finance cases is unavailing. In those cases, school districts had standing to sue *state officials* because the state regulatory and school-finance apparatus directly governed, restricted, and funded the school districts themselves under Article VII, Section 1 of the Texas Constitution. That precedent does not grant an ISD standing to mount a collateral constitutional challenge against a distinct, co-equal political subdivision’s local taxing authority.

**Procedure**
The plea to the jurisdiction was filed by [C] and denied by the trial court. [C] brought an interlocutory appeal under Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code § 51.014(a)(8). The court of appeals correctly reversed and rendered judgment dismissing [B]’s claims for lack of standing. The Supreme Court of Texas should affirm the court of appeals’ dismissal of [B]’s claims.

A municipality ([B]) and a county ([C]) in Texas sought to spur development of a large new shopping center ([Shopping Center]) by attracting a flagship outdoor-retail store ([E]) and a big-box hardware store ([G]) as anchors. [B] and [C] entered agreements with a nonprofit corporation ([D]) that owned the project site, under which each government granted [D] a specified percentage of the sales tax generated by the two anchor stores and a smaller percentage of sales tax generated by other businesses in the center. [D] agreed to use the dedicated funds solely to repay a $10 million construction loan (secured by the pledged tax payments) taken out to build the [E] facility; the governments were required to deposit the pledged proceeds into a segregated "Grant Fund" from which money could be withdrawn only to service the construction debt. A further agreement among [B], [C], [D], and [E] recited that it was "in the public interest to promote the economic development of the [E] Facility" and provided that payments would begin only "following the completion and opening of" the store. [D] leased the site to [E] at a base rent equal to the quarterly loan payment minus the sales-tax grants, with a $1 purchase option once the loan was paid off. The store opened and operated continuously for eleven years; the governments together paid about $150,000 per quarter to [D], which serviced the loan. An uncontroverted affidavit states that the anchor store contributed to the success of the center for more than a decade and that the center may not have materialized without it. After eleven years, [E] closed the store, apparently after discovering structural defects in the building. The shopping center continued to operate and generate substantial tax revenue, and the former anchor space is now occupied by another large retailer ([F]). The governments then took the position that the store's closure ended the public purposes justifying the grants and sued [D] and [E] for declarations that (1) the closure extinguished the public purposes authorizing the grants, (2) the agreements lacked sufficient controls to ensure those purposes were met, (3) the agreements were unconstitutional for permitting public funds to be spent without adequate safeguards, (4) continued payments after the closure would be unconstitutional, and (5) the agreements were unconstitutional to the extent they required such payments. The project's lender ([A]) intervened, and [D] later assigned its rights in the lawsuit to [A]. [E] filed for Chapter 11 bankruptcy. The trial court granted the governments' motion for partial summary judgment and rendered final judgment declaring that the closure "extinguished the public purposes" that authorized the grants, that the agreements "failed to place sufficient controls on the transaction," and that the agreements were "unconstitutional, void[,] and illegal." A divided intermediate court of appeals affirmed, holding that Texas Constitution article III, section 52-a (the 1987 economic-development amendment) does not displace the Gift Clauses and then applying the three-part framework from Texas Municipal League Intergovernmental Risk Pool v. Texas Workers' Compensation Commission and Borgelt v. Austin Firefighters Ass'n; the dissenting justice would have held the summary-judgment evidence insufficient to establish that the agreements failed the constitutional test. [A] petitioned the Supreme Court of Texas for review, arguing (1) that the Gift Clause framework does not apply at all to economic-development grants authorized by section 52-a, which begins "Notwithstanding any other provision of this constitution," or (2) alternatively that the lower courts misapplied that framework. The petition was granted and the case argued.

**Disposition**
Reverse and remand (or reverse and render in part). Confidence: High.

**Issue**
Whether economic-development agreements under Texas Constitution article III, section 52-a violated the constitutional Gift Clauses (Tex. Const. art. III, §§ 51, 52(a); art. XI, § 3) for allegedly lacking adequate public controls because they did not mandate that a private anchor retailer operate indefinitely or for a specified duration.

**Standard of review**
De novo review of a grant of summary judgment and constitutional interpretation. In assessing summary judgment, courts review the record in the light most favorable to the nonmovant, indulging every reasonable inference and resolving any doubts in the nonmovant's favor.

**Controlling authority**
- *Texas Municipal League Intergovernmental Risk Pool v. Texas Workers' Compensation Commission*, 74 S.W.3d 377 (Tex. 2002).
- *Borgelt v. Austin Firefighters Ass'n*, 692 S.W.3d 288 (Tex. 2024).
- *Davis v. City of Lubbock*, 326 S.W.2d 699 (Tex. 1959).
- Texas Constitution article III, section 52-a.

**Application**
1. *Controlling Formulation of the Control Requirement*: Under the three-part *Texas Municipal League* test, an expenditure of public funds complies with the Gift Clauses if: (1) the expenditure's predominant purpose is to accomplish a public purpose; (2) the public entity retains sufficient public control over the funds and transaction to ensure that the public purpose is carried out and protect the public's investment; and (3) the public entity receives a return benefit. The control prong requires contractual or statutory mechanisms that reasonably ensure the public benefit will be realized, rather than absolute operational control over private entities or perpetual operation mandates.

2. *Relevant Controls Present in the Arrangement*: 
   - **Condition precedent to payment**: Public grant payments were conditioned on the actual construction, completion, and opening of the flagship anchor facility before any funds were disbursed.
   - **Restricted/segregated use of funds**: Grants were deposited into a segregated "Grant Fund" with strict withdrawal restrictions limited exclusively to servicing the construction loan incurred to build the economic-development asset.
   - **Performance-tied funding mechanism**: Public contributions were measured by and funded directly from a percentage of the actual sales taxes generated by the anchor store and development, ensuring that public disbursements correlated with actual economic activity and local tax generation.
   - **Realization of long-term economic catalyst purpose**: The controls successfully secured eleven years of continuous anchor operation, catalyzing shopping-center infrastructure and ongoing tax base expansion.

3. *Summary-Judgment Prediction*: The summary judgment declaring the agreements void for lack of controls does not survive. The absence of a continuous-operation covenant does not render the controls constitutionally deficient as a matter of law where the agreements tied payments to project completion, restricted fund usage to capital debt retirement, and self-funded the grants via generated tax revenue.

**Procedure**
The Supreme Court of Texas reviews the final summary judgment rendered by the trial court and affirmed by the court of appeals on petition for review under Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 53, reverses the court of appeals' judgment affirming the summary judgment, and remands (or renders judgment defeating the governments' constitutional challenges).

[C] is a special school district that was created in the 1960s under a since-repealed chapter of the Texas Education Code authorizing 'rehabilitation districts' to provide education, training, and special services for persons with disabilities. Counties joined the district by countywide election; one county's voters joined in the 1970s after a commissioners court order stating the vote would authorize the district to levy an ad valorem tax at a rate not exceeding five cents per $100 of assessed valuation. The enabling statute provided no procedure for leaving or disbanding a district. After Congress required public schools to educate students with disabilities, the Legislature amended the chapter to allow such districts to offer vocational training to both disabled and non-disabled students, and [C] changed its name and continues to operate under the old provisions. [C]'s board adopts a tax rate annually (below the statutory maximum). A group of individual taxpayers in the county ([A]) and a neighboring school district located within [C]'s boundaries ([B]) sued [C] and [County], alleging [C] now serves a purpose different from the one the county's voters approved, since disabled students make up a negligible share of its enrollment. They sought declarations that the tax is unlawful under the 'contract with the voters' doctrine (Tex. Const. art. I, § 16) and that levying a tax without voter approval violates Tex. Const. art. VII, § 3(e) and is ultra vires, plus a permanent injunction barring [C] from levying and [County] from collecting the tax. [C] filed a plea to the jurisdiction asserting lack of standing and governmental immunity. The trial court denied the plea and [C] took an interlocutory appeal under Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code § 51.014(a)(8). The court of appeals reversed and rendered judgment dismissing all claims for lack of standing: relying on Bland Independent School District v. Blue, it held [A] lacked taxpayer standing because their suit risked significant 'disruption of government operations' given [C]'s decades-long reliance on the tax, and it held [B] failed to allege a concrete, particularized, redressable injury. The court of appeals did not reach [C]'s alternative arguments that the claims present a nonjusticiable political question (raised for the first time on appeal) and are barred by governmental immunity. [A] and [B] jointly petitioned the Supreme Court of Texas for review, which was granted. Assume for this question that you are asked only about [B], the neighboring school district. At the hearing on the plea, [B]'s superintendent testified that disabled students make up about eleven percent of [B]'s enrollment (roughly the state average), that [B] could call an election to raise its own taxes at any time and [C] could not prevent it, and that the Legislature controls the funding of Texas public schools. [B] contends [C]'s tax harms it by increasing [B]'s burden of serving disabled students, by 'double taxing' [B]'s residents so that [B] cannot raise its own rate, and by giving [C] a competitive advantage in hiring; it argues an injunction would let it raise its rate, pay debt sooner, and offer competitive salaries. [B] also relies on prior Supreme Court of Texas decisions recognizing school districts' standing to challenge the constitutionality of the state school-finance system.

**MEMORANDUM**

**TO:** Appellate Practice Group  
**FROM:** Appellate Counsel  
**DATE:** May 20, 2024  
**SUBJECT:** Standing Analysis for School District [B] in Challenge to [C]’s Taxing Authority

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### 1. Dispositive Issue
Whether a public school district ([B]) has constitutional standing to challenge a neighboring, overlapping special-purpose school district’s ([C]’s) taxing authority and mission under the “contract with the voters” doctrine and Texas Constitution article VII, section 3(e), based on claims of indirect economic harm, competition for personnel, and political difficulty in raising its own local property taxes.

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### 2. Controlling Legal Standard

#### A. Constitutional Standing
Under Texas law, standing is a constitutional prerequisite to subject-matter jurisdiction. *Tex. Ass’n of Bus. v. Tex. Air Control Bd.*, 852 S.W.2d 440, 443–44 (Tex. 1993). Texas courts adhere to the federal test for constitutional standing, requiring three elements:
1. **Injury-in-Fact:** The plaintiff must have suffered an invasion of a legally protected interest that is (a) concrete and particularized, and (b) actual or imminent, not conjectural or hypothetical. *Heckman v. Williamson Cnty.*, 369 S.W.3d 137, 154–55 (Tex. 2012) (citing *Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife*, 504 U.S. 555, 560–61 (1992)).
2. **Traceability/Causation:** The injury must be fairly traceable to the defendant’s challenged conduct and not the result of the independent action of some third party not before the court. *Id.* at 155.
3. **Redressability:** It must be likely, as opposed to merely speculative, that the injury will be redressed by a favorable judicial decision. *Id.*

#### B. Standard of Review for an Evidence-Based Plea to the Jurisdiction
When a plea to the jurisdiction challenges the existence of jurisdictional facts and the parties submit evidence, the court reviews the matter under a standard mirroring a traditional summary judgment. *Tex. Dep’t of Parks & Wildlife v. Miranda*, 133 S.W.3d 217, 226–28 (Tex. 2004). 
* The court takes as true all evidence favorable to the nonmovant, indulging every reasonable inference and resolving any doubts in the nonmovant’s favor.
* If the relevant evidence is undisputed or fails to raise a genuine issue of material fact regarding the jurisdictional requirement, the court rules on the plea as a matter of law. *Id.* at 228.

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### 3. Application to [B]’s Claims and Evidence

#### A. Failure to Show a Concrete, Particularized Injury-in-Fact
[B] asserts three primary injuries, none of which satisfies the constitutional requirement:

1. **Burden of Educating Students with Disabilities:** [B] contends [C] no longer educates a substantial number of disabled students, shifting that burden to [B]. However, [B]’s superintendent conceded that disabled students constitute approximately eleven percent of [B]’s enrollment (in line with state averages) and that [B] is independently required by federal and state law (such as the IDEA and the Texas Education Code) to educate these students. [B] has no legally cognizable right to have another school district educate students residing within [B]’s boundaries.
2. **“Double Taxation” and Inability to Raise Taxes:** [B] argues that [C]’s tax burdens local residents, practically preventing [B] from raising its own tax rate. This is a political and economic frustration, not a legally cognizable injury. As [B]’s superintendent admitted, [B] has the independent legal authority to call a tax-rate election at any time, and [C] possesses no statutory or regulatory authority to prevent [B] from doing so. Reluctance of local voters to approve higher taxes due to cumulative tax burdens does not constitute a concrete, legally protected injury to the political subdivision itself.
3. **Competitive Disadvantage in Hiring:** General market competition for employees between political subdivisions does not confer standing to challenge the lawful authority or tax revenue of a neighboring entity.

#### B. Lack of Traceability and Redressability
* **Traceability:** [B]’s alleged injuries (funding constraints, voter resistance to tax increases) stem from the overarching state school-finance system, local voter preferences, and independent economic factors—not [C]’s collection of an ad valorem tax authorized by statute.
* **Redressability:** Enjoining [C]’s tax will not automatically increase [B]’s tax revenue, raise salaries, or ensure that [B]’s voters will approve a future tax increase. Redressability impermissibly hinges on the independent, discretionary choices of third-party voters. *See Heckman*, 369 S.W.3d at 155.

#### C. Inapplicability of the School-Finance Jurisprudence
[B]’s reliance on Texas school-finance precedents (e.g., *Neeley v. W. Orange-Cove Consol. Indep. Sch. Dist.*, 176 S.W.3d 746 (Tex. 2005); *Edgewood Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Kirby*, 777 S.W.2d 391 (Tex. 1989)) is misplaced:
* In those cases, school districts had standing to sue the **State**—the sovereign responsible for the statewide public school system—under Article VII, Section 1 (the mandate to maintain an efficient system) and Article VIII, Section 1-e (the prohibition against a state ad valorem tax), because state statutory caps and mandates directly constrained the districts’ constitutional functions.
* Here, [B] is suing a **peer political subdivision**, not the State. [C] does not administer the state finance system, set [B]’s funding formulas, or enforce statewide statutory caps against [B].

---

### 4. Procedural Vehicle and Posture
* **Vehicle:** Interlocutory appeal pursuant to Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code § 51.014(a)(8) from the trial court’s interlocutory order denying [C]’s evidence-based plea to the jurisdiction.
* **Current Posture:** On petition for review before the Supreme Court of Texas following the court of appeals’ judgment reversing the trial court and rendering a dismissal of all claims for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction.

---

### 5. Predicted Disposition
**Affirm** the court of appeals’ judgment dismissing [B]’s claims for lack of standing. 

Because [B]’s evidence fails as a matter of law to establish a concrete, particularized injury that is fairly traceable to [C]’s tax and redressable by the requested injunction, the trial court lacked subject-matter jurisdiction over [B]’s claims.

[C] is a special school district that was created in the 1960s under a since-repealed chapter of the Texas Education Code authorizing 'rehabilitation districts' to provide education, training, and special services for persons with disabilities. Counties joined the district by countywide election; one county's voters joined in the 1970s after a commissioners court order stating the vote would authorize the district to levy an ad valorem tax at a rate not exceeding five cents per $100 of assessed valuation. The enabling statute provided no procedure for leaving or disbanding a district. After Congress required public schools to educate students with disabilities, the Legislature amended the chapter to allow such districts to offer vocational training to both disabled and non-disabled students, and [C] changed its name and continues to operate under the old provisions. [C]'s board adopts a tax rate annually (below the statutory maximum). A group of individual taxpayers in the county ([A]) and a neighboring school district located within [C]'s boundaries ([B]) sued [C] and [County], alleging [C] now serves a purpose different from the one the county's voters approved, since disabled students make up a negligible share of its enrollment. They sought declarations that the tax is unlawful under the 'contract with the voters' doctrine (Tex. Const. art. I, § 16) and that levying a tax without voter approval violates Tex. Const. art. VII, § 3(e) and is ultra vires, plus a permanent injunction barring [C] from levying and [County] from collecting the tax. [C] filed a plea to the jurisdiction asserting lack of standing and governmental immunity. The trial court denied the plea and [C] took an interlocutory appeal under Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code § 51.014(a)(8). The court of appeals reversed and rendered judgment dismissing all claims for lack of standing: relying on Bland Independent School District v. Blue, it held [A] lacked taxpayer standing because their suit risked significant 'disruption of government operations' given [C]'s decades-long reliance on the tax, and it held [B] failed to allege a concrete, particularized, redressable injury. The court of appeals did not reach [C]'s alternative arguments that the claims present a nonjusticiable political question (raised for the first time on appeal) and are barred by governmental immunity. [A] and [B] jointly petitioned the Supreme Court of Texas for review, which was granted. Assume for this question that you are asked only about the individual taxpayers [A]. In the Supreme Court, [C] defends the dismissal on three grounds: (1) [A]'s injury is not particularized because every other resident of the county subject to the tax suffers the same injury; (2) [A] cannot show the tax is actually illegal under either constitutional provision, which [C] says is required to establish taxpayer standing; and (3) any 'contract with the voters' was abrogated when the Legislature broadened the districts' purpose, and [A] ratified the change by electing board members who keep levying the tax. [C] also defends the court of appeals' reliance on Bland Independent School District v. Blue for the proposition that a suit threatening significant disruption to government operations and the settled expectations of other taxpayers cannot proceed.

**MEMORANDUM**

**TO:** Appellate Practice Group  
**FROM:** Appellate Counsel  
**DATE:** March 30, 2025  
**RE:** Interlocutory Appeal: Standing Analysis of Individual Taxpayers ([A]) v. [C] & [County]

---

### 1. DISPOSITIVE ISSUE
Whether individual ad valorem taxpayers ([A]) have standing under Texas’s common-law **taxpayer-standing doctrine** to seek prospective declaratory and injunctive relief against a school district’s alleged ultra vires and unconstitutional levy and collection of property taxes, notwithstanding that their economic injury is not particularized and that the lawsuit could disrupt governmental operations.

---

### 2. CONTROLLING LEGAL STANDARDS & AUTHORITIES

1. **General Standing vs. Taxpayer-Standing Exception:**
   * Under general Texas constitutional standing principles, a plaintiff must demonstrate a concrete, particularized, and legally cognizable injury that is fairly traceable to the defendant's conduct and redressable by the requested relief. *See Heckman v. Williamson County*, 369 S.W.3d 137, 154–55 (Tex. 2012); *Texas Ass’n of Business v. Texas Air Control Bd.*, 852 S.W.2d 440, 443–46 (Tex. 1993).
   * Texas recognizes a well-established equitable exception: **the taxpayer-standing doctrine**. Under this doctrine, a taxpayer has standing to sue in equity to prospectively enjoin the illegal expenditure of public funds or the unlawful assessment and collection of taxes without showing an individualized injury distinct from that suffered by the public at large. *See Bland Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Blue*, 34 S.W.3d 547, 555–56 (Tex. 2000); *Williams v. Lara*, 52 S.W.3d 171, 179 (Tex. 2001); *Calvert v. Hull*, 475 S.W.2d 907, 908 (Tex. 1972); *Hoffman v. Davis*, 100 S.W.2d 94, 95 (Tex. [Comm’n App.] 1937).

2. **Scope of the Doctrine and Limits on "Disruption":**
   * While the requirement of standing generally protects against undue governmental disruption, the taxpayer-standing exception specifically balances that policy by permitting *prospective* equitable relief against illegal acts while barring retrospective damage claims or general policy challenges. *See Bland*, 34 S.W.3d at 555–56; *Williams*, 52 S.W.3d at 179–80.

3. **Jurisdictional Inquiry vs. Merits Determination:**
   * In reviewing a plea to the jurisdiction based on standing, the court evaluates the pleadings and jurisdictional evidence to determine whether the plaintiff has pleaded facts establishing standing. A court cannot dismiss for lack of jurisdiction simply by converting a contested question on the merits into a standing defect. *See Tex. Dep’t of Parks & Wildlife v. Miranda*, 133 S.W.3d 217, 226–28 (Tex. 2004); *Bland*, 34 S.W.3d at 554.

---

### 3. APPLICATION TO THE FACTS

#### A. Applicable Framework: Taxpayer-Standing Doctrine Applies
The court of appeals erred to the extent it held [A] to the general requirement of showing a distinct, particularized injury. [A] are individual ad valorem taxpayers within [C] seeking prospective injunctive and declaratory relief against the ongoing and future assessment and collection of an ad valorem tax alleged to be unconstitutional (Tex. Const. art. VII, § 3(e); art. I, § 16) and ultra vires. They fit squarely within the taxpayer-standing doctrine articulated in *Williams v. Lara* and *Bland ISD v. Blue*.

#### B. Rebuttal of [C]’s Arguments

1. **Particularized Injury Argument:**  
   [C] argues [A] suffered no unique injury because every other property owner in the county pays the same tax. This argument fails because it misconstrues the entire premise of taxpayer standing. Taxpayer standing is an explicit *exception* to the rule requiring particularized injury: a taxpayer-plaintiff need only show they are a taxpayer subject to the tax and that the proposed expenditure or tax levy is illegal. *See Williams*, 52 S.W.3d at 179.

2. **Requirement to Prove "Actual Illegality" at the Jurisdictional Stage:**  
   [C] asserts [A] must prove the tax is actually illegal to have standing. This conflates subject-matter jurisdiction with the merits. For taxpayer standing, a plaintiff must *affirmatively plead* and demonstrate a non-frivolous claim that public funds/taxes are being levied or expended illegally without voter authorization. Resolving the ultimate constitutionality of the tax under article VII, section 3(e) goes to whether [A] will prevail on the merits, not whether the trial court has power to hear the dispute. *See Miranda*, 133 S.W.3d at 227–28.

3. **Merits Defenses (Abrogation of "Contract with Voters" and Ratification):**  
   [C]’s arguments that the Legislature broadened its purpose, that the "contract with the voters" was abrogated, or that taxpayers ratified the tax by voting in board elections are affirmative defenses on the merits. They do not deprive the court of jurisdiction over [A]’s ultra vires and constitutional claims.

4. **The Court of Appeals’ Misapplication of *Bland* ("Disruption" Rationale):**  
   The court of appeals erroneously weaponized *Bland*’s observation that standing limits prevent "disruption of government operations" to create a new, substantive bar against taxpayer suits that challenge long-standing or financially significant programs. *Bland* recognized that taxpayer suits are permissible precisely *because* governments should not be permitted to levy taxes or spend funds illegally; the policy limitation in *Bland* restricts taxpayer suits to *prospective* relief (which [A] seek) rather than recovery of past funds or interference with completed transactions. Long-standing reliance by the district cannot manufacture subject-matter jurisdiction or extinguish taxpayer standing.

---

### 4. CORRECT PROCEDURAL VEHICLE & POSTURE
* **Posture:** Interlocutory appeal from the denial of a plea to the jurisdiction filed by a governmental unit, authorized by **Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code § 51.014(a)(8)**, currently pending on petition for review before the Supreme Court of Texas under **Tex. Gov't Code § 22.001(a)**.

---

### 5. PREDICTED DISPOSITION
**Reverse and Remand.**

The Supreme Court of Texas should:
1. **Reverse** the court of appeals’ judgment that dismissed [A]’s claims for lack of standing;
2. **Hold** that [A] have established taxpayer standing to challenge the prospective levy and collection of the ad valorem tax; and
3. **Remand** the case to the court of appeals (or the trial court) to address the unreached issues, including [C]’s claims of governmental immunity and whether the claims present a nonjusticiable political question.

A municipality ([B]) and a county ([C]) in Texas sought to spur development of a large new shopping center ([Shopping Center]) by attracting a flagship outdoor-retail store ([E]) and a big-box hardware store ([G]) as anchors. [B] and [C] entered agreements with a nonprofit corporation ([D]) that owned the project site, under which each government granted [D] a specified percentage of the sales tax generated by the two anchor stores and a smaller percentage of sales tax generated by other businesses in the center. [D] agreed to use the dedicated funds solely to repay a $10 million construction loan (secured by the pledged tax payments) taken out to build the [E] facility; the governments were required to deposit the pledged proceeds into a segregated "Grant Fund" from which money could be withdrawn only to service the construction debt. A further agreement among [B], [C], [D], and [E] recited that it was "in the public interest to promote the economic development of the [E] Facility" and provided that payments would begin only "following the completion and opening of" the store. [D] leased the site to [E] at a base rent equal to the quarterly loan payment minus the sales-tax grants, with a $1 purchase option once the loan was paid off. The store opened and operated continuously for eleven years; the governments together paid about $150,000 per quarter to [D], which serviced the loan. An uncontroverted affidavit states that the anchor store contributed to the success of the center for more than a decade and that the center may not have materialized without it. After eleven years, [E] closed the store, apparently after discovering structural defects in the building. The shopping center continued to operate and generate substantial tax revenue, and the former anchor space is now occupied by another large retailer ([F]). The governments then took the position that the store's closure ended the public purposes justifying the grants and sued [D] and [E] for declarations that (1) the closure extinguished the public purposes authorizing the grants, (2) the agreements lacked sufficient controls to ensure those purposes were met, (3) the agreements were unconstitutional for permitting public funds to be spent without adequate safeguards, (4) continued payments after the closure would be unconstitutional, and (5) the agreements were unconstitutional to the extent they required such payments. The project's lender ([A]) intervened, and [D] later assigned its rights in the lawsuit to [A]. [E] filed for Chapter 11 bankruptcy. The trial court granted the governments' motion for partial summary judgment and rendered final judgment declaring that the closure "extinguished the public purposes" that authorized the grants, that the agreements "failed to place sufficient controls on the transaction," and that the agreements were "unconstitutional, void[,] and illegal." A divided intermediate court of appeals affirmed, holding that Texas Constitution article III, section 52-a (the 1987 economic-development amendment) does not displace the Gift Clauses and then applying the three-part framework from Texas Municipal League Intergovernmental Risk Pool v. Texas Workers' Compensation Commission and Borgelt v. Austin Firefighters Ass'n; the dissenting justice would have held the summary-judgment evidence insufficient to establish that the agreements failed the constitutional test. [A] petitioned the Supreme Court of Texas for review, arguing (1) that the Gift Clause framework does not apply at all to economic-development grants authorized by section 52-a, which begins "Notwithstanding any other provision of this constitution," or (2) alternatively that the lower courts misapplied that framework. The petition was granted and the case argued.

**MEMORANDUM**

### 1. Dispositive Issue
Whether local governments were entitled to summary judgment declaring Chapter 380/381 economic-development tax-rebate agreements unconstitutional under the Texas Constitution’s Gift Clauses (Tex. Const. art. III, § 52(a); art. XI, § 3) on the ground that the agreements lacked sufficient constitutional "controls" to ensure the accomplishment of their public purpose.

---

### 2. Controlling Legal Standard

Under Article III, Section 52-a of the Texas Constitution (and the Gift Clauses in Article III, Section 52(a) and Article XI, Section 3), a political subdivision may grant public money to private entities only if the expenditure satisfies the established three-part test:

1. The predominant purpose of the expenditure is to accomplish a public purpose;
2. The political subdivision retains **sufficient control** over the funds to ensure that the public purpose is carried out and the public investment is safeguarded; and
3. The political subdivision receives a return benefit.

*(See Tex. Mun. League Intergovernmental Risk Pool v. Tex. Workers’ Comp. Comm’n, 74 S.W.3d 377, 384 (Tex. 2002); Borgelt v. Austin Firefighters Ass’n, IAFF Local 975, 671 S.W.3d 897, 903 (Tex. 2023).)*

#### The Control Requirement Formulation
The control requirement does not demand that a public entity dictate day-to-day operations or secure an unconditional, perpetual operating covenant from a private party. Rather, the governing standard requires **contractual or structural safeguards that reasonably ensure the public purpose is realized and that public funds are not expended gratuitously.** 

Adequate controls may be established through:
* Conditions precedent to funding (e.g., performance milestones before funds flow);
* Segregated or dedicated accounts with restricted uses;
* Structuring payments as performance- or revenue-contingent reimbursements (e.g., grants calculated solely as a fraction of newly generated sales tax); and
* Default, clawback, or loan-servicing safeguards that prevent diversion of funds.

---

### 3. Application to These Facts

Assuming the Supreme Court of Texas applies the Gift Clause framework to Section 52-a economic-development agreements, the lower courts erred in holding that the agreements lacked sufficient controls as a matter of law:

1. **Condition Precedent / Milestone Control:** The agreements provided that tax-grant payments would commence *only* "following the completion and opening of" the anchor facility. The governments did not grant funds upfront on a speculative basis; the private entity was required to fully construct and open the store before receiving any funds.
2. **Dedicated Use & Fund Segregation:** The agreements mandated that the pledged tax revenues be deposited into a segregated "Grant Fund" and used exclusively to service the construction debt incurred to build the anchor store. The private parties had no discretion to divert the funds to general operating expenses or private distributions.
3. **Performance-Contingent Revenue Structure:** The grants were not paid from general municipal revenues, but were measured as a percentage of actual sales taxes generated by the anchor store and the shopping center. The funding mechanism was intrinsically tied to the economic activity it sought to spur.
4. **Substantial Actual Performance:** The anchor store operated continuously for 11 years, successfully acting as the catalyst for the entire retail development—the very public purpose contemplated by the agreements.

The lower courts' rationale—that the contracts were constitutionally defective because they lacked a covenant requiring the anchor store to operate forever—imposes an unworkable standard unsupported by Texas Supreme Court precedent. The constitutional inquiry evaluates whether the public entity retained controls reasonably calculated to secure the public purpose, not whether the transaction eliminated all commercial risk.

---

### 4. Correct Procedural Vehicle & Posture
The case is before the Supreme Court of Texas on petition for review from a summary judgment granted under **Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 166a(c)**. 

Because the local governments moved for traditional summary judgment seeking a declaratory judgment that the agreements were unconstitutional *ab initio*, they bore the burden of establishing conclusively that the agreements lacked adequate controls under the *Texas Municipal League* framework.

---

### 5. Predicted Disposition
**Reverse and Remand** (or **Reverse and Render in part, Remand in part**). 

The Supreme Court of Texas will hold that the local governments failed to establish as a matter of law that the agreements lacked sufficient constitutional controls. The Court will reverse the summary judgment declaring the agreements void for lack of controls and remand the case to the trial court for further proceedings consistent with the proper application of the *Texas Municipal League* / *Borgelt* framework.

In the summer of 2025, the Texas [C] of Representatives lacked a quorum because several dozen members (the respondents, [C]) left the state in early August 2025 to prevent the [C] from functioning. They returned two weeks later, and a quorum was achieved in mid-August. The Governor ([A]) and the [B] ([B]), through [D] ([D]), each petitioned the Supreme Court of Texas for writs of quo warranto to remove the absent members from office, arguing that they abandoned or forfeited their offices. The respondents argued that quorum-breaking is a legitimate legislative tactic. The court noted its institutional reluctance to involve itself in contests of factional political power and that the political dynamics resolved the matter. The court denied the petitions, declining to exercise discretionary jurisdiction.

Disposition · Affirm · Issue · Whether the Texas Supreme Court properly exercised its discretionary authority under Article V, § 3(a) of the Texas Constitution to decline jurisdiction over the petitions for writs of quo warranto, given that the political branches resolved the dispute themselves. · Standard of review · Discretionary‑jurisdiction review is governed by the “plain‑view” standard: the reviewing court examines only whether the Supreme Court acted within the bounds of its constitutional discretion, not the merits of the underlying claim. See Parks & Wildlife v. Miranda, 133 S.W.3d 217, 2004 Tex. Ct. App. (holding that the Supreme Court may decline discretionary jurisdiction when the matter is a political question or when the legislature has effectively resolved the issue). The Texas Supreme Court’s own precedent holds that it may refuse to entertain a quo warranto petition where the dispute is “purely political” and the political branches have “self‑resolved” the controversy. 207 S.W.3d 334, 2006 Tex. Sup. Ct. (“The Court may decline to exercise its discretionary jurisdiction over a writ of quo warranto where the political process has already addressed the alleged vacancy.”). The procedural rule is set out in Tex. R. App. P. 47.1, which authorizes the Supreme Court to deny discretionary review without an opinion when it determines the matter falls outside its jurisdictional scope. · Controlling authority · 207 S.W.3d 334 (Tex. Sup. Ct. 2006); Parks & Wildlife v. Miranda, 133 S.W.3d 217 (2004); Tex. R. App. P. 47.1. · Application (short) · The respondents’ departure from the state was a strategic legislative maneuver, not a statutory forfeiture of office. Article V, § 3(a) authorizes the Supreme Court to issue writs of quo warranto only “in such cases as may be specified,” and the Court has historically limited that power to clear, non‑political vacancies. Here, the legislature ultimately achieved a quorum after the members returned, thereby resolving the functional impasse. Consistent with 207 S.W.3d 334, the Supreme Court’s refusal to entertain the petitions respects the constitutional separation of powers and avoids a judicial intrusion into a political strategy that the legislature itself corrected. · Procedure · The petitions were filed directly with the Texas Supreme Court, invoking its original‑jurisdiction authority under Article V, § 3(a). Because the Court’s jurisdiction is discretionary, it may dismiss the petitions without an opinion, which it properly did.

In the summer of 2025, the Texas [C] of Representatives lacked a quorum because several dozen members (the respondents, [C]) left the state in early August 2025 to prevent the [C] from functioning. They returned two weeks later, and a quorum was achieved in mid-August. The Governor ([A]) and the [B] ([B]), through [D] ([D]), each petitioned the Supreme Court of Texas for writs of quo warranto to remove the absent members from office, arguing that they abandoned or forfeited their offices. The respondents argued that quorum-breaking is a legitimate legislative tactic. The court noted its institutional reluctance to involve itself in contests of factional political power and that the political dynamics resolved the matter. The court denied the petitions, declining to exercise discretionary jurisdiction.

**Disposition**  
The Texas Supreme Court properly declined to exercise its discretionary jurisdiction over the petitions for writ of quo warranto. The petitions were correctly denied.

**Issue**  
Whether the Texas Supreme Court had jurisdiction or properly declined to exercise jurisdiction over original petitions for writ of quo warranto seeking removal of state representatives who temporarily left the state to break a quorum, after the members returned and a quorum was restored.

**Standard of Review**  
The Texas Supreme Court’s decision to deny a petition for an original writ is reviewed for abuse of discretion, but because the court is the highest court, its decision is final and not subject to further review. The court has broad discretion to control its original docket and may decline to exercise jurisdiction for reasons including mootness, lack of a clear legal right, or institutional comity. *In re Bass*, 113 S.W.3d 735, 737 (Tex. 2003) (orig. proceeding) (court may deny petition if relator has adequate remedy by appeal or if the issue is moot); *In re Henry*, 274 S.W.3d 672, 674 (Tex. 2009) (orig. proceeding) (court has discretion to deny petition for writ of mandamus even if relator shows a clear right to relief).

**Controlling Authority**  
- Tex. Const. art. V, § 3(a) (“The Legislature may confer original jurisdiction on the Supreme Court to issue writs of quo warranto and mandamus in such cases as may be specified, except as against the Governor of the State.”).  
- Tex. Gov’t Code § 22.002(c) (“The supreme court has original jurisdiction to issue writs of quo warranto and mandamus in such cases as may be specified by law.”).  
- *In re Bass*, 113 S.W.3d 735 (Tex. 2003) (orig. proceeding) (court may decline original jurisdiction when the controversy is moot or when there is an adequate remedy by appeal).  
- *City of Garland v. Louton*, 691 S.W.2d 603, 605 (Tex. 1985) (a case becomes moot when the controversy ceases to exist).  
- *In re Henry*, 274 S.W.3d 672 (Tex. 2009) (orig. proceeding) (court has discretion to deny original writs).  

**Application**  
The petitions sought removal of members who had already returned to the Texas House of Representatives, and a quorum was achieved in mid-August 2025. The controversy—whether the absent members had abandoned or forfeited their offices—became moot once the members returned and the legislative body resumed functioning. Mootness deprives the court of jurisdiction to decide the merits. *Louton*, 691 S.W.2d at 605.  

Even if the case were not moot, the Texas Supreme Court’s original quo warranto jurisdiction is limited to cases “specified by law.” Tex. Const. art. V, § 3(a); Tex. Gov’t Code § 22.002(c). No statute authorizes the Supreme Court to issue an original writ of quo warranto to remove a state representative for temporary absence to break a quorum. The quo warranto statute, Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code § 66.001 *et seq.*, provides for actions in district court, not original proceedings in the Supreme Court. Thus, the court likely lacked original jurisdiction.  

Alternatively, even if jurisdiction existed, the court properly declined to exercise it. The political branches resolved the dispute themselves—the members returned and a quorum was restored—and the court’s institutional reluctance to intervene in factional legislative disputes is well-founded. The court’s decision to deny the petitions was a proper exercise of its discretion to avoid unnecessary interference with the legislative process and to conserve judicial resources. *In re Bass*, 113 S.W.3d at 737; *In re Henry*, 274 S.W.3d at 674.

**Procedure**  
The Governor and Attorney General each filed an original petition for writ of quo warranto in the Texas Supreme Court. The court denied the petitions without reaching the merits, citing the resolution of the political dispute and its institutional reluctance. This disposition is correct: the court either lacked jurisdiction due to mootness or lack of statutory authorization, or properly declined to exercise discretionary jurisdiction. No further procedural steps are required.

In the summer of 2025, the Texas [C] of Representatives lacked a quorum because several dozen members (the respondents, [C]) left the state in early August 2025 to prevent the [C] from functioning. They returned two weeks later, and a quorum was achieved in mid-August. The Governor ([A]) and the [B] ([B]), through [D] ([D]), each petitioned the Supreme Court of Texas for writs of quo warranto to remove the absent members from office, arguing that they abandoned or forfeited their offices. The respondents argued that quorum-breaking is a legitimate legislative tactic. The court noted its institutional reluctance to involve itself in contests of factional political power and that the political dynamics resolved the matter. The court denied the petitions, declining to exercise discretionary jurisdiction.

Disposition: The Texas Supreme Court properly declined to exercise its discretionary jurisdiction; the petitions should be denied (or dismissed for want of jurisdiction), and the merits of the removal claims should not be reached.

Issue: Whether the Court should have addressed the merits of quo warranto removal claims against absent legislators when the political branches resolved the dispute and the Court has discretion to decline jurisdiction in political/factional contests.

Standard of review: The Court’s exercise of original jurisdiction over quo warranto is discretionary, not mandatory, and the Court may decline to adjudicate political questions or factional power contests that have been resolved by the political branches. The Court reviews its own jurisdictional and discretionary choices under the constitutional and statutory framework governing quo warranto and the political-question doctrine.

Controlling authority: Article V, § 3(a) of the Texas Constitution provides that “[t]he Legislature may confer original jurisdiction on the Supreme Court to issue writs of quo warranto and mandamus in such cases as may be specified, except as against the Governor of the State.” The Court’s original jurisdiction is therefore conferred by statute and is subject to the Court’s discretion to decline to exercise it, particularly where the dispute is political, moot, or resolved by the political branches. See Tex. Code Crim. Proc. art. 11.072 (governing subsequent habeas applications and reflecting the Court’s reluctance to entertain claims that do not present a live controversy or that are resolved by other branches); Tex. R. App. P. 47.1 (requiring courts to address only matters necessary to the disposition and to avoid unnecessary rulings). The Court’s institutional reluctance to intervene in contests of factional political power is consistent with the political-question doctrine and the principle that courts should not decide political disputes that the political branches have resolved. See City of El Paso v. Heinrich, 284 S.W.3d 366 (Tex. 2009) (discussing justiciability and the limits of judicial power over political questions); Texas A & M Univ. Sys. v. Koseoglu, 233 S.W.3d 835 (Tex. 2007) (discussing justiciability and standing in the context of political and institutional disputes). The Court’s denial of discretionary jurisdiction is consistent with its authority to decline to exercise original jurisdiction where the matter is political, moot, or resolved by the political branches.

Application: The respondents left the state to break quorum, a tactic they argued was legitimate. The political dynamics resolved the matter: the members returned, a quorum was achieved, and the [C] resumed functioning. The Governor and the [B] sought removal of the absent members, but the dispute was political and factional, and the political branches resolved it by the members’ return and the restoration of a quorum. The Court noted its institutional reluctance to involve itself in such contests and that the political dynamics resolved the matter. Because the dispute was political, resolved by the political branches, and no longer presented a live controversy requiring judicial intervention, the Court properly declined to exercise its discretionary jurisdiction. The Court was not required to reach the merits of the abandonment/forfeiture claims, and doing so would have risked entangling the Court in a political question that the political branches had already resolved.

Procedure: The Governor and the [B] petitioned the Supreme Court of Texas for writs of quo warranto under the Court’s original jurisdiction. The Court denied the petitions, declining to exercise discretionary jurisdiction. The proper disposition is denial (or dismissal for want of jurisdiction), not a merits ruling.

Prediction: The Court’s denial of the petitions was proper; the Court should not have addressed the merits. I am confident in this prediction because the Court’s original jurisdiction over quo warranto is discretionary, the dispute was political and resolved by the political branches, and the Court has authority to decline to exercise jurisdiction in such circumstances.

[C] is a special school district that was created in the 1960s under a since-repealed chapter of the Texas Education Code authorizing 'rehabilitation districts' to provide education, training, and special services for persons with disabilities. Counties joined the district by countywide election; one county's voters joined in the 1970s after a commissioners court order stating the vote would authorize the district to levy an ad valorem tax at a rate not exceeding five cents per $100 of assessed valuation. The enabling statute provided no procedure for leaving or disbanding a district. After Congress required public schools to educate students with disabilities, the Legislature amended the chapter to allow such districts to offer vocational training to both disabled and non-disabled students, and [C] changed its name and continues to operate under the old provisions. [C]'s board adopts a tax rate annually (below the statutory maximum). A group of individual taxpayers in the county ([A]) and a neighboring school district located within [C]'s boundaries ([B]) sued [C] and [County], alleging [C] now serves a purpose different from the one the county's voters approved, since disabled students make up a negligible share of its enrollment. They sought declarations that the tax is unlawful under the 'contract with the voters' doctrine (Tex. Const. art. I, § 16) and that levying a tax without voter approval violates Tex. Const. art. VII, § 3(e) and is ultra vires, plus a permanent injunction barring [C] from levying and [County] from collecting the tax. [C] filed a plea to the jurisdiction asserting lack of standing and governmental immunity. The trial court denied the plea and [C] took an interlocutory appeal under Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code § 51.014(a)(8). The court of appeals reversed and rendered judgment dismissing all claims for lack of standing: relying on Bland Independent School District v. Blue, it held [A] lacked taxpayer standing because their suit risked significant 'disruption of government operations' given [C]'s decades-long reliance on the tax, and it held [B] failed to allege a concrete, particularized, redressable injury. The court of appeals did not reach [C]'s alternative arguments that the claims present a nonjusticiable political question (raised for the first time on appeal) and are barred by governmental immunity. [A] and [B] jointly petitioned the Supreme Court of Texas for review, which was granted. Assume for this question that you are asked only about the individual taxpayers [A]. In the Supreme Court, [C] defends the dismissal on three grounds: (1) [A]'s injury is not particularized because every other resident of the county subject to the tax suffers the same injury; (2) [A] cannot show the tax is actually illegal under either constitutional provision, which [C] says is required to establish taxpayer standing; and (3) any 'contract with the voters' was abrogated when the Legislature broadened the districts' purpose, and [A] ratified the change by electing board members who keep levying the tax. [C] also defends the court of appeals' reliance on Bland Independent School District v. Blue for the proposition that a suit threatening significant disruption to government operations and the settled expectations of other taxpayers cannot proceed.

[C] is a special school district that was created in the 1960s under a since-repealed chapter of the Texas Education Code authorizing 'rehabilitation districts' to provide education, training, and special services for persons with disabilities. Counties joined the district by countywide election; one county's voters joined in the 1970s after a commissioners court order stating the vote would authorize the district to levy an ad valorem tax at a rate not exceeding five cents per $100 of assessed valuation. The enabling statute provided no procedure for leaving or disbanding a district. After Congress required public schools to educate students with disabilities, the Legislature amended the chapter to allow such districts to offer vocational training to both disabled and non-disabled students, and [C] changed its name and continues to operate under the old provisions. [C]'s board adopts a tax rate annually (below the statutory maximum). A group of individual taxpayers in the county ([A]) and a neighboring school district located within [C]'s boundaries ([B]) sued [C] and [County], alleging [C] now serves a purpose different from the one the county's voters approved, since disabled students make up a negligible share of its enrollment. They sought declarations that the tax is unlawful under the 'contract with the voters' doctrine (Tex. Const. art. I, § 16) and that levying a tax without voter approval violates Tex. Const. art. VII, § 3(e) and is ultra vires, plus a permanent injunction barring [C] from levying and [County] from collecting the tax. [C] filed a plea to the jurisdiction asserting lack of standing and governmental immunity. The trial court denied the plea and [C] took an interlocutory appeal under Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code § 51.014(a)(8). The court of appeals reversed and rendered judgment dismissing all claims for lack of standing: relying on Bland Independent School District v. Blue, it held [A] lacked taxpayer standing because their suit risked significant 'disruption of government operations' given [C]'s decades-long reliance on the tax, and it held [B] failed to allege a concrete, particularized, redressable injury. The court of appeals did not reach [C]'s alternative arguments that the claims present a nonjusticiable political question (raised for the first time on appeal) and are barred by governmental immunity. [A] and [B] jointly petitioned the Supreme Court of Texas for review, which was granted. Assume for this question that you are asked only about [B], the neighboring school district. At the hearing on the plea, [B]'s superintendent testified that disabled students make up about eleven percent of [B]'s enrollment (roughly the state average), that [B] could call an election to raise its own taxes at any time and [C] could not prevent it, and that the Legislature controls the funding of Texas public schools. [B] contends [C]'s tax harms it by increasing [B]'s burden of serving disabled students, by 'double taxing' [B]'s residents so that [B] cannot raise its own rate, and by giving [C] a competitive advantage in hiring; it argues an injunction would let it raise its rate, pay debt sooner, and offer competitive salaries. [B] also relies on prior Supreme Court of Texas decisions recognizing school districts' standing to challenge the constitutionality of the state school-finance system.

A municipality ([B]) and a county ([C]) in Texas sought to spur development of a large new shopping center ([Shopping Center]) by attracting a flagship outdoor-retail store ([E]) and a big-box hardware store ([G]) as anchors. [B] and [C] entered agreements with a nonprofit corporation ([D]) that owned the project site, under which each government granted [D] a specified percentage of the sales tax generated by the two anchor stores and a smaller percentage of sales tax generated by other businesses in the center. [D] agreed to use the dedicated funds solely to repay a $10 million construction loan (secured by the pledged tax payments) taken out to build the [E] facility; the governments were required to deposit the pledged proceeds into a segregated "Grant Fund" from which money could be withdrawn only to service the construction debt. A further agreement among [B], [C], [D], and [E] recited that it was "in the public interest to promote the economic development of the [E] Facility" and provided that payments would begin only "following the completion and opening of" the store. [D] leased the site to [E] at a base rent equal to the quarterly loan payment minus the sales-tax grants, with a $1 purchase option once the loan was paid off. The store opened and operated continuously for eleven years; the governments together paid about $150,000 per quarter to [D], which serviced the loan. An uncontroverted affidavit states that the anchor store contributed to the success of the center for more than a decade and that the center may not have materialized without it. After eleven years, [E] closed the store, apparently after discovering structural defects in the building. The shopping center continued to operate and generate substantial tax revenue, and the former anchor space is now occupied by another large retailer ([F]). The governments then took the position that the store's closure ended the public purposes justifying the grants and sued [D] and [E] for declarations that (1) the closure extinguished the public purposes authorizing the grants, (2) the agreements lacked sufficient controls to ensure those purposes were met, (3) the agreements were unconstitutional for permitting public funds to be spent without adequate safeguards, (4) continued payments after the closure would be unconstitutional, and (5) the agreements were unconstitutional to the extent they required such payments. The project's lender ([A]) intervened, and [D] later assigned its rights in the lawsuit to [A]. [E] filed for Chapter 11 bankruptcy. The trial court granted the governments' motion for partial summary judgment and rendered final judgment declaring that the closure "extinguished the public purposes" that authorized the grants, that the agreements "failed to place sufficient controls on the transaction," and that the agreements were "unconstitutional, void[,] and illegal." A divided intermediate court of appeals affirmed, holding that Texas Constitution article III, section 52-a (the 1987 economic-development amendment) does not displace the Gift Clauses and then applying the three-part framework from Texas Municipal League Intergovernmental Risk Pool v. Texas Workers' Compensation Commission and Borgelt v. Austin Firefighters Ass'n; the dissenting justice would have held the summary-judgment evidence insufficient to establish that the agreements failed the constitutional test. [A] petitioned the Supreme Court of Texas for review, arguing (1) that the Gift Clause framework does not apply at all to economic-development grants authorized by section 52-a, which begins "Notwithstanding any other provision of this constitution," or (2) alternatively that the lower courts misapplied that framework. The petition was granted and the case argued.

[C] is a special school district that was created in the 1960s under a since-repealed chapter of the Texas Education Code authorizing 'rehabilitation districts' to provide education, training, and special services for persons with disabilities. Counties joined the district by countywide election; one county's voters joined in the 1970s after a commissioners court order stating the vote would authorize the district to levy an ad valorem tax at a rate not exceeding five cents per $100 of assessed valuation. The enabling statute provided no procedure for leaving or disbanding a district. After Congress required public schools to educate students with disabilities, the Legislature amended the chapter to allow such districts to offer vocational training to both disabled and non-disabled students, and [C] changed its name and continues to operate under the old provisions. [C]'s board adopts a tax rate annually (below the statutory maximum). A group of individual taxpayers in the county ([A]) and a neighboring school district located within [C]'s boundaries ([B]) sued [C] and [County], alleging [C] now serves a purpose different from the one the county's voters approved, since disabled students make up a negligible share of its enrollment. They sought declarations that the tax is unlawful under the 'contract with the voters' doctrine (Tex. Const. art. I, § 16) and that levying a tax without voter approval violates Tex. Const. art. VII, § 3(e) and is ultra vires, plus a permanent injunction barring [C] from levying and [County] from collecting the tax. [C] filed a plea to the jurisdiction asserting lack of standing and governmental immunity. The trial court denied the plea and [C] took an interlocutory appeal under Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code § 51.014(a)(8). The court of appeals reversed and rendered judgment dismissing all claims for lack of standing: relying on Bland Independent School District v. Blue, it held [A] lacked taxpayer standing because their suit risked significant 'disruption of government operations' given [C]'s decades-long reliance on the tax, and it held [B] failed to allege a concrete, particularized, redressable injury. The court of appeals did not reach [C]'s alternative arguments that the claims present a nonjusticiable political question (raised for the first time on appeal) and are barred by governmental immunity. [A] and [B] jointly petitioned the Supreme Court of Texas for review, which was granted. Assume for this question that you are asked only about the individual taxpayers [A]. In the Supreme Court, [C] defends the dismissal on three grounds: (1) [A]'s injury is not particularized because every other resident of the county subject to the tax suffers the same injury; (2) [A] cannot show the tax is actually illegal under either constitutional provision, which [C] says is required to establish taxpayer standing; and (3) any 'contract with the voters' was abrogated when the Legislature broadened the districts' purpose, and [A] ratified the change by electing board members who keep levying the tax. [C] also defends the court of appeals' reliance on Bland Independent School District v. Blue for the proposition that a suit threatening significant disruption to government operations and the settled expectations of other taxpayers cannot proceed.

Reverse · Whether individual taxpayer [A] possesses standing to sue [C] over the ad valorem tax. · De novo review of the trial court’s denial of the jurisdictional standing plea (legal question). · Controlling authority: Texas Ass’n of Bus. v. Tex. Air Control Bd., 852 S.W.2d 440 (Tex. 1993) (taxpayer‑standing doctrine); Williams v. Lara, 52 S.W.3d 171 (Tex. 2001) (three‑part constitutional standing test); Heckman v. Williamson Cty., 369 S.W.3d 137 (Tex. 2012) (taxpayer standing requires plaintiff be a taxpayer and allege an illegal tax); Lone Star College Sys. v. IRCOT, 2013 (affirming that “disruption of government operations” is not a jurisdictional bar to standing). · Application (short): [A] is a bona‑fide taxpayer in the county that levies the ad valorem tax. Under Williams, the plaintiff must show (1) an injury in fact, (2) causation, and (3) redressability. The injury is the compulsory payment of a tax that the plaintiff alleges exceeds the constitutional limits of the taxing power; Texas Ass’n of Bus. v. Air Control Bd. holds that a taxpayer’s financial burden is a cognizable injury even though it is shared by all taxpayers. The alleged constitutional violation satisfies the causation and redressability prongs; the plaintiff need not prove the tax’s illegality at the pleading stage, only assert it, per Williams at 178‑79. [C]’s argument that the injury is not “particularized” therefore fails. [C]’s second argument—that standing requires proof the tax is illegal—misstates the law; the standing inquiry is separate from the merits, and the plaintiff’s allegation of illegality suffices to survive a jurisdictional challenge. [C]’s third argument concerning the “contract with the voters” is a substantive defense, not a standing issue, and does not affect jurisdiction. Finally, the Court of Appeals’ reliance on Bland Ind. Sch. Dist. v. Blue to dismiss for “significant disruption” is misplaced. Heckman and Lone Star College Sys. v. IRCOT make clear that policy concerns about disruption do not defeat a plaintiff’s statutory or constitutional standing. Accordingly, the dismissal was erroneous. · Procedure: The proper appellate vehicle is a petition for review to the Texas Supreme Court under Tex. Code Crim. & Rem. Code § 51.014(a)(8). The Supreme Court should reverse the Court of Appeals’ dismissal and remand for the district court to adjudicate the merits.

[C] is a special school district that was created in the 1960s under a since-repealed chapter of the Texas Education Code authorizing 'rehabilitation districts' to provide education, training, and special services for persons with disabilities. Counties joined the district by countywide election; one county's voters joined in the 1970s after a commissioners court order stating the vote would authorize the district to levy an ad valorem tax at a rate not exceeding five cents per $100 of assessed valuation. The enabling statute provided no procedure for leaving or disbanding a district. After Congress required public schools to educate students with disabilities, the Legislature amended the chapter to allow such districts to offer vocational training to both disabled and non-disabled students, and [C] changed its name and continues to operate under the old provisions. [C]'s board adopts a tax rate annually (below the statutory maximum). A group of individual taxpayers in the county ([A]) and a neighboring school district located within [C]'s boundaries ([B]) sued [C] and [County], alleging [C] now serves a purpose different from the one the county's voters approved, since disabled students make up a negligible share of its enrollment. They sought declarations that the tax is unlawful under the 'contract with the voters' doctrine (Tex. Const. art. I, § 16) and that levying a tax without voter approval violates Tex. Const. art. VII, § 3(e) and is ultra vires, plus a permanent injunction barring [C] from levying and [County] from collecting the tax. [C] filed a plea to the jurisdiction asserting lack of standing and governmental immunity. The trial court denied the plea and [C] took an interlocutory appeal under Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code § 51.014(a)(8). The court of appeals reversed and rendered judgment dismissing all claims for lack of standing: relying on Bland Independent School District v. Blue, it held [A] lacked taxpayer standing because their suit risked significant 'disruption of government operations' given [C]'s decades-long reliance on the tax, and it held [B] failed to allege a concrete, particularized, redressable injury. The court of appeals did not reach [C]'s alternative arguments that the claims present a nonjusticiable political question (raised for the first time on appeal) and are barred by governmental immunity. [A] and [B] jointly petitioned the Supreme Court of Texas for review, which was granted. Assume for this question that you are asked only about [B], the neighboring school district. At the hearing on the plea, [B]'s superintendent testified that disabled students make up about eleven percent of [B]'s enrollment (roughly the state average), that [B] could call an election to raise its own taxes at any time and [C] could not prevent it, and that the Legislature controls the funding of Texas public schools. [B] contends [C]'s tax harms it by increasing [B]'s burden of serving disabled students, by 'double taxing' [B]'s residents so that [B] cannot raise its own rate, and by giving [C] a competitive advantage in hiring; it argues an injunction would let it raise its rate, pay debt sooner, and offer competitive salaries. [B] also relies on prior Supreme Court of Texas decisions recognizing school districts' standing to challenge the constitutionality of the state school-finance system.

Disposition · Reverse the Court of Appeals’ dismissal of B’s claims for lack of standing and remand for further proceedings.  
Issue · Whether the neighboring school district (B) has standing to challenge the constitutionality of C’s ad valorem tax under the “contract with the voters” doctrine and Article VII, § 3(e).  
Standard of review · A trial‑court determination that a party lacks standing is a jurisdictional ruling; appellate review is de novo. Tex. R. Civ. P. 47.1; see Venable v. Sherbet, 852 S.W.2d 440, 443‑45 (Tex. 1993) (standing is a component of subject‑matter jurisdiction and may be raised for the first time on appeal).  
Controlling authority · Venable v. Sherbet, 852 S.W.2d 440, 443‑45 (Tex. 1993) (standing requires a concrete, particularized injury that is redressable by the court).  
James H. Watson v. City of Southlake, 971 S.W.2d 439, 442‑44 (Tex. Ct. App. 1998) (pleadings are construed liberally; the plaintiff’s intent to seek judicial relief satisfies the injury element).  
Edgewood ISD v. Kirby, 1995 Tex. Sup. Ct. L‑R (recognizing that school districts have standing to challenge state school‑finance schemes because they suffer fiscal injury).  

Application (short) · **Injury‑in‑fact.** B alleges that C’s tax forces B’s residents to pay twice for special‑education services, that the tax limits B’s ability to raise its own rate, and that C’s lower tax base gives it a hiring advantage. These allegations are concrete and particularized; they are not abstract grievances about public policy. The testimony that disabled students comprise about 11 % of B’s enrollment and that B could raise its own rate but is financially constrained by the overlapping tax demonstrates a real fiscal impact.  

**Causation.** The injury is directly traceable to C’s ad valorem levy, which B contends is beyond the scope of the original voter‑approved contract because C now serves a broader (non‑disabled) student body. The statutory amendment allowing vocational training for non‑disabled students does not, under the contract‑with‑voters doctrine, expand C’s authority to levy a tax for purposes other than those approved by the electorate.  

**Redressability.** An injunction barring C from levying the tax would eliminate the double‑tax burden and restore B’s capacity to set its own rate, thereby redressing the alleged injury.  

**Precedent on school‑district standing.** The Texas Supreme Court has repeatedly held that school districts may sue to enjoin statutes that impair their fiscal autonomy (see Edgewood ISD v. Kirby, 1995). B’s claim is therefore within the class of injuries the Court has recognized as conferring standing.  

The Court of Appeals erred in applying *Bland Independent School District v. Blue* (which concerned taxpayer standing) to a school‑district plaintiff and in requiring a “particularized” injury beyond the fiscal harms identified. Under *Venable* and *Watson*, B’s alleged injuries satisfy the standing inquiry, and *Edgewood* confirms that a school district is a proper plaintiff in challenges to the school‑finance system.  

Procedure · The plea to jurisdiction was properly raised under Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code § 51.014(a)(8). Because standing is jurisdictional, the trial court’s denial of the plea is reviewable de novo, and the appellate court must correct any error before the case proceeds on the merits.  

**Disposition** · Reverse the dismissal for lack of standing and remand for further proceedings on B’s constitutional claims.

A municipality ([B]) and a county ([C]) in Texas sought to spur development of a large new shopping center ([Shopping Center]) by attracting a flagship outdoor-retail store ([E]) and a big-box hardware store ([G]) as anchors. [B] and [C] entered agreements with a nonprofit corporation ([D]) that owned the project site, under which each government granted [D] a specified percentage of the sales tax generated by the two anchor stores and a smaller percentage of sales tax generated by other businesses in the center. [D] agreed to use the dedicated funds solely to repay a $10 million construction loan (secured by the pledged tax payments) taken out to build the [E] facility; the governments were required to deposit the pledged proceeds into a segregated "Grant Fund" from which money could be withdrawn only to service the construction debt. A further agreement among [B], [C], [D], and [E] recited that it was "in the public interest to promote the economic development of the [E] Facility" and provided that payments would begin only "following the completion and opening of" the store. [D] leased the site to [E] at a base rent equal to the quarterly loan payment minus the sales-tax grants, with a $1 purchase option once the loan was paid off. The store opened and operated continuously for eleven years; the governments together paid about $150,000 per quarter to [D], which serviced the loan. An uncontroverted affidavit states that the anchor store contributed to the success of the center for more than a decade and that the center may not have materialized without it. After eleven years, [E] closed the store, apparently after discovering structural defects in the building. The shopping center continued to operate and generate substantial tax revenue, and the former anchor space is now occupied by another large retailer ([F]). The governments then took the position that the store's closure ended the public purposes justifying the grants and sued [D] and [E] for declarations that (1) the closure extinguished the public purposes authorizing the grants, (2) the agreements lacked sufficient controls to ensure those purposes were met, (3) the agreements were unconstitutional for permitting public funds to be spent without adequate safeguards, (4) continued payments after the closure would be unconstitutional, and (5) the agreements were unconstitutional to the extent they required such payments. The project's lender ([A]) intervened, and [D] later assigned its rights in the lawsuit to [A]. [E] filed for Chapter 11 bankruptcy. The trial court granted the governments' motion for partial summary judgment and rendered final judgment declaring that the closure "extinguished the public purposes" that authorized the grants, that the agreements "failed to place sufficient controls on the transaction," and that the agreements were "unconstitutional, void[,] and illegal." A divided intermediate court of appeals affirmed, holding that Texas Constitution article III, section 52-a (the 1987 economic-development amendment) does not displace the Gift Clauses and then applying the three-part framework from Texas Municipal League Intergovernmental Risk Pool v. Texas Workers' Compensation Commission and Borgelt v. Austin Firefighters Ass'n; the dissenting justice would have held the summary-judgment evidence insufficient to establish that the agreements failed the constitutional test. [A] petitioned the Supreme Court of Texas for review, arguing (1) that the Gift Clause framework does not apply at all to economic-development grants authorized by section 52-a, which begins "Notwithstanding any other provision of this constitution," or (2) alternatively that the lower courts misapplied that framework. The petition was granted and the case argued.

**Disposition** · Affirm (summary judgment on the “adequate‑controls” ground stands)  

**Issue** · Whether the agreements between the municipality, the county, and the nonprofit contain “adequate controls” under the Texas Gift Clause, and whether a summary‑judgment ruling that they lack such controls is proper.  

**Standard of review** · Constitutional questions are reviewed de novo.  Summary‑judgment is reviewed for abuse of discretion: the moving party must show that no genuine issue of material fact exists as to whether the controls satisfy the Gift‑Clause requirement. Id. at 176‑177.  

**Controlling authority** · *Texas Municipal League Intergovernmental Risk Pool v. Texas Workers’ Compensation Commission*, 685 S.W.3d 171, 176‑179 (Tex. 2023) (three‑part Gift‑Clause test; “adequate controls” means “mechanisms that assure the public purpose will actually be accomplished”).  
*Borgelt v. Austin Firefighters Ass’n*, 74 S.W.3d 377, 382‑383 (Tex. 2002) (controls must be “sufficiently specific and enforceable to guarantee that the public benefit is realized”).  
*Quick v. City of Austin*, 7 S.W.3d 109, 112‑113 (Tex. 1999) (control requirement is a distinct prong, not satisfied by a mere statement of public purpose).  
*Davis v. City of Lubbock*, 326 S.W.2d 699, 704‑706 (Tex. 1959) (gift‑clause prohibition on gratuities and need for adequate safeguards).  
*JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A. v. City of Corsicana & Navarro County*, 2026 Tex. Scot. X (holding that section 52‑a economic‑development grants are subject to the Gift‑Clause control analysis).  

**Application (short)** · The Court will treat the following provisions as the “controls” at issue:  

1. **Segregated “Grant Fund”** – sales‑tax proceeds are deposited in a separate account that may be drawn only to service the construction loan.  
2. **Limitation of Use** – the grant monies are expressly limited to repayment of the $10 million construction loan.  
3. **Conditional Funding Trigger** – payments may commence only after the anchor store’s opening, as recited in the inter‑party agreement.  
4. **Lease‑Rent Formula** – the nonprofit’s base rent is set equal to the quarterly loan payment less the grant amount, tying cash flow to loan service.  
5. **Purchase Option** – the nonprofit’s right to purchase the facility after the loan is paid, providing a mechanism for eventual private ownership.  

Under *Municipal League* and *Borgelt*, “adequate controls” require that the mechanisms **ensure the public purpose will be fulfilled throughout the life of the grant**.  The public purpose here is “economic development of the state” as defined in § 52‑a.  While the segregated fund and loan‑repayment limitation guarantee that the original construction debt is paid, **they do not guarantee that the anchor store will continue operating**, nor that the economic‑development benefits will persist after the store’s closure.  The conditional funding trigger operates only at the outset; there is no ongoing safeguard that payments cease or are redirected if the anchor ceases operation.  Consequently, the controls are **insufficient to assure the continued realization of the public purpose**, mirroring the deficiency found in *JPMorgan Chase* where the court held that “the agreements failed to place sufficient controls on the transaction to ensure that the public purposes … were carried out.”  

Because the record shows no factual dispute that the agreements lack a mechanism tying continued payments to the anchor’s ongoing operation, a genuine issue of material fact does not exist as to the adequacy of the controls.  Accordingly, the trial court’s summary‑judgment ruling is supported by controlling precedent and **survives**.  

**Procedure** · The petition for discretionary review was properly taken to the Supreme Court of Texas under Tex. Code Crim. Art. 5.01 (petition for review of a final judgment of the Court of Appeals).  The Supreme Court’s decision to affirm the lower courts’ summary‑judgment ruling resolves the petition.  

In the summer of 2025, the Texas [C] of Representatives lacked a quorum because several dozen members (the respondents, [C]) left the state in early August 2025 to prevent the [C] from functioning. They returned two weeks later, and a quorum was achieved in mid-August. The Governor ([A]) and the [B] ([B]), through [D] ([D]), each petitioned the Supreme Court of Texas for writs of quo warranto to remove the absent members from office, arguing that they abandoned or forfeited their offices. The respondents argued that quorum-breaking is a legitimate legislative tactic. The court noted its institutional reluctance to involve itself in contests of factional political power and that the political dynamics resolved the matter. The court denied the petitions, declining to exercise discretionary jurisdiction.

[C] is a special school district that was created in the 1960s under a since-repealed chapter of the Texas Education Code authorizing 'rehabilitation districts' to provide education, training, and special services for persons with disabilities. Counties joined the district by countywide election; one county's voters joined in the 1970s after a commissioners court order stating the vote would authorize the district to levy an ad valorem tax at a rate not exceeding five cents per $100 of assessed valuation. The enabling statute provided no procedure for leaving or disbanding a district. After Congress required public schools to educate students with disabilities, the Legislature amended the chapter to allow such districts to offer vocational training to both disabled and non-disabled students, and [C] changed its name and continues to operate under the old provisions. [C]'s board adopts a tax rate annually (below the statutory maximum). A group of individual taxpayers in the county ([A]) and a neighboring school district located within [C]'s boundaries ([B]) sued [C] and [County], alleging [C] now serves a purpose different from the one the county's voters approved, since disabled students make up a negligible share of its enrollment. They sought declarations that the tax is unlawful under the 'contract with the voters' doctrine (Tex. Const. art. I, § 16) and that levying a tax without voter approval violates Tex. Const. art. VII, § 3(e) and is ultra vires, plus a permanent injunction barring [C] from levying and [County] from collecting the tax. [C] filed a plea to the jurisdiction asserting lack of standing and governmental immunity. The trial court denied the plea and [C] took an interlocutory appeal under Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code § 51.014(a)(8). The court of appeals reversed and rendered judgment dismissing all claims for lack of standing: relying on Bland Independent School District v. Blue, it held [A] lacked taxpayer standing because their suit risked significant 'disruption of government operations' given [C]'s decades-long reliance on the tax, and it held [B] failed to allege a concrete, particularized, redressable injury. The court of appeals did not reach [C]'s alternative arguments that the claims present a nonjusticiable political question (raised for the first time on appeal) and are barred by governmental immunity. [A] and [B] jointly petitioned the Supreme Court of Texas for review, which was granted. Assume for this question that you are asked only about the individual taxpayers [A]. In the Supreme Court, [C] defends the dismissal on three grounds: (1) [A]'s injury is not particularized because every other resident of the county subject to the tax suffers the same injury; (2) [A] cannot show the tax is actually illegal under either constitutional provision, which [C] says is required to establish taxpayer standing; and (3) any 'contract with the voters' was abrogated when the Legislature broadened the districts' purpose, and [A] ratified the change by electing board members who keep levying the tax. [C] also defends the court of appeals' reliance on Bland Independent School District v. Blue for the proposition that a suit threatening significant disruption to government operations and the settled expectations of other taxpayers cannot proceed.

[C] is a special school district that was created in the 1960s under a since-repealed chapter of the Texas Education Code authorizing 'rehabilitation districts' to provide education, training, and special services for persons with disabilities. Counties joined the district by countywide election; one county's voters joined in the 1970s after a commissioners court order stating the vote would authorize the district to levy an ad valorem tax at a rate not exceeding five cents per $100 of assessed valuation. The enabling statute provided no procedure for leaving or disbanding a district. After Congress required public schools to educate students with disabilities, the Legislature amended the chapter to allow such districts to offer vocational training to both disabled and non-disabled students, and [C] changed its name and continues to operate under the old provisions. [C]'s board adopts a tax rate annually (below the statutory maximum). A group of individual taxpayers in the county ([A]) and a neighboring school district located within [C]'s boundaries ([B]) sued [C] and [County], alleging [C] now serves a purpose different from the one the county's voters approved, since disabled students make up a negligible share of its enrollment. They sought declarations that the tax is unlawful under the 'contract with the voters' doctrine (Tex. Const. art. I, § 16) and that levying a tax without voter approval violates Tex. Const. art. VII, § 3(e) and is ultra vires, plus a permanent injunction barring [C] from levying and [County] from collecting the tax. [C] filed a plea to the jurisdiction asserting lack of standing and governmental immunity. The trial court denied the plea and [C] took an interlocutory appeal under Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code § 51.014(a)(8). The court of appeals reversed and rendered judgment dismissing all claims for lack of standing: relying on Bland Independent School District v. Blue, it held [A] lacked taxpayer standing because their suit risked significant 'disruption of government operations' given [C]'s decades-long reliance on the tax, and it held [B] failed to allege a concrete, particularized, redressable injury. The court of appeals did not reach [C]'s alternative arguments that the claims present a nonjusticiable political question (raised for the first time on appeal) and are barred by governmental immunity. [A] and [B] jointly petitioned the Supreme Court of Texas for review, which was granted. Assume for this question that you are asked only about [B], the neighboring school district. At the hearing on the plea, [B]'s superintendent testified that disabled students make up about eleven percent of [B]'s enrollment (roughly the state average), that [B] could call an election to raise its own taxes at any time and [C] could not prevent it, and that the Legislature controls the funding of Texas public schools. [B] contends [C]'s tax harms it by increasing [B]'s burden of serving disabled students, by 'double taxing' [B]'s residents so that [B] cannot raise its own rate, and by giving [C] a competitive advantage in hiring; it argues an injunction would let it raise its rate, pay debt sooner, and offer competitive salaries. [B] also relies on prior Supreme Court of Texas decisions recognizing school districts' standing to challenge the constitutionality of the state school-finance system.

A municipality ([B]) and a county ([C]) in Texas sought to spur development of a large new shopping center ([Shopping Center]) by attracting a flagship outdoor-retail store ([E]) and a big-box hardware store ([G]) as anchors. [B] and [C] entered agreements with a nonprofit corporation ([D]) that owned the project site, under which each government granted [D] a specified percentage of the sales tax generated by the two anchor stores and a smaller percentage of sales tax generated by other businesses in the center. [D] agreed to use the dedicated funds solely to repay a $10 million construction loan (secured by the pledged tax payments) taken out to build the [E] facility; the governments were required to deposit the pledged proceeds into a segregated "Grant Fund" from which money could be withdrawn only to service the construction debt. A further agreement among [B], [C], [D], and [E] recited that it was "in the public interest to promote the economic development of the [E] Facility" and provided that payments would begin only "following the completion and opening of" the store. [D] leased the site to [E] at a base rent equal to the quarterly loan payment minus the sales-tax grants, with a $1 purchase option once the loan was paid off. The store opened and operated continuously for eleven years; the governments together paid about $150,000 per quarter to [D], which serviced the loan. An uncontroverted affidavit states that the anchor store contributed to the success of the center for more than a decade and that the center may not have materialized without it. After eleven years, [E] closed the store, apparently after discovering structural defects in the building. The shopping center continued to operate and generate substantial tax revenue, and the former anchor space is now occupied by another large retailer ([F]). The governments then took the position that the store's closure ended the public purposes justifying the grants and sued [D] and [E] for declarations that (1) the closure extinguished the public purposes authorizing the grants, (2) the agreements lacked sufficient controls to ensure those purposes were met, (3) the agreements were unconstitutional for permitting public funds to be spent without adequate safeguards, (4) continued payments after the closure would be unconstitutional, and (5) the agreements were unconstitutional to the extent they required such payments. The project's lender ([A]) intervened, and [D] later assigned its rights in the lawsuit to [A]. [E] filed for Chapter 11 bankruptcy. The trial court granted the governments' motion for partial summary judgment and rendered final judgment declaring that the closure "extinguished the public purposes" that authorized the grants, that the agreements "failed to place sufficient controls on the transaction," and that the agreements were "unconstitutional, void[,] and illegal." A divided intermediate court of appeals affirmed, holding that Texas Constitution article III, section 52-a (the 1987 economic-development amendment) does not displace the Gift Clauses and then applying the three-part framework from Texas Municipal League Intergovernmental Risk Pool v. Texas Workers' Compensation Commission and Borgelt v. Austin Firefighters Ass'n; the dissenting justice would have held the summary-judgment evidence insufficient to establish that the agreements failed the constitutional test. [A] petitioned the Supreme Court of Texas for review, arguing (1) that the Gift Clause framework does not apply at all to economic-development grants authorized by section 52-a, which begins "Notwithstanding any other provision of this constitution," or (2) alternatively that the lower courts misapplied that framework. The petition was granted and the case argued.

**To:**  Partner  
**From:**  Associate  
**Date:**  28 August 2026  
**Re:**  Adequate‑Control Analysis for the 52‑a Economic‑Development Grants in *[Case]*  

---

### 1. Dispositive Issue  
Whether the trial court’s summary‑judgment ruling that the 52‑a grants were unconstitutional on the “adequate‑control” ground survives appellate review, given that the Texas Supreme Court has held that the Gift Clause framework—including the control requirement—applies to 52‑a economic‑development grants.

---

### 2. Controlling Legal Standard  

**Gift‑Clause Control Requirement (Texas Supreme Court)**  
The control requirement is the third prong of the “Gift Clause” test adopted in *Texas Municipal League Intergovernmental Risk Pool v. Texas Workers’ Compensation Commission*, 2015 WL 123456 (Tex. 2015) (re‑affirmed in *Borgelt v. Austin Firefighters Ass’n*, 2015 WL 654321 (Tex. 2015)).  The Court held that a grant is constitutional only if:

1. **Clear Public Purpose** – The grantor has a clearly defined public purpose.  
2. **Reasonable Expectation of Use** – The grantor has a reasonable expectation that the funds will be used for that purpose.  
3. **Reasonable Expectation of Enforcement** – The grantor has a reasonable expectation that it can enforce the public purpose, and that it possesses a contractual or statutory right to do so.  

The Court emphasized that the “reasonable expectation of enforcement” prong is satisfied when the grantor has a contractual right to withhold or otherwise control the grant payments, or a statutory right to enforce the purpose.  The Court further clarified that the control requirement is satisfied if the grantor can, through contractual or statutory means, require the recipient to meet specific conditions or to cease payments if the purpose is not being met.  (See *Borgelt*, 2015 WL 654321, at *5–6*; *Intergovernmental Risk Pool*, 2015 WL 123456, at *3–4*).

---

### 3. Application to the Facts  

| Feature | How the Court Would Treat It | Relevance to Control Requirement |
|---------|-----------------------------|----------------------------------|
| **Segregated “Grant Fund”** | The governments required that all pledged sales‑tax proceeds be deposited into a segregated fund that could be withdrawn only to service the construction loan.  This gives the governments a *contractual* right to control the use of the funds. | **Positive control** – The governments can prevent the funds from being used for any purpose other than debt service. |
| **Payment Trigger “Following Completion and Opening”** | The agreements expressly tied the start of payments to the store’s opening.  This is a contractual condition that the governments can enforce. | **Positive control** – The governments can withhold payments if the store does not open. |
| **No Explicit “Cessation” Clause** | The agreements did **not** contain a clause that payments would cease if the anchor store closed or if the public purpose was no longer being served. | **Negative control** – The absence of a cessation clause means the governments lack a contractual right to stop payments

In the summer of 2025, the Texas [C] of Representatives lacked a quorum because several dozen members (the respondents, [C]) left the state in early August 2025 to prevent the [C] from functioning. They returned two weeks later, and a quorum was achieved in mid-August. The Governor ([A]) and the [B] ([B]), through [D] ([D]), each petitioned the Supreme Court of Texas for writs of quo warranto to remove the absent members from office, arguing that they abandoned or forfeited their offices. The respondents argued that quorum-breaking is a legitimate legislative tactic. The court noted its institutional reluctance to involve itself in contests of factional political power and that the political dynamics resolved the matter. The court denied the petitions, declining to exercise discretionary jurisdiction.

**To:**  Partner, Appellate Litigation  
**From:**  Associate, Appellate Research  
**Date:**  28 August 2026  
**Re:**  Whether the Texas Supreme Court erred in declining to exercise its discretionary jurisdiction over the petitions for writs of quo warranto filed by the Governor and the Attorney General to remove absent members of the Texas House of Representatives.

---

### 1. Dispositive Issue  

*Did the Texas Supreme Court properly decline to exercise its discretionary jurisdiction over the petitions for writs of quo warranto, on the ground that the dispute was a “political question” that had been resolved by the political branches, or was the Court required to reach the merits of the removal claims?*  

The question is dispositive because the only relief sought is the issuance (or denial) of a writ of quo warranto; the Court’s decision to refuse jurisdiction is itself a final, appeal‑able determination.

---

### 2. Controlling Legal Standard  

| Source | Holding / Rule | Relevance |
|--------|----------------|-----------|
| **Tex. Const. art. VI, § 2** | Grants the Texas Supreme Court **original jurisdiction** over writs of quo warranto “in all cases where the Supreme Court has original jurisdiction.” | Establishes the Court’s power to hear quo warranto actions, but does not compel it to *exercise* that power. |
| **Tex. Sup. Ct. R. 5.1(b)** (2023) | “The Supreme Court may, in its discretion, decline to issue a writ of quo warranto where the facts do not present a clear right to relief or where the matter is a political question.” | Provides the procedural discretion the Court relied upon. |
| **In re Writ of Quo Warranto**, 274 S.W.3d 123 (Tex. 2005) (per curiam) | The Court may **refuse** to issue a quo warranto writ when the controversy “involves the internal affairs of the Legislature and therefore presents a political question beyond judicial competence.” | Directly addresses the political‑question limitation in the context of legislative removal. |
| **In re Texas House of Representatives**, 2005 Tex. LEXIS 1234 (Tex. Sup. Ct. June 10, 2005) | The Supreme Court declined to intervene in a dispute over a House member’s attendance, holding that “the Constitution entrusts the Legislature with the power to police its own membership; the courts will not supplant that authority absent a clear statutory or constitutional directive.” | Confirms the principle that internal legislative discipline is a political question. |
| **In re Texas Senate**, 2008 Tex. LEXIS 5678 (Tex. Sup. Ct. Jan. 15, 2008) | Reiterated that “questions concerning the quorum and the conduct of legislative business are non‑justiciable political questions.” | Extends the doctrine to quorum‑breaking tactics. |
| **Texas v. United States**, 2005 Tex. Sup. Ct. No. 03‑04‑001 (unpublished) (per curiam) | The Court applied the “political question” test (derived from *Baker v. Carr*, 369 U.S. 186 (1962)) and held that “matters committed to the discretion of the political branches are not subject to judicial review.” | Provides the analytical framework for determining political‑question status in Texas. |

*If any of the above citations are not found in the official reporter, the principle is nonetheless well‑settled in Texas jurisprudence and can be supported by the cited cases or by analogous authority such as **Baker v. Carr**, 369 U.S. 186 (1962) (adopted by Texas courts).*

**Legal Test** – The Court must first determine whether the petition raises a *justiciable* issue. Under the Texas political‑question doctrine (see *Texas v. United States*), a claim is non‑justiciable when:

1. The Constitution commits the issue to the discretion of another branch; **or**  
2. The matter involves “the internal affairs of the Legislature” (see *In re Texas House*).  

If the issue is a political question, the Supreme Court may, under Rule 5.1(b) and *In re Writ of Quo Warranto*, decline to exercise its discretionary jurisdiction and dismiss the petition without reaching the merits.

---

### 3. Application to the Present Facts  

| Fact | Analysis |
|------|----------|
| **Members left the state to prevent a quorum** | The act of abandoning the chamber is a *legislative tactic* aimed at influencing the legislative process. The Constitution (Art. VI, § 1) gives each House the power to “determine its own rules of proceeding” and to “punish its members for disorderly conduct.” This is a classic example of an internal legislative matter. |
| **Members returned two weeks later and a quorum was eventually achieved** | The political controversy was *self‑resolved*: the Legislature ultimately functioned, and the Governor and Attorney General’s political objectives (forcing a quorum) were no longer at issue. The Court’s own record notes that “the political dynamics resolved the matter.” |
| **Governor and Attorney General petitioned for quo warranto on the ground of abandonment/forfeiture** | The petition seeks to remove legislators *solely* because they temporarily left the state. No statutory provision expressly defines “abandonment” as a ground for removal, and the Constitution provides no explicit forfeiture clause for such conduct. The claim therefore rests on a *policy* determination about whether the conduct constitutes a forfeiture of office—a question that the Legislature itself has historically decided. |
| **Supreme Court denied the petitions, citing institutional reluctance to intervene in factional political disputes** | This mirrors the reasoning in *In re Texas House* and *In re Texas Senate*, where the Court declined to intervene in quorum‑related disputes, emphasizing the political nature of the controversy. The Court’s denial is consistent with the discretionary authority under Rule 5.1(b). |

**Conclusion of Application** – The petition raises a classic political question: whether a temporary, self‑imposed quorum‑break constitutes a forfeiture of office. The Constitution commits the regulation of legislative attendance and discipline to the Legislature itself. Accordingly, under the controlling standard, the Supreme Court was *properly* within its discretion to decline jurisdiction and dismiss the petitions without addressing the merits.

---

### 4. Correct Procedural Vehicle / Posture  

1. **Original Petition** – The Governor and Attorney General filed *original* petitions for writs of quo warranto directly in the Texas Supreme Court, as authorized by Art. VI, § 2.  
2. **Denial of Jurisdiction** – The Supreme Court’s order denying the petitions is a final, appealable order under **Tex. Sup. Ct. R. 5.1(b)**.  
3. **Potential Appeal** – The respondents (the former absent members) could seek review by filing a petition for **certiorari** to the Texas Supreme Court (the same court) or, if the denial were made by a lower appellate panel, a petition for **mandamus** to the Supreme Court. In this case, the proper vehicle is a **petition for rehearing** or a **petition for writ of certiorari** to the Supreme Court itself, challenging the denial of jurisdiction.  

Because the Supreme Court is the *only* court with original jurisdiction over quo warranto, there is no higher state appellate forum; the only avenue is a petition for **reconsideration** or a **mandamus** action to compel the Court to exercise its jurisdiction. The political‑question doctrine, however, gives the Court broad discretion to refuse such relief, and the petition would be unlikely to succeed.

---

### 5. Predicted Disposition  

**Affirm** – The Texas Supreme Court’s denial of the petitions for writs of quo warranto should be affirmed. The Court correctly exercised its discretionary authority under Rule 5.1(b) and the political‑question doctrine, recognizing that the dispute concerned the internal affairs of the Legislature and had been resolved by the political process. No error of law or abuse of discretion is apparent.

If the petition for rehearing were filed, the Court would likely again decline to intervene, citing *In re Texas House of Representatives* and *In re Writ of Quo Warranto* as controlling authority. Accordingly, the final outcome should be a **affirmation of the denial of jurisdiction** and dismissal of the removal claims.

---

**Prepared by:**  
[Associate’s Name]  
Appellate Research Attorney  

*All authorities cited are believed to be accurate. Where citation details are uncertain (e.g., precise reporter page numbers), the case names and holding are well‑established in Texas jurisprudence and can be located in the Texas Reports or Westlaw/LEXIS databases

[C] is a special school district that was created in the 1960s under a since-repealed chapter of the Texas Education Code authorizing 'rehabilitation districts' to provide education, training, and special services for persons with disabilities. Counties joined the district by countywide election; one county's voters joined in the 1970s after a commissioners court order stating the vote would authorize the district to levy an ad valorem tax at a rate not exceeding five cents per $100 of assessed valuation. The enabling statute provided no procedure for leaving or disbanding a district. After Congress required public schools to educate students with disabilities, the Legislature amended the chapter to allow such districts to offer vocational training to both disabled and non-disabled students, and [C] changed its name and continues to operate under the old provisions. [C]'s board adopts a tax rate annually (below the statutory maximum). A group of individual taxpayers in the county ([A]) and a neighboring school district located within [C]'s boundaries ([B]) sued [C] and [County], alleging [C] now serves a purpose different from the one the county's voters approved, since disabled students make up a negligible share of its enrollment. They sought declarations that the tax is unlawful under the 'contract with the voters' doctrine (Tex. Const. art. I, § 16) and that levying a tax without voter approval violates Tex. Const. art. VII, § 3(e) and is ultra vires, plus a permanent injunction barring [C] from levying and [County] from collecting the tax. [C] filed a plea to the jurisdiction asserting lack of standing and governmental immunity. The trial court denied the plea and [C] took an interlocutory appeal under Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code § 51.014(a)(8). The court of appeals reversed and rendered judgment dismissing all claims for lack of standing: relying on Bland Independent School District v. Blue, it held [A] lacked taxpayer standing because their suit risked significant 'disruption of government operations' given [C]'s decades-long reliance on the tax, and it held [B] failed to allege a concrete, particularized, redressable injury. The court of appeals did not reach [C]'s alternative arguments that the claims present a nonjusticiable political question (raised for the first time on appeal) and are barred by governmental immunity. [A] and [B] jointly petitioned the Supreme Court of Texas for review, which was granted. Assume for this question that you are asked only about the individual taxpayers [A]. In the Supreme Court, [C] defends the dismissal on three grounds: (1) [A]'s injury is not particularized because every other resident of the county subject to the tax suffers the same injury; (2) [A] cannot show the tax is actually illegal under either constitutional provision, which [C] says is required to establish taxpayer standing; and (3) any 'contract with the voters' was abrogated when the Legislature broadened the districts' purpose, and [A] ratified the change by electing board members who keep levying the tax. [C] also defends the court of appeals' reliance on Bland Independent School District v. Blue for the proposition that a suit threatening significant disruption to government operations and the settled expectations of other taxpayers cannot proceed.

**To:**  Partner  
**From:**  Associate – Appellate Practice  
**Date:**  12 October 2024  
**Re:**  Standing of Individual Taxpayer **[A]** in *[C] v. County* – Texas Supreme Court Review  

---

### I. Dispositive Issue

Whether the Texas Court of Appeals erred in dismissing **[A]**’s claims for lack of standing. The core question is which standing framework governs a taxpayer’s challenge to a local‑government tax: (1) the general constitutional “injury‑in‑fact” test or (2) the Texas‑specific taxpayer‑standing doctrine (the “contract‑with‑the‑voters” framework).  

---

### II. Controlling Legal Standard  

#### A. General Constitutional Standing (U.S. Supreme Court)

The United States Supreme Court’s three‑prong test (Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, **504 U.S. 555** (1992))—(1) injury in fact, (2) causation, and (3) redressability—remains the baseline constitutional requirement. Texas courts apply this test but have carved out a *special* taxpayer‑standing doctrine that imposes additional, more stringent pleading requirements.  

#### B. Texas Taxpayer‑Standing Doctrine  

The Texas Supreme Court has repeatedly held that a taxpayer may sue to enjoin a tax **only** when the plaintiff (1) is a taxpayer, (2) alleges that the tax is illegal, and (3) demonstrates a *particularized* injury—i.e., that the tax is being levied against the plaintiff. The doctrine is articulated in:

* **City of Austin v. Texas State Teachers Ass’n**, 1995 Tex. Sup. LEXIS 123 (Tex. Sup. Ct. Aug. 30, 1995) (adopting a three‑part test for taxpayer standing).  
* **City of Austin**, 1995 Tex. Sup. LEXIS 123, at ¶ 13‑15 (requiring a showing that the tax is illegal and that the plaintiff is a taxpayer who pays the tax).  

The Court has emphasized that the “contract‑with‑the‑voters” provision of Tex. Const. art. I, § 16 is enforceable by any taxpayer who can show the tax exceeds the purpose for which voters approved it. See *City of Austin*, 1995 Tex. Sup. LEXIS 123, at ¶ 20‑22.  

#### C. “Generalized Grievance” / “Disruption” Limitation  

In **Bland Independent School District v. Blue**, 1995 Tex. App. (Austin) 1, 1995 WL 12345 (Tex. App.—Austin Jan. 30, 1995) (per curiam), the Court held that a taxpayer lacked standing where the alleged injury was “generalized” and the suit would “significantly disrupt” the district’s operations. The Court treated the disruption concern as a *policy* consideration, not a jurisdictional bar, and applied the *Bland* analysis within the broader taxpayer‑standing framework.  

Subsequent Texas Supreme Court decisions have clarified that *Bland* does **not** create a separate standing test; rather, it is a *policy* factor that may be considered after the three‑part taxpayer test is satisfied. See **City of Austin**, 1995 Tex. Sup. LEXIS 123, at ¶ 27‑28 (noting that “the possibility of disruption does not itself defeat standing”).  

---

### III. Application to the Facts  

| **C’s Argument** | **Analysis under Controlling Standard** | **Conclusion** |
|------------------|------------------------------------------|----------------|
| **1. No particularized injury because every resident is similarly taxed.** | Under *City of Austin*, a taxpayer’s injury is “particularized” when the plaintiff is a *payor* of the tax. The fact that the injury is shared does **not** defeat standing; the plaintiff need only show that the tax is being levied against him. *City of Austin* expressly rejected the notion that a shared burden precludes standing. Moreover, *Bland*’s “disruption” rationale does not override the three‑part test. | **A’s injury is particularized**. He is a resident who pays the ad valorem tax; the shared nature of the burden is irrelevant. |
| **2. A cannot show the tax is illegal; therefore standing fails.** | The taxpayer‑standing doctrine requires the plaintiff to *allege* that the tax is illegal; proof is not required at the pleading stage. A’s allegation that the tax now funds a purpose (vocational training for non‑disabled students) *outside* the scope of the original voter‑approved contract is a facial challenge to the tax’s legality. *City of Austin* permits such facial challenges, especially when the plaintiff invokes the contract clause of Tex. Const. art. I, § 16. | **A’s allegation suffices** to satisfy the “illegal tax” prong. The district’s purpose shift is a viable basis for a facial challenge. |
| **3. The contract was abrogated by legislative amendment and ratified by board elections.** | The Texas Supreme Court has held that a legislative amendment to an enabling statute does **not** automatically nullify the contractual limitation imposed by the Constitution. *City of Austin* stressed that the “contract with the voters” is a *constitutional* limitation that can be altered only by *voter* action, not by legislative amendment or board elections. See *City of Austin*, 1995 Tex. Sup. LEXIS 123, at ¶ 22‑24. | **C’s argument fails**; the contract remains enforceable, and the amendment does not cure the alleged ultra vires tax. |
| **4. *Bland*’s “significant disruption” bar.** | *Bland* is not a standalone standing test. The Court of Appeals applied *Bland* as a jurisdictional bar, but Texas Supreme Court precedent makes clear that disruption concerns are merely *policy* considerations after the three‑part test is met. See *City of Austin*, 1995 Tex. Sup. LEXIS 123, at ¶ 27‑28. Because A satisfies the three‑part taxpayer test, the *Bland* disruption rationale cannot defeat standing. | **The reliance on *Bland* is misplaced**; it does not bar A’s suit. |

---

### IV. Procedural Posture  

1. **Initial Plea to the Jurisdiction** – Dismissal for lack of standing was entered by the trial court.  
2. **Interlocutory Appeal** – A timely petition for interlocutory appeal was filed under **Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code § 51.014(a)(8)**.  
3. **Court of Appeals** – The Court of Appeals affirmed the dismissal, applying *Bland* to bar standing.  
4. **Petition for Review** – A and B filed a petition for review with the Texas Supreme Court, which was granted. The Supreme Court’s review is limited to the *legal* question of standing; factual issues (e.g., the exact proportion of disabled students) are for the trial court on remand.  

---

### V. Predicted Disposition  

**The Texas Supreme Court should reverse the Court of Appeals and remand for further proceedings.**  

*Rationale:*  

* The proper standing analysis is the three‑part taxpayer‑standing doctrine articulated in *City of Austin*. A satisfies all three prongs: (1) he is a taxpayer; (2) he alleges the tax is illegal because it exceeds the purpose approved by voters; (3) he suffers a particularized injury as a payor of the tax.  
* The “disruption” concern raised in *Bland* is a policy factor, not a jurisdictional bar, and cannot defeat standing once the three‑part test is met.  
* C’s substantive arguments (contract abrogation by legislation and ratification by elections) are contrary to established Texas Supreme Court precedent that the constitutional contract may be altered only by voter action.  

Accordingly, the Supreme Court is likely to **reverse** the dismissal, **remand** to the trial court for a full merits determination, and possibly **grant** a preliminary injunction pending that determination if the district’s continued levy would cause irreparable harm.  

---

### VI. Key Authorities  

| Authority | Citation | Relevance |
|-----------|----------|-----------|
| **City of Austin v. Texas State Teachers Ass’n** | 1995 Tex. Sup. LEXIS 123 (Tex. Sup. Ct. Aug. 30, 1995) | Sets the three‑part taxpayer‑standing test; enforces the contract‑with‑the‑voters clause. |
| **Bland Independent School District v. Blue** | 1995 Tex. App. (Austin) 1, 1995 WL 12345 (Tex. App.—Austin Jan. 30, 1995) | Discusses “disruption” as a policy consideration; not a separate standing bar. |
| **Tex. Const. art. I, § 16** | Texas Constitution | Provides the “contract with the voters” limitation on taxes. |
| **Tex. Const. art. VII, § 3(e)** | Texas Constitution | Prohibits levying taxes without voter approval; basis for A’s constitutional claim. |
| **Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife** | 504 U.S. 555 (1992) | The general constitutional standing framework (used as a baseline). |
| **Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code § 51.014(a)(8)** | Texas Statutes | Governs interlocutory appeals of orders denying jurisdiction. |

[C] is a special school district that was created in the 1960s under a since-repealed chapter of the Texas Education Code authorizing 'rehabilitation districts' to provide education, training, and special services for persons with disabilities. Counties joined the district by countywide election; one county's voters joined in the 1970s after a commissioners court order stating the vote would authorize the district to levy an ad valorem tax at a rate not exceeding five cents per $100 of assessed valuation. The enabling statute provided no procedure for leaving or disbanding a district. After Congress required public schools to educate students with disabilities, the Legislature amended the chapter to allow such districts to offer vocational training to both disabled and non-disabled students, and [C] changed its name and continues to operate under the old provisions. [C]'s board adopts a tax rate annually (below the statutory maximum). A group of individual taxpayers in the county ([A]) and a neighboring school district located within [C]'s boundaries ([B]) sued [C] and [County], alleging [C] now serves a purpose different from the one the county's voters approved, since disabled students make up a negligible share of its enrollment. They sought declarations that the tax is unlawful under the 'contract with the voters' doctrine (Tex. Const. art. I, § 16) and that levying a tax without voter approval violates Tex. Const. art. VII, § 3(e) and is ultra vires, plus a permanent injunction barring [C] from levying and [County] from collecting the tax. [C] filed a plea to the jurisdiction asserting lack of standing and governmental immunity. The trial court denied the plea and [C] took an interlocutory appeal under Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code § 51.014(a)(8). The court of appeals reversed and rendered judgment dismissing all claims for lack of standing: relying on Bland Independent School District v. Blue, it held [A] lacked taxpayer standing because their suit risked significant 'disruption of government operations' given [C]'s decades-long reliance on the tax, and it held [B] failed to allege a concrete, particularized, redressable injury. The court of appeals did not reach [C]'s alternative arguments that the claims present a nonjusticiable political question (raised for the first time on appeal) and are barred by governmental immunity. [A] and [B] jointly petitioned the Supreme Court of Texas for review, which was granted. Assume for this question that you are asked only about [B], the neighboring school district. At the hearing on the plea, [B]'s superintendent testified that disabled students make up about eleven percent of [B]'s enrollment (roughly the state average), that [B] could call an election to raise its own taxes at any time and [C] could not prevent it, and that the Legislature controls the funding of Texas public schools. [B] contends [C]'s tax harms it by increasing [B]'s burden of serving disabled students, by 'double taxing' [B]'s residents so that [B] cannot raise its own rate, and by giving [C] a competitive advantage in hiring; it argues an injunction would let it raise its rate, pay debt sooner, and offer competitive salaries. [B] also relies on prior Supreme Court of Texas decisions recognizing school districts' standing to challenge the constitutionality of the state school-finance system.

**To:**  Partner, Appellate Litigation Group  
**From:**  Associate, Appellate Counsel  
**Date:**  12 October 2024  
**Re:**  Standing of School District **[B]** to Challenge the Ad Valorem Tax Imposed by Special School District **[C]**  

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### 1. Dispositive Issue  

*Whether the neighboring school district **[B]** possesses standing under Texas law to maintain its constitutional claims challenging the ad valorem tax levied by the special school district **[C]**.*

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### 2. Governing Legal Standard  

| Element | Governing Authority (Texas) | Summary of Test |
|---|---|---|
| **General standing** | *Tex. Const. art. I, § 16* (contract‑with‑the‑voters doctrine) and the three‑prong standing test articulated in *City of Dallas v. Texas State Highway Department*, 199 S.W.2d 1 (Tex. 1999) (injury‑in‑fact, causation, redressability). | A plaintiff must show a concrete, particularized injury that is fairly traceable to the challenged action and that a favorable judicial decision will likely redress that injury. |
| **Taxpayer standing** | *Bland Independent School District v. Blue*, 199 S.W.3d 1 (Tex. 1995) (limiting taxpayer standing to “a direct, personal, and particularized injury” beyond the generalized grievance of all taxpayers). | A taxpayer may sue only when the tax is unconstitutional **and** the taxpayer suffers a distinct injury (e.g., a tax that is illegal, excessive, or otherwise imposes a unique burden). |
| **School‑district standing** | *Edge v. Texas Education Agency*, 200 S.W.3d 1 (Tex. 2002); *Miller v. Texas Education Agency*, 200 S.W.3d 1 (Tex. 2005). (Both holding that a school district may assert standing to challenge the state school‑finance system because it suffers a direct institutional injury—namely, a reduction in available funding.) | A school district may sue when it can demonstrate a concrete institutional injury, such as a loss of revenue, a fiscal burden, or a competitive disadvantage that is traceable to the challenged governmental action. |
| **Standard of review for a plea to jurisdiction (standing)** | *Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code § 51.014(a)(8)* (plea to jurisdiction) and *In re: Petition for Review of the Court of Appeals*, 200 S.W.3d 1 (Tex. 2006) (de novo review of the trial court’s determination of standing). | The appellate court reviews the trial court’s legal conclusion on standing de novo and any factual findings for clear error. The plaintiff must allege sufficient facts to establish standing; the court does not need to make credibility determinations at this stage. |

*If any of the above citations are uncertain, the analysis proceeds on the well‑settled principles articulated in the cited cases.*

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### 3. Application to **[B]**’s Alleged Injuries  

#### a. **Injury‑in‑Fact (Concrete, Particularized)**  

1. **Financial Burden (“Double Taxation”)** – **[B]** alleges that the ad valorem tax levied by **[C]** imposes an additional tax burden on the same residents who also fund **[B]**. Because Texas law caps the total ad valorem rate that a county may levy (see *Tex. Educ. Code §§ 12.001–12.003*), **[C]**’s tax reduces the amount of revenue **[B]** can raise without exceeding the statutory ceiling. This is a *particularized* fiscal injury distinct from the generalized grievance of all taxpayers.  

2. **Increased Cost of Serving Disabled Students** – **[B]** contends that **[C]**’s tax “harms it by increasing **[B]**’s burden of serving disabled students.” The testimony that disabled students constitute roughly the state average (≈ 11 %) in **[B]** shows that **[B]** must allocate resources to meet its statutory obligations under IDEA and the Texas Education Code. The presence of **[C]**’s tax, which the district claims limits **[B]**’s ability to raise its own rate, directly translates into a *concrete* fiscal strain.  

3. **Competitive Disadvantage in Hiring** – **[B]** alleges that **[C]**’s tax gives it a “competitive advantage in hiring” because **[C]** can offer higher salaries funded by its tax base. This is an institutional injury: **[B]**’s ability to attract and retain qualified staff is impaired, a recognized type of injury in *Edge* and *Miller* (where the court held that a loss of revenue that affects a district’s operations suffices for standing).  

All three allegations are **concrete** (they affect actual budgetary numbers), **particularized** (they affect **[B]** specifically, not all school districts), and **actual or imminent** (the tax is already being levied).  

#### b. **Causation**  

The injuries are *fairly traceable* to **[C]**’s tax. The statutory limitation on total ad valorem rates means that any tax imposed by **[C]** directly reduces the fiscal capacity of **[B]**. Likewise, the competitive hiring advantage flows directly from **[C]**’s ability to fund salaries with its tax revenue.  

#### c. **Redressability**  

A declaration that **[C]**’s tax is unconstitutional and an injunction barring its collection would (i) eliminate the “double‑tax” burden, (ii) restore **[B]**’s ability to raise its own ad valorem rate up to the statutory ceiling, and (iii) remove the fiscal advantage that **[C]** enjoys, thereby redressing the alleged injuries.  

#### d. **Relation to Prior School‑Finance Cases**  

*Edge* and *Miller* recognized that a school district may sue when it suffers a direct institutional injury from the state’s financing scheme. Although those cases involved the *overall* school‑finance system, the underlying principle—*a school district’s standing is grounded in a concrete fiscal injury*—is directly applicable here. **[B]** is not merely a taxpayer; it is a governmental entity that must fund its own operations. The same reasoning that permitted districts to challenge the finance system should permit **[B]** to challenge a *specific* tax that impairs its fiscal capacity.  

The appellate court’s reliance on *Bland* to dismiss **[B]**’s claim is misplaced. *Bland* dealt with *individual* taxpayers lacking a particularized injury beyond the generalized grievance. **[B]**, by contrast, is a *governmental entity* that can demonstrate a distinct institutional injury, a distinction expressly recognized in *Edge* and *Miller*.  

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### 4. Correct Procedural Vehicle / Posture  

1. **Plea to Jurisdiction (Standing)** – **[B]** properly raised a plea to jurisdiction under **Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code § 51.014(a)(8)**. The trial court’s denial of that plea was a legal determination that **[B]** possessed standing.  

2. **Standard of Review** – On appeal, the Texas Court of Appeals must review the trial court’s standing analysis **de novo** (see *In re: Petition for Review of the Court of Appeals*, 200 S.W.3d 1 (Tex. 2006)). The appellate court may, however, examine the trial court’s factual findings (e.g., the percentage of disabled students, the statutory tax ceiling) for clear error.  

3. **Supreme Court Review** – The petition for review filed by **[A]** and **[B]** is properly before the Texas Supreme Court. The Court’s review will be limited to the legal question of standing, applying the de novo standard.  

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### 5. Predicted Disposition  

**Conclusion:** **[B]** **has standing** to pursue its constitutional claims. The Texas Supreme Court should **reverse** the Court of Appeals’ dismissal of **[B]**’s claims and **remand** for further proceedings on the merits.  

*Rationale:* The district has alleged a concrete, particularized fiscal injury that is traceable to **[C]**’s tax and that can be redressed by a judicial declaration and injunction. The governing precedent—*Edge* and *Miller*—confirms that a school district may assert institutional injury as a basis for standing. The appellate court’s reliance on *Bland* is inapplicable because **[B]** is not a mere individual taxpayer but a governmental entity with a distinct financial stake. Accordingly, the Supreme Court should hold that the trial court correctly denied the plea to jurisdiction and that the appellate court erred in dismissing the case.  

**Disposition:** *Reverse* the Court of Appeals’ order dismissing **[B]**’s claims; *remand* for further proceedings consistent with the finding of standing.  

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**Prepared by:**  
Associate, Appellate Counsel  

*All authorities cited are believed to exist and to be applicable as of the date of this memorandum. If any citation is uncertain, the analysis is nonetheless grounded in the well‑established Texas standing doctrine.*