Grades, item by item

This is an oil-and-gas title dispute over a mineral or royalty interest conveyed by an old Texas deed. The deed describes the interest using a double fraction (a fraction multiplied by another fraction, such as a fraction 'of one-eighth'). Petitioners [A1] through [A16] and respondents [B1] through [B9] are competing successors-in-interest who dispute the size of the interest the deed conveyed or reserved. After the trial court ruled on the deed, the court of appeals issued a decision construing the double fraction under the general canons of deed construction and the Supreme Court of Texas precedent then available. The losing party petitioned the Supreme Court of Texas for review. While the petition was pending, the Supreme Court decided a different double-fraction case that further developed its existing framework for reading '1/8' in antiquated mineral instruments; the court of appeals did not have that later opinion when it ruled, and the Supreme Court has since disposed of several similar pending double-fraction petitions in a uniform manner.

**Disposition** 
Vacate and remand to the court of appeals. (Confidence: High).

**Issue** 
Whether the deed’s double-fraction conveyance/reservation must be construed under the estate-misconception doctrine and the rebuttable presumption that "1/8" reflects a term of art for the entire mineral estate, requiring remand for the court of appeals to reconsider its judgment in light of recent Texas Supreme Court precedent.

**Standard of review** 
De novo. Deed construction presents a pure question of law where courts ascertain the grantor’s intent from the four corners of the instrument.

**Controlling authority** 
*Van Dyke v. Navigator Group Ventures, LLC*, 668 S.W.3d 353 (Tex. 2023) (foundational decision establishing a rebuttable presumption that "1/8" in legacy mineral conveyances was used as a term of art referring to the entire mineral estate under the estate-misconception doctrine); *Hysaw v. Dawkins*, 483 S.W.3d 1 (Tex. 2016); Tex. R. App. P. 59.1, 60.2.

**Application** 
The instrument implicates the estate-misconception doctrine and legacy fraction-of-royalty jurisprudence. Under *Van Dyke*, Texas courts apply a rebuttable presumption that historical references to "1/8" in double fractions served as shorthand for the entire mineral estate rather than a simple mathematical fraction. Because the court of appeals issued its decision without the benefit of the Supreme Court of Texas's recent clarifying jurisprudence governing double fractions and the estate-misconception doctrine, the Supreme Court routinely declines to render a definitive construction in the first instance, choosing instead to allow the lower appellate court to apply the updated framework.

**Procedure** 
Petition for review under Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 53. Pursuant to Texas Rules of Appellate Procedure 59.1 and 60.2(f), the Supreme Court of Texas grants the petition for review without hearing oral argument, vacates the judgment of the court of appeals, and remands the case to the court of appeals for further proceedings in light of recent precedent.

This is an oil-and-gas title dispute over a mineral or royalty interest conveyed by an old Texas deed. The deed describes the interest using a double fraction (a fraction multiplied by another fraction, such as a fraction 'of one-eighth'). Petitioners [A1] through [A16] and respondents [B1] through [B9] are competing successors-in-interest who dispute the size of the interest the deed conveyed or reserved. After the trial court ruled on the deed, the court of appeals issued a decision construing the double fraction. After the court of appeals issued its decision, the Supreme Court of Texas decided another double-fraction case, Clifton v. Johnson, which further developed the rebuttable presumption first discussed in Van Dyke v. Navigator Group, 668 S.W.3d 353 (Tex. 2023), that a double fraction in an antiquated instrument using '1/8' is presumed to refer to the entire mineral estate rather than a fixed fraction. The losing party petitioned the Supreme Court of Texas for review. The court of appeals did not have the benefit of Clifton when it ruled, and the Supreme Court has since disposed of several similar pending double-fraction petitions the same way. Neither side has been heard at oral argument in the Supreme Court.

Disposition: Grant the petition for review, vacate the judgment of the court of appeals, and remand to the court of appeals. Confidence: High.

Issue: Whether the court of appeals' judgment construing a double-fraction reservation or conveyance in an antiquated deed should be vacated and remanded for reconsideration in light of intervening Supreme Court of Texas double-fraction precedent.

Standard of review: Deed construction is a question of law reviewed de novo. However, procedural disposition under Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 59.1 permits the Court to grant review and remand without hearing oral argument when intervening precedent governs the lower court's analysis.

Controlling authority: *Van Dyke v. Navigator Group*, 668 S.W.3d 353 (Tex. 2023); Tex. R. App. P. 59.1, 60.2(f).

Application: The court of appeals rendered its decision without the benefit of recent Supreme Court precedent articulating and refining the rebuttable presumption regarding the "estate-misconception" doctrine and double-fraction language (e.g., fractional interests referencing "one-eighth"). Where intervening controlling authority fundamentally reshapes the legal framework governing an issue of first impression or unresolved construction, the Supreme Court of Texas routinely declines to adjudicate the deed construction on the merits in the first instance. Instead, the Court grants the petition for review and remands the matter so that the court of appeals may reconsider the instrument under the proper legal presumption.

Procedure: Petition for review under Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 53; summary disposition on the merits without oral argument pursuant to Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 59.1, vacating the intermediate appellate court's judgment and remanding under Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 60.2(f).

This is an oil-and-gas title dispute over a mineral or royalty interest conveyed by an old Texas deed. The deed describes the interest using a double fraction (a fraction multiplied by another fraction, such as a fraction 'of one-eighth'). Petitioners [A1] through [A16] and respondents [B1] through [B9] are competing successors-in-interest who dispute the size of the interest the deed conveyed or reserved. After the trial court ruled on the deed, the court of appeals issued a decision construing the double fraction under the general canons of deed construction and the Supreme Court of Texas precedent then available. The losing party petitioned the Supreme Court of Texas for review. While the petition was pending, the Supreme Court decided a different double-fraction case that further developed its existing framework for reading '1/8' in antiquated mineral instruments; the court of appeals did not have that later opinion when it ruled, and the Supreme Court has since disposed of several similar pending double-fraction petitions in a uniform manner.

**MEMORANDUM**

**TO:** Appellate Practice Group  
**FROM:** Texas Appellate Counsel  
**RE:** Double-Fraction Deed Construction Petition for Review / Intervening Precedent Analysis  

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### 1. Dispositive Issue
Whether the double fraction in the subject deed (e.g., a fraction multiplied by "1/8") conveys or reserves a fixed fractional interest or a floating fraction of the entire mineral/royalty estate under the "estate-misconception doctrine" and the "presumed-time-attuned meaning" of "1/8," and whether the Supreme Court of Texas will decide the deed's construction itself or remand to the court of appeals to apply recently clarified precedent.

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### 2. Controlling Legal Standard & Authorities

#### Substantive Doctrine: The Estate-Misconception Doctrine & Presumed-Meaning Canon
Under Texas oil-and-gas jurisprudence, the construction of antiquated instruments containing double fractions (most commonly involving "1/8") is governed by the holistic, four-corners approach, informed by two historical realities:
1. **The Estate-Misconception Doctrine:** The widespread historical misconception that a mineral owner who leased their land retained only a 1/8 mineral interest (the typical standard royalty) rather than a fee simple determinable reversionary interest in the entire 8/8 estate.
2. **The "Legacy 1/8" / Time-Attuned Meaning Presumption:** In antiquated instruments executed during the era when 1/8 was the near-universal standard royalty, "1/8" was often used as shorthand or a term of art for the entire mineral estate or standard royalty interest.

#### Key Supreme Court of Texas Authorities:
* ***Hysaw v. Dawkins*, 483 S.W.3d 1 (Tex. 2016):** Established the modern holistic approach to double-fraction analysis, recognizing the estate-misconception doctrine and rejecting mechanical mathematical multiplication when the instrument indicates "1/8" was used as a proxy for the entire estate.
* ***Van Dyke v. Navigator Group*, 668 S.W.3d 353 (Tex. 2023) (Foundational Decision):** Formally established a rebuttable presumption that the term "1/8" in antiquated instruments (from the era of the ubiquitous 1/8 lease royalty) was used as a term of art referring to the total mineral/royalty estate (the full 8/8), rather than a literal arithmetical fraction of 0.125.
* ***Intervening / Subsequent SCOTX Precedent:*** Following *Van Dyke*, the Supreme Court has continued to clarify and refine the boundaries of the presumption across various vintage deed structures (including addressing whether contemporaneous extrinsic circumstances, express mineral leasing clauses, or subsequent development can rebut the *Van Dyke* presumption).

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### 3. Application to Facts
The court of appeals construed the subject deed without the benefit of the Supreme Court's latest full articulation of the double-fraction and estate-misconception framework. 

Under *Van Dyke* and its progeny:
1. The court must presume that the reference to "1/8" in the double fraction served as a term of art for the whole mineral estate.
2. The burden rests on the party advocating for strict literal multiplication to point to intrinsic textual evidence in the deed's four corners rebutting that presumption.
3. Because the court of appeals applied an incomplete or superseded framework, its construction rested on legal standards that did not give proper effect to the rebuttable presumption now mandated by Texas law.

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### 4. Correct Procedural Vehicle & Posture
* **Vehicle:** Petition for Review to the Supreme Court of Texas (Tex. Gov't Code § 22.001; Tex. R. App. P. 53).
* **Summary Disposition Posture:** Under **Tex. R. App. P. 59.1**, the Supreme Court may grant the petition for review without hearing oral argument and issue a per curiam opinion/order.
* **Remand Authority:** Under **Tex. R. App. P. 60.2(f)**, the Supreme Court is empowered to vacate or reverse the judgment of the court of appeals and remand the case to that court in the interest of justice when an intervening decision alters or clarifies the applicable standard.

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### 5. Predicted Disposition

* **Primary Prediction:** **Grant petition for review, vacate the court of appeals’ judgment without rendering a final deed construction, and remand to the Court of Appeals.**
* **Rationale:** When an intermediate appellate court renders an opinion without the benefit of a significant, newly issued Supreme Court decision directly clarifying the governing standard in double-fraction cases, the Supreme Court's established and uniform practice is to refrain from construing the instrument in the first instance. Instead, it vacates the intermediate judgment and remands the matter to the court of appeals to reconsider the deed under the clarified legal framework in the first instance.

This is an oil-and-gas title dispute over a mineral or royalty interest conveyed by an old Texas deed. The deed describes the interest using a double fraction (a fraction multiplied by another fraction, such as a fraction 'of one-eighth'). Petitioners [A1] through [A16] and respondents [B1] through [B9] are competing successors-in-interest who dispute the size of the interest the deed conveyed or reserved. After the trial court ruled on the deed, the court of appeals issued a decision construing the double fraction. After the court of appeals issued its decision, the Supreme Court of Texas decided another double-fraction case, Clifton v. Johnson, which further developed the rebuttable presumption first discussed in Van Dyke v. Navigator Group, 668 S.W.3d 353 (Tex. 2023), that a double fraction in an antiquated instrument using '1/8' is presumed to refer to the entire mineral estate rather than a fixed fraction. The losing party petitioned the Supreme Court of Texas for review. The court of appeals did not have the benefit of Clifton when it ruled, and the Supreme Court has since disposed of several similar pending double-fraction petitions the same way. Neither side has been heard at oral argument in the Supreme Court.

**MEMORANDUM**

**TO:** Appellate Practice Group / Co-Counsel  
**FROM:** Texas Appellate Counsel  
**DATE:** March 30, 2026  
**SUBJECT:** Analysis and Predicted Disposition of Petition for Review in Double-Fraction Title Dispute ([A] v. [B])

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### 1. The Dispositive Issue
The dispositive threshold issue is whether the Supreme Court of Texas should independently construe the disputed deed on the merits or, instead, grant the petition for review without oral argument, reverse/vacate the court of appeals’ judgment, and remand the case to the intermediate appellate court for reconsideration in light of intervening controlling precedent (*Van Dyke v. Navigator Group* and *Clifton v. Johnson*).

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### 2. Controlling Legal Standard

#### A. Doctrinal Framework: Estate-Misconception & Double Fractions
Under Texas oil-and-gas jurisprudence, the "estate-misconception doctrine" reflects the historical misunderstanding that a mineral owner retained only a 1/8 interest rather than the entire mineral estate subject to a 1/8 royalty. 

* In *Hysaw v. Dawkins*, 483 S.W.3d 1 (Tex. 2016), and *Van Dyke v. Navigator Group*, 668 S.W.3d 353 (Tex. 2023), the Supreme Court of Texas established a rebuttable presumption: in antiquated mineral instruments utilizing double fractions involving "1/8" (e.g., "one-half of one-eighth"), the term "1/8" is presumed to refer to the entire mineral estate (*in toto*) rather than a simple mathematical fraction, unless the instrument contains express language rebutting that presumption.
* *Clifton v. Johnson* further clarifies and refines the application and rebuttability of this presumption in legacy deeds.

#### B. Procedural Mechanism for Intervening Precedent
Under the Texas Rules of Appellate Procedure:
* **Tex. R. App. P. 59.1:** If at least six justices concur, the Supreme Court may grant a petition for review and decide the case without hearing oral argument (typically via a *per curiam* opinion).
* **Tex. R. App. P. 60.2(f):** The Supreme Court may vacate or reverse the judgment of the court of appeals and remand the case in the interest of justice.

When a lower appellate court decides a case without the benefit of a subsequent, dispositive decision of the Supreme Court of Texas that reshapes or clarifies the governing substantive test, the Court routinely exercises its discretion under Rules 59.1 and 60.2(f) to grant review without oral argument, vacate or reverse the intermediate court's judgment, and remand to the court of appeals so that court may apply the correct legal standard in the first instance.

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### 3. Application to These Facts

1. **Failure to Apply Intervening Standard:** The court of appeals construed the double-fraction deed before the Supreme Court issued *Clifton v. Johnson* (which elaborated on *Van Dyke*). Consequently, the court of appeals evaluated the deed under an incomplete or superseded framework without properly applying the formalized rebuttable presumption governing legacy 1/8 instruments.
2. **Institutional Role and Efficiency:** The Supreme Court of Texas functions primarily to declare the law rather than to serve as an initial court of error correction on every individual deed when the underlying doctrine has just been clarified. Because the Court has established a consistent pattern of remanding pending pipeline double-fraction petitions following *Van Dyke* and *Clifton*, the same standard practice applies here.
3. **Merits Need Not Be Reached:** The Supreme Court does not need to decide the construction of the specific fraction because the court of appeals has not yet had the opportunity to interpret the deed under the *Clifton* framework. Remanding allows the intermediate appellate court to apply the presumption, evaluate whether the deed contains text rebutting the presumption, and address any subsidiary issues (e.g., presumed grant doctrine or estoppel) under current law.

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### 4. Correct Procedural Vehicle and Posture

* **Vehicle:** A standard Petition for Review filed pursuant to **Tex. R. App. P. 53**.
* **Procedural Posture:** The case is pending on the Supreme Court of Texas’s petition docket without having been set for oral argument.
* **Mechanism of Disposition:** The Court will issue a summary *per curiam* opinion pursuant to **Tex. R. App. P. 59.1**.

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### 5. Predicted Disposition

* **Grant or Deny:** **GRANT** the petition for review.
* **Oral Argument:** **DISPENSED WITH** under Tex. R. App. P. 59.1.
* **Judgment:** **REVERSE** (or **VACATE**) the judgment of the court of appeals.
* **Remand:** **REMAND** the cause to the **court of appeals** for further proceedings in light of *Clifton v. Johnson* and *Van Dyke v. Navigator Group*.