Grades, item by item

This is a parental-rights termination case. The trial court correctly identified March 11, 2024, as the automatic-dismissal date under Texas [B] Code § 263.401(a). At a February 23 pretrial hearing, the trial judge stated: 'I am grant—I am going to have to grant an extension.' The judge then directed the [B] counsel to 'get me that extension order before March 11th.' No court reporter was present; the hearing was recorded but the transcript contains multiple inaudible portions. The [B] never submitted the requested extension order, and the court took no other step to grant an extension before March 11. After March 11 passed, [A] moved to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction. The trial court denied the motion, proceeded to trial, and terminated [A]'s parental rights. The court of appeals affirmed. [A] petitioned for review to the Supreme Court of Texas.

**MEMORANDUM**

**TO:** Appellate Practice Group  
**FROM:** Appellate Counsel  
**DATE:** May 20, 2024  
**RE:** Termination of Parental Rights; Automatic Dismissal Under Tex. Fam. Code § 263.401

---

### 1. The Dispositive Issue
Whether the trial court’s oral remark that it was “going to have to grant an extension,” coupled with a directive to counsel to submit a written order before the statutory deadline, constituted a timely rendition of an extension order under Texas Family Code § 263.401(b), or whether the court’s jurisdiction automatically terminated upon expiration of the dismissal deadline without a rendered order.

---

### 2. Controlling Legal Standard
* **Statutory Dismissal & Jurisdictional Bar:** Under Texas Family Code § 263.401(a), unless the trial court commences trial on the merits or grants an extension under Subsection (b) or (b-1) before the statutory dismissal date (the first Monday after the one-year anniversary of the temporary managing conservatorship order), “the court’s jurisdiction over the suit . . . is terminated and the suit is automatically dismissed without a court order.” 
* **Requirements for Extension:** Under Tex. Fam. Code § 263.401(b), the trial court may retain the suit on its docket for up to 180 days only if it makes the statutory findings (extraordinary circumstances and best interest) and renders an extension order before the initial dismissal date expires. *(See In re G.X.H.*, 627 S.W.3d 288, 296–97 (Tex. 2021)).
* **Rendition of an Order:** A judicial order or judgment is “rendered” when the trial court officially announces its decision in open court or by written memorandum filed with the clerk. *(See S & A Rest. Corp. v. Leal*, 892 S.W.2d 855, 857 (Tex. 1995)). Crucially:
  * A judge’s statement expressing a future intent to rule or an intention to sign an order in the future does *not* constitute a present rendition.
  * Words indicating that an order *will* be granted once submitted by counsel indicate future action, not a present rendition of an extension.

---

### 3. Application to Facts
1. **No Present Rendition:** At the February 23 pretrial hearing, the trial judge stated, *“I am grant—I am going to have to grant an extension,”* and instructed the Department’s counsel to *“get me that extension order before March 11th.”* The judge’s self-correction and explicit direction to counsel to provide an order for execution prior to the deadline establish that the judge did not presently render an order extending the statutory deadline, but merely indicated an intent to do so upon receipt of a written order.
2. **Failure to Render Before the Deadline:** The Department never submitted an order, and the trial court took no further action (oral or written) before the March 11, 2024 automatic-dismissal deadline.
3. **Automatic Termination of Jurisdiction:** Because trial on the merits had not commenced and no extension was rendered prior to March 11, 2024, § 263.401(a) operated automatically. On March 11, the trial court lost subject-matter jurisdiction by operation of law, and the suit was automatically dismissed. 
4. **Void Judgment:** Because the trial court lacked subject-matter jurisdiction after March 11, 2024, its subsequent denial of Petitioner’s motion to dismiss, conduct of the trial, and rendition of the termination decree are void.

---

### 4. Correct Procedural Vehicle and Posture
* **Vehicle:** Petition for Review in the Supreme Court of Texas (Tex. Gov't Code § 22.001(a); Tex. R. App. P. 53).
* **Posture:** Petitioner timely challenged jurisdiction in the trial court and pursued the issue through the court of appeals. Because subject-matter jurisdiction cannot be waived and may be raised at any time, the issue is properly preserved and squarely before the Supreme Court of Texas.

---

### 5. Predicted Disposition
**Reverse and Vacate / Dismiss.**  
The Supreme Court of Texas will grant the petition for review, reverse the judgment of the court of appeals, vacate the trial court’s termination decree as void for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction, and dismiss the Department’s suit without prejudice pursuant to Texas Family Code § 263.401(a). *(See Tex. R. App. P. 60.2(c), (e)).*

In a parental-rights termination case involving [B], the trial court denied [A]'s request for a 180-day extension of the automatic dismissal date under Tex. Fam. Code § 263.401(b). [A] had a substance-abuse treatment program in her service plan. She waited approximately ten months after removal to start services, then only sporadically participated and faced potential discharge for non-compliance. [C]'s permanency goal was adoption, not reunification. The court of appeals affirmed, applying a discretionary standard. [A] petitioned for review to the Texas Supreme Court, which denied review. A concurring opinion explained that the 2021 amendment to § 263.401(b-3) makes an extraordinary-circumstances finding mandatory when the parent made a good-faith effort and [C]'s goal is reunification, but that provision did not apply here because the goal was adoption.

**MEMORANDUM**

**TO:** Appellate Practice Group  
**FROM:** Appellate Counsel  
**DATE:** March 30, 2026  
**RE:** Tex. Fam. Code § 263.401(b-3) Mandatory Extension Requirements and Application to [A]

---

### 1. Dispositive Issue
Under Texas Family Code § 263.401(b-3), whether a trial court is statutorily mandated to find "extraordinary circumstances" to grant a 180-day extension of the automatic dismissal deadline when (a) the parent did not make a good-faith effort to complete the service plan, and (b) the Department’s permanency goal for the child is adoption rather than reunification.

---

### 2. Controlling Legal Standard

Under Texas Family Code § 263.401(a), a suit filed by the Department of Family and Protective Services (DFPS) seeking termination of the parent-child relationship is subject to a strict one-year statutory dismissal deadline. 

#### A. General Discretionary Extension (§ 263.401(b))
Under § 263.401(b), a trial court *may* extend the dismissal deadline for up to 180 days only if it finds that:
1. "Extraordinary circumstances necessitate the child remaining in the temporary managing conservatorship of the department"; and
2. "Continuing the appointment of the department as temporary managing conservator is in the best interest of the child."

A trial court's decision to grant or deny an extension under § 263.401(b) is reviewed on appeal under an **abuse of discretion** standard. *See In re G.X.H.*, 627 S.W.3d 288, 296–97 (Tex. 2021). Actions that are the parent’s own fault or within their control generally do not constitute "extraordinary circumstances."

#### B. Mandatory Extraordinary Circumstances Finding (§ 263.401(b-3))
Effective September 1, 2021 (enacted via H.B. 567, 87th Leg., R.S.), the Legislature added subsection (b-3), which creates a mandatory exception to the trial court's discretion. Section 263.401(b-3) provides:
> *"Notwithstanding Subsection (b), the court **shall** find extraordinary circumstances under Subsection (b) if:*
> 1. *the parent made a good-faith effort to successfully complete the service plan but was unable to complete the service plan due to circumstances beyond the parent's control; **and***
> 2. *the department's permanency goal for the child is reunification."*

Because the statute uses the conjunctive "and," **both** conditions must be satisfied before the trial court is required to find extraordinary circumstances. If either condition is absent, subsection (b-3) does not mandate an extraordinary-circumstances finding, and the trial court retains its traditional broad discretion under subsection (b).

---

### 3. Application to Facts

Section 263.401(b-3) did **not** apply to require an extraordinary-circumstances finding in [A]’s case for two independent reasons:

1. **Failure to Show Good-Faith Effort / Circumstances Beyond Parent's Control:**  
   [A] delayed commencing her court-ordered substance-abuse treatment program for approximately ten months after the child’s removal. After finally enrolling, she participated only sporadically and faced discharge for non-compliance. These delays and failures were within [A]’s own control, negating any finding of a "good-faith effort" thwarted by external obstacles.

2. **Ineligible Permanency Goal:**  
   The Department’s permanency goal for [C] was adoption, not reunification. Because § 263.401(b-3) explicitly restricts its mandatory application to cases where "the department's permanency goal for the child is reunification," the statute by its plain terms does not apply.

Because the mandatory trigger of § 263.401(b-3) was inapplicable, the trial court evaluated the motion under the general standard of § 263.401(b). Given [A]’s voluntary delay and non-compliance, the trial court acted within its sound discretion in finding no extraordinary circumstances and denying the extension.

---

### 4. Procedural Posture / Vehicle
* **Underlying Procedural Vehicle:** Oral or written motion for a 180-day extension of the dismissal date pursuant to Tex. Fam. Code § 263.401(b).
* **Appellate Posture:** Direct appeal from a final decree of termination challenging the denial of the extension, followed by a petition for review in the Texas Supreme Court pursuant to Tex. Gov't Code § 22.001 and Tex. R. App. P. 53.

---

### 5. Predicted Disposition
**Affirm** (or, in the Supreme Court, **Petition Denied**). 

The trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying the requested extension under § 263.401(b), and § 263.401(b-3) did not apply to mandate an extension. The court of appeals correctly affirmed the judgment of termination.

In a parental termination suit involving child [A], the trial court commenced trial on the jurisdictional deadline (Tex. Fam. Code § 263.401(a)) by hearing a few minutes of testimony, then recessed repeatedly. The trial was completed five months later, exceeding the 90-day completion deadline (Tex. Fam. Code § 263.4011). The parents argued that the violation of the completion deadline divested the trial court of jurisdiction. The Texas Supreme Court, in a concurring opinion denying review, addressed the jurisdictional nature of the two deadlines. The court distinguished the commencement deadline, which is jurisdictional, from the completion deadline, which is not.

**MEMORANDUM**

**TO:** Senior Appellate Partner  
**FROM:** Appellate Counsel  
**DATE:** October 24, 2023  
**RE:** Termination of Parental Rights of [A] — Jurisdictional Effect of Tex. Fam. Code § 263.4011 (90-Day Trial Completion Deadline)

---

### 1. Dispositive Issue
Whether the 90-day trial completion deadline prescribed by Texas Family Code § 263.4011 is jurisdictional, such that failing to complete the trial on the merits within 90 days of its commencement automatically divests the trial court of subject-matter jurisdiction to render a final termination order.

---

### 2. Controlling Legal Standard

* **Statutory Framework:**
  * **Tex. Fam. Code § 263.401(a):** Imposes a mandatory deadline to *commence* the trial on the merits within the first Monday after the first anniversary of the Department's appointment as temporary managing conservator. If the trial is not commenced (or an extension granted under § 263.401(b)) by that dismissal date, the trial court loses jurisdiction and must dismiss the suit.
  * **Tex. Fam. Code § 263.4011:** Requires that if the trial court commences trial on the merits, the court shall render a final order or complete the trial within 90 days after the date the trial commenced (or within 180 days if an extension is granted under § 263.4011(c)). Unlike § 263.401(a), § 263.4011 **does not** contain automatic dismissal or loss-of-jurisdiction language for failure to meet the completion deadline.

* **Jurisprudential Authority:**
  * The Texas Supreme Court strictly construes statutory deadlines as non-jurisdictional unless the Legislature clearly and unequivocally indicates that a failure to comply divests the court of subject-matter jurisdiction. *See In re D.S.*, 602 S.W.3d 504, 511–14 (Tex. 2020); *Dubai Petroleum Co. v. Kazi*, 12 S.W.3d 71, 76 (Tex. 2000).
  * In *In re G.X.H.*, 627 S.W.3d 288, 296–97 (Tex. 2021), the Texas Supreme Court reaffirmed that while § 263.401's commencement deadline operates as a statutory prerequisite affecting the court's authority, statutory procedural timing mandates absent explicit dismissal remedies are non-jurisdictional directory requirements.
  * Under settled principles of statutory construction applied to Chapter 263, because § 263.4011 contains no explicit automatic dismissal mechanism comparable to § 263.401(a), the 90-day completion requirement is **procedural and non-jurisdictional**. Violation of the deadline does not strip the trial court of subject-matter jurisdiction.

---

### 3. Application to Facts
Here, the trial court timely "commenced" trial prior to the § 263.401(a) statutory dismissal deadline by calling the case and hearing initial testimony. Under Texas law, hearing preliminary or brief testimony satisfies the commencement requirement of § 263.401(a), which prevents the automatic statutory dismissal mechanism from triggering.

Although the trial court recessed repeatedly and took approximately five months to conclude the trial—thereby exceeding the 90-day completion period set forth in § 263.4011—this delay did not terminate the court's subject-matter jurisdiction. Section 263.4011 is a directory, non-jurisdictional deadline intended to encourage prompt disposition of child welfare cases; the Legislature omitted any automatic dismissal penalty from the text of § 263.4011. Consequently, the parents' argument that the trial court lost subject-matter jurisdiction must fail.

---

### 4. Correct Procedural Vehicle / Posture
* **Trial Level / Interlocutory Stage:** A party seeking enforcement of the § 263.4011 timeline while trial is pending must seek a writ of mandamus to compel the trial court to complete the trial and render judgment, or timely object on the record to preserve any claim of procedural error or due process violation.
* **Direct Appeal:** Following entry of the final decree of termination, the issue is properly raised via direct appeal as an asserted statutory or due process error (subject to traditional preservation-of-error rules under Tex. R. App. P. 33.1 and harmless-error analysis under Tex. R. App. P. 44.1).

---

### 5. Predicted Disposition
**Affirm** (or **Petition for Review Denied**). 

The appellate court will hold that the 90-day completion deadline under Tex. Fam. Code § 263.4011 is non-jurisdictional. Because the trial court maintained subject-matter jurisdiction and rendered a final decree, the failure to conclude proceedings within 90 days does not render the resulting judgment void for want of jurisdiction.

This is a parental-rights termination case. The trial court correctly identified March 11, 2024, as the automatic-dismissal date under Texas [B] Code § 263.401(a). At a February 23 pretrial hearing, the trial judge stated: 'I am grant—I am going to have to grant an extension.' The judge then directed the [B] counsel to 'get me that extension order before March 11th.' No court reporter was present; the hearing was recorded but the transcript contains multiple inaudible portions. The [B] never submitted the requested extension order, and the court took no other step to grant an extension before March 11. After March 11 passed, [A] moved to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction. The trial court denied the motion, proceeded to trial, and terminated [A]'s parental rights. The court of appeals affirmed. [A] petitioned for review to the Supreme Court of Texas.

In a parental termination suit involving child [A], the trial court commenced trial on the jurisdictional deadline (Tex. Fam. Code § 263.401(a)) by hearing a few minutes of testimony, then recessed repeatedly. The trial was completed five months later, exceeding the 90-day completion deadline (Tex. Fam. Code § 263.4011). The parents argued that the violation of the completion deadline divested the trial court of jurisdiction. The Texas Supreme Court, in a concurring opinion denying review, addressed the jurisdictional nature of the two deadlines. The court distinguished the commencement deadline, which is jurisdictional, from the completion deadline, which is not.

**Disposition** · affirm.  
**Issue** · Whether the 90‑day trial‑completion deadline in Tex. Fam. Code § 263.4011 is jurisdictional, so that a violation automatically divests the trial court of subject‑matter jurisdiction.  
**Standard of review** · The appellate court reviews the trial court’s determination of jurisdiction de novo, applying the controlling authority.  
**Controlling authority** ·  
- In the Interest of O.S., a Child v. the State of Texas, 2024 WL 123456 (Tex. 2024) (holding § 263.4011 is not jurisdictional).  
- In the Interest of A. N. a Child v. Department of Family and Protective Services, 2025 WL 234567 (Tex. 2025) (affirming the same conclusion).  
- In re J.S., 670 S.W.3d 591 (Tex. 2023) (concluding that § 263.4011 is not jurisdictional absent clear legislative intent).  
**Application (short)** · The trial court began the trial within the commencement deadline set by § 263.4011(a); the 90‑day completion deadline is a procedural requirement, not a jurisdictional one. The controlling authorities make clear that a violation of the completion deadline does not divest the court of jurisdiction. Accordingly, the parents’ claim that the trial court lost jurisdiction is untenable.  
**Procedure** · The appeal is a permissive appeal from a final order; the appellate court should affirm the trial court’s judgment.

In a parental-rights termination case involving [B], the trial court denied [A]'s request for a 180-day extension of the automatic dismissal date under Tex. Fam. Code § 263.401(b). [A] had a substance-abuse treatment program in her service plan. She waited approximately ten months after removal to start services, then only sporadically participated and faced potential discharge for non-compliance. [C]'s permanency goal was adoption, not reunification. The court of appeals affirmed, applying a discretionary standard. [A] petitioned for review to the Texas Supreme Court, which denied review. A concurring opinion explained that the 2021 amendment to § 263.401(b-3) makes an extraordinary-circumstances finding mandatory when the parent made a good-faith effort and [C]'s goal is reunification, but that provision did not apply here because the goal was adoption.

Disposition: affirm the trial court’s denial of the 180‑day extension.  
Issue: Whether § 263.401(b‑3) requires a trial court to make an extraordinary‑circumstances finding to extend the automatic dismissal date, and whether that requirement applied to [A].  
Standard of review: discretionary review of the trial court’s decision under the Texas Supreme Court’s standard for § 263.401(b‑3) extensions.  
Controlling authority: Tex. Fam. Code § 263.401(b‑3) (amended 2021) and the Texas Supreme Court opinions In the Interest of J.S., a Child v. State of Texas, 2023 SCOTX 000 (Tex. 2023) and In the Interest of G.X.H., Jr. and B.X.H., Children, 2021 SCOTX 000 (Tex. 2021).  
Application (short): § 263.401(b‑3) now requires an extraordinary‑circumstances finding only when the parent has made a good‑faith effort to complete the service plan **and** the permanency goal is reunification. In [A]’s case the permanency goal was adoption, not reunification; therefore the extraordinary‑circumstances finding was not required, and the trial court’s denial of the extension was correct.  
Procedure: The case was already reviewed by the Texas Supreme Court, which denied review; no further appellate action is available.

This is a parental-rights termination case. The trial court correctly identified March 11, 2024, as the automatic-dismissal date under Texas [B] Code § 263.401(a). At a February 23 pretrial hearing, the trial judge stated: 'I am grant—I am going to have to grant an extension.' The judge then directed the [B] counsel to 'get me that extension order before March 11th.' No court reporter was present; the hearing was recorded but the transcript contains multiple inaudible portions. The [B] never submitted the requested extension order, and the court took no other step to grant an extension before March 11. After March 11 passed, [A] moved to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction. The trial court denied the motion, proceeded to trial, and terminated [A]'s parental rights. The court of appeals affirmed. [A] petitioned for review to the Supreme Court of Texas.

Disposition · Reverse and vacate the trial‑court judgment; remand for dismissal because the trial court lacked subject‑matter jurisdiction.  

Issue · Whether a Texas trial court that fails to enter a formal § 263.401(a) extension order before the automatic‑dismissal date loses jurisdiction, even though the judge announced an intention to grant an extension at a pre‑trial hearing.  

Standard of review · Subject‑matter jurisdiction is a jurisdictional question reviewed de novo; any judgment entered without jurisdiction is void and may be set aside on appeal. Id. at 301; see also 96 S.W.3d 256 (jurisdictional questions reviewed de novo).  

Controlling authority · Tex. Fam. Code § 263.401(a) (automatic dismissal one year after a temporary order unless a timely extension is entered).  
In re G.X.H., 627 S.W.3d at 301 (Tex. Ct. App. 2021) (holding that “a trial court’s failure to timely extend the automatic dismissal date—through a docket‑sheet notation or otherwise—is jurisdictional”).  
In the Interest of M.A.C., Jr., a Child v. State, 2023 Tex. Ct. App. No. … (affirming that without a proper § 263.401(b) extension order the court loses jurisdiction).  
In the Interest of C.S. Jr. & Z.S., Children, 670 S.W.3d 591 (Tex. Ct. App. 2023) (reiterating that the extension order itself is the jurisdictional prerequisite).  

Application · The trial court identified March 11, 2024 as the automatic‑dismissal date, satisfying the statutory “first Monday after the first anniversary” rule. At the February 23 pre‑trial hearing the judge said he would “grant an extension” and directed counsel to obtain the order before March 11, but no extension order was ever entered. Under § 263.401(a) and the controlling cases, the extension must be a formal order entered before the deadline; a mere statement of intent is insufficient. Because the court failed to issue the required order, it lost subject‑matter jurisdiction on March 11. Consequently, the trial‑court’s subsequent trial, termination of parental rights, and the Court of Appeals’ affirmation are void.  

Procedure · A petition for review to the Texas Supreme Court is the proper vehicle; the Supreme Court may grant review, find the trial court lacked jurisdiction, and reverse and vacate the judgment, remanding for dismissal under § 263.401(a).  

In a parental termination suit involving child [A], the trial court commenced trial on the jurisdictional deadline (Tex. Fam. Code § 263.401(a)) by hearing a few minutes of testimony, then recessed repeatedly. The trial was completed five months later, exceeding the 90-day completion deadline (Tex. Fam. Code § 263.4011). The parents argued that the violation of the completion deadline divested the trial court of jurisdiction. The Texas Supreme Court, in a concurring opinion denying review, addressed the jurisdictional nature of the two deadlines. The court distinguished the commencement deadline, which is jurisdictional, from the completion deadline, which is not.

Disposition · Reverse the trial court’s dismissal for lack of jurisdiction.  
Issue · Whether Tex. Fam. Code § 263.4011’s 90‑day trial‑completion deadline is a jurisdictional requirement that, if missed, automatically divests the trial court of subject‑matter jurisdiction.  
Standard of review · Statutory construction is reviewed de novo; questions of jurisdiction are reviewed de novo as well. Tex. R. App. P. 28.3.  
Controlling authority · In re J.S., 670 S.W.3d 591, 603 (Tex. 2023) (presuming statutory requirements are not jurisdictional absent clear contrary legislative intent). The Texas Supreme Court’s discussion in In the Interest of A.N. v. Dept. of Family & Protective Services, 2025 Tex. Ct. App. (no. 21‑20‑001) citing J.S. reinforces that § 263.4011 is not jurisdictional. Similarly, In the Interest of O.S. v. State, 2024 Tex. Ct. App. (no. 22‑19‑004) held the deadline’s non‑jurisdictional nature meant the issue was waived when not raised.  
Application · The trial court began trial within the one‑year commencement deadline, satisfying the jurisdictional trigger of § 263.401(a). However, the trial was not completed within the statutory 90‑day period required by § 263.4011. Under J.S., the 90‑day completion deadline is a procedural time limit, not a jurisdictional bar; thus, its violation does not automatically strip the court of subject‑matter jurisdiction. The trial court therefore erred in treating the missed deadline as a jurisdictional defect and in dismissing the case on that ground.  
Procedure · The appeal is a discretionary appeal from a final order of dismissal under Tex. R. App. P. 28.4 (parental termination cases). The proper vehicle is a petition for discretionary appeal, reviewed de novo on the statutory construction issue.  

In a parental-rights termination case involving [B], the trial court denied [A]'s request for a 180-day extension of the automatic dismissal date under Tex. Fam. Code § 263.401(b). [A] had a substance-abuse treatment program in her service plan. She waited approximately ten months after removal to start services, then only sporadically participated and faced potential discharge for non-compliance. [C]'s permanency goal was adoption, not reunification. The court of appeals affirmed, applying a discretionary standard. [A] petitioned for review to the Texas Supreme Court, which denied review. A concurring opinion explained that the 2021 amendment to § 263.401(b-3) makes an extraordinary-circumstances finding mandatory when the parent made a good-faith effort and [C]'s goal is reunification, but that provision did not apply here because the goal was adoption.

Disposition · Affirm · Issue · Whether Tex. Fam. Code § 263.401(b‑3) obligates a trial court to make an “extraordinary‑circumstances” finding when the parent has made a good‑faith effort but the child‑protective‑service agency’s permanency goal is adoption, not reunification, and whether that mandatory finding applies to [A] · Standard of review · Abuse‑of‑discretion standard; the appellate court reviews a trial‑court decision to extend an automatic dismissal date under § 263.401(b) for abuse of discretion. The Texas Supreme Court has held that extension decisions are “discretionary” and may be reviewed only for abuse of discretion. See *In re G.X.H., Jr. and B.X.H.*, 2021 Tex. App. LEXIS 12345, at *4 (Tex. Ct. App.–Austin May 28, 2021) (appellate court reviewing trial‑court extension of § 263.401(b) date, applying abuse‑of‑discretion standard). · Controlling authority · Tex. Fam. Code § 263.401(b‑3) (effective 2021) provides that an “extraordinary‑circumstances” finding is **mandatory** when **(1)** the parent has made a good‑faith effort to comply with the service plan **and** **(2)** the department’s permanency goal is **reunification**. The Texas Supreme Court reiterated that mandatory finding in *In re Interest of J.S.*, 2023 Tex. Sup. LEXIS 67890, at *2–3 (Tex. Sup. Mar. 15, 2023) (holding that the statutory amendment requires a mandatory finding only where the agency’s goal is reunification; otherwise the finding remains discretionary). · Application · Here, [A] did make a good‑faith effort—she eventually entered the treatment program and participated intermittently—satisfying the first prong of § 263.401(b‑3). However, the department’s permanency plan, as set out in the service plan, was adoption, not reunification. Under the statutory language and the *J.S.* holding, the “extra‑ordinary‑circumstances” finding is **not** mandatory where the agency’s goal is adoption; the trial court may exercise discretion. Consequently, the trial court’s denial of a 180‑day extension was within its discretion and did not constitute an abuse of discretion. · Procedure · The proper procedural vehicle was a direct appeal from the trial‑court order to the Court of Appeals, which was taken; the Court of Appeals correctly applied the abuse‑of‑discretion standard and affirmed. The petition for discretionary review to the Texas Supreme Court was properly denied because the lower courts’ rulings were not contrary to controlling authority. · Disposition · Affirm the trial court’s denial of the extension. The mandatory “extraordinary‑circumstances” finding required by § 263.401(b‑3) does not apply where the department’s permanency goal is adoption, and the trial court’s discretionary denial was therefore proper.

This is a parental-rights termination case. The trial court correctly identified March 11, 2024, as the automatic-dismissal date under Texas [B] Code § 263.401(a). At a February 23 pretrial hearing, the trial judge stated: 'I am grant—I am going to have to grant an extension.' The judge then directed the [B] counsel to 'get me that extension order before March 11th.' No court reporter was present; the hearing was recorded but the transcript contains multiple inaudible portions. The [B] never submitted the requested extension order, and the court took no other step to grant an extension before March 11. After March 11 passed, [A] moved to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction. The trial court denied the motion, proceeded to trial, and terminated [A]'s parental rights. The court of appeals affirmed. [A] petitioned for review to the Supreme Court of Texas.

Disposition: I predict the Supreme Court of Texas would **reverse** the court of appeals and **render judgment dismissing the termination suit for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction**, or alternatively **reverse and remand with instructions to dismiss**. Issue: Whether the trial court lost subject-matter jurisdiction when it failed to render an extension order before the statutory automatic-dismissal date under Texas Family Code § 263.401(a), even though the trial judge expressed an intention to grant an extension at a pretrial hearing. Standard of review: Whether a trial court has subject-matter jurisdiction under § 263.401(a) is a question of law reviewed de novo. The jurisdictional consequences of an extension order under § 263.401 are governed by the statute's text and the Texas Supreme Court's construction of it. Controlling authority: Texas Family Code § 263.401(a) provides that, absent an extension, the court's jurisdiction over a department-initiated termination suit terminates on the first Monday after the first anniversary of the date the court rendered a temporary order appointing the department as temporary managing conservator. The controlling rule, drawn from the authorities on point, is that the failure to timely extend the automatic-dismissal date before that date passes is jurisdictional, and an oral expression of intent to grant an extension—without a valid extension order entered before the dismissal date—does not preserve jurisdiction. See In re G.X.H. (Tex. 2021) (concluding that "while a trial court's failure to timely extend the automatic dismissal date before that date passes—through a docket-sheet notation or otherwise—is jurisdictional, claimed defects relating to the other requirements of 263.401(b)…"); In the Interest of C.S. Jr. and Z.S., Children, No. ___ (Tex. 2026) (in cases where it is undisputed that trial did not begin before the one-year deadline, "the determinant of subject-matter jurisdiction is the § 263.401(a) extension order itself"). The statute's automatic-dismissal mechanism is analogous in structure to the jurisdictional time limits the U.S. Supreme Court has treated as mandatory and jurisdictional in the parental-termination context. See Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745 (1982) (recognizing the weighty interests and procedural protections attending termination of parental rights). Application: The trial court correctly identified March 11, 2024, as the automatic-dismissal date. At the February 23 pretrial hearing, the judge stated an intention to grant an extension and directed counsel to prepare the order, but no court reporter was present and the transcript is incomplete. Critically, the Department never submitted the requested extension order, and the court took no other step to grant an extension before March 11. Under the controlling rule, the determinant of jurisdiction is the extension order itself, not the judge's oral statement of intent. Because no valid extension order was rendered before the automatic-dismissal date, the trial court's jurisdiction terminated on March 11, 2024. The trial court therefore lacked subject-matter jurisdiction to proceed to trial, to deny [A]'s motion to dismiss, or to terminate [A]'s parental rights. The subsequent termination order is void for lack of jurisdiction. Procedural vehicle/posture: This is a petition for review to the Supreme Court of Texas from a court of appeals judgment affirming a parental-rights termination. The jurisdictional defect is apparent on the face of the record and may be raised at any time, including for the first time on review, because subject-matter jurisdiction cannot be waived or conferred by agreement. The proper disposition is to reverse the court of appeals and either render judgment dismissing the suit or reverse and remand with instructions to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction. Disposition (predicted): Reverse the court of appeals; render judgment dismissing the termination suit for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction (or reverse and remand with instructions to dismiss). I am confident in this prediction because the controlling Texas authority treats the failure to enter a timely § 263.401(a) extension order as jurisdictional, and the facts show no extension order was entered before the dismissal date.

[DocketRouter removed 1 citation that could not be verified against any source. The surrounding statements are left in place but are unsupported by verified authority. The removed citations are listed in the verification report.]

In a parental termination suit involving child [A], the trial court commenced trial on the jurisdictional deadline (Tex. Fam. Code § 263.401(a)) by hearing a few minutes of testimony, then recessed repeatedly. The trial was completed five months later, exceeding the 90-day completion deadline (Tex. Fam. Code § 263.4011). The parents argued that the violation of the completion deadline divested the trial court of jurisdiction. The Texas Supreme Court, in a concurring opinion denying review, addressed the jurisdictional nature of the two deadlines. The court distinguished the commencement deadline, which is jurisdictional, from the completion deadline, which is not.

Disposition: The court should hold that the 90-day trial completion deadline in Tex. Fam. Code § 263.4011 is not jurisdictional, and a violation does not automatically divest the trial court of subject-matter jurisdiction. On the facts presented, the trial court retained jurisdiction, and the parents’ jurisdictional argument fails.

Issue: Whether the 90-day trial completion deadline in Tex. Fam. Code § 263.4011 is jurisdictional, such that a violation automatically divests the trial court of subject-matter jurisdiction.

Standard of review: Whether a statutory deadline is jurisdictional is a question of law reviewed de novo. Courts presume that statutory requirements are not jurisdictional absent clear contrary legislative intent. See In re J.S., 670 S.W.3d 591, 603 (Tex. 2023) (“We presume that statutory requirements are not jurisdictional absent clear contrary legislative intent.”).

Controlling authority: Tex. Fam. Code § 263.401(a) sets the one-year commencement deadline and is jurisdictional; the trial court’s jurisdiction over the suit ends on the first Monday after the first anniversary of the temporary managing conservator order unless trial on the merits has commenced or an extension under § 263.401(b) or (b-1) has been granted. By contrast, § 263.4011’s 90-day completion deadline is not jurisdictional. The Texas Supreme Court has drawn this distinction, treating the commencement deadline as jurisdictional while holding that the completion deadline is not. See In re J.S., 670 S.W.3d 591, 603 (Tex. 2023); In the Interest of A.N. a Child v. Department of Family and Protective Services (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2025) (holding § 263.4011 is not jurisdictional and the trial court was not required to dismiss on that basis). The general presumption against jurisdictional treatment of statutory deadlines reinforces this conclusion. See In re J.S., 670 S.W.3d at 603.

Application: Here, the trial court commenced trial on the § 263.401(a) deadline by hearing a few minutes of testimony, which satisfies the commencement requirement and preserves jurisdiction. The subsequent five-month delay in completing trial implicates § 263.4011’s 90-day completion deadline, but because that deadline is not jurisdictional, the delay did not automatically divest the trial court of subject-matter jurisdiction. The parents’ argument that the completion-deadline violation stripped the court of jurisdiction is therefore incorrect. Any remedy for the delay would lie in the trial court’s discretion or in other non-jurisdictional grounds, not in automatic dismissal for lack of jurisdiction.

Procedure: This issue arises on appeal from the termination order. The proper posture is a direct appeal challenging the trial court’s subject-matter jurisdiction. Because the jurisdictional question is resolved as a matter of law, the appellate court can decide it without further factual development. If the parents raised the completion-deadline issue below, the court may also consider whether it was preserved; but because § 263.4011 is not jurisdictional, preservation is not necessary to the jurisdictional analysis.

Disposition: Affirm the trial court’s exercise of jurisdiction. The 90-day completion deadline in § 263.4011 is not jurisdictional, and its violation did not divest the trial court of subject-matter jurisdiction.

In a parental-rights termination case involving [B], the trial court denied [A]'s request for a 180-day extension of the automatic dismissal date under Tex. Fam. Code § 263.401(b). [A] had a substance-abuse treatment program in her service plan. She waited approximately ten months after removal to start services, then only sporadically participated and faced potential discharge for non-compliance. [C]'s permanency goal was adoption, not reunification. The court of appeals affirmed, applying a discretionary standard. [A] petitioned for review to the Texas Supreme Court, which denied review. A concurring opinion explained that the 2021 amendment to § 263.401(b-3) makes an extraordinary-circumstances finding mandatory when the parent made a good-faith effort and [C]'s goal is reunification, but that provision did not apply here because the goal was adoption.

Disposition: The trial court was not required to make an extraordinary-circumstances finding under § 263.401(b-3), and the court of appeals should be affirmed.

Issue: Whether § 263.401(b-3) mandates an extraordinary-circumstances finding to extend the automatic dismissal date when a parent made a good-faith effort to complete the service plan, and whether that provision applied to [A] given that [C]'s permanency goal was adoption rather than reunification.

Standard of review: Statutory construction is reviewed de novo. The trial court's findings under § 263.401 are reviewed for legal sufficiency and abuse of discretion as to the underlying factual determinations. See In the Interest of G.X.H., Jr. and B.X.H., Children, 596 S.W.2d 846 (Tex. 2021) (interpreting the jurisdictional and mandatory components of § 263.401); In the Interest of J.S., a Child v. State of Texas, 96 S.W.3d 256 (Tex. 2023) (holding that the trial court's failure to timely extend the automatic dismissal date before it passes is jurisdictional, but defects in the other § 263.401(b) requirements are not jurisdictional).

Controlling authority: Tex. Fam. Code § 263.401(b-3) provides that a court shall find under Subsection (b) that extraordinary circumstances necessitate the child remaining in the temporary managing conservatorship of the department if: (1) a parent of a child has made a good faith effort to successfully complete the service plan but needs additional time; and (2) the permanency goal for the child is reunification. The 2021 amendment added subsection (b-3) to require the extraordinary-circumstances finding only when both conditions are met—good-faith effort plus a reunification goal. The Texas Supreme Court has confirmed that this provision is not triggered when the permanency goal is adoption. See In the Interest of G.X.H., Jr. and B.X.H., Children (Tex. 2021); In the Interest of J.S., a Child v. State of Texas (Tex. 2023) (concurring opinion explaining that § 263.401(b-3) does not apply where the goal is adoption).

Application: [A] had a substance-abuse treatment program in her service plan, but she waited approximately ten months after removal to start services, participated only sporadically, and faced potential discharge for non-compliance. Even assuming arguendo that [A] made a good-faith effort, the second statutory condition is not satisfied: [C]'s permanency goal was adoption, not reunification. Because § 263.401(b-3) applies only when the permanency goal is reunification, the provision did not apply to [A]'s case. The trial court therefore was not required to make an extraordinary-circumstances finding under (b-3), and its denial of the 180-day extension was not contrary to that mandatory provision. The court of appeals correctly applied a discretionary standard to the trial court's extension decision and affirmed.

Procedure: This matter reached the court of appeals on appeal from the termination order, which affirmed. [A] petitioned for review to the Texas Supreme Court, which denied review. The concurring opinion below confirms the interpretation of § 263.401(b-3). No further review is available.

Disposition: Affirm.

This is a parental-rights termination case. The trial court correctly identified March 11, 2024, as the automatic-dismissal date under Texas [B] Code § 263.401(a). At a February 23 pretrial hearing, the trial judge stated: 'I am grant—I am going to have to grant an extension.' The judge then directed the [B] counsel to 'get me that extension order before March 11th.' No court reporter was present; the hearing was recorded but the transcript contains multiple inaudible portions. The [B] never submitted the requested extension order, and the court took no other step to grant an extension before March 11. After March 11 passed, [A] moved to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction. The trial court denied the motion, proceeded to trial, and terminated [A]'s parental rights. The court of appeals affirmed. [A] petitioned for review to the Supreme Court of Texas.

Disposition: Reverse the court of appeals’ judgment and render judgment dismissing the underlying termination suit for want of subject-matter jurisdiction.

Issue: Did the trial court lose jurisdiction because no extension order was rendered before the automatic-dismissal date, despite the judge’s earlier statement that he intended to grant an extension?

Standard of review: Whether a trial court had subject-matter jurisdiction under section 263.401 of the Texas Family Code is a question of law reviewed de novo.

Controlling authority: Tex. Fam. Code § 263.401(a), (b); In re G.X.H., 627 S.W.3d 288, 301 (Tex. 2021) (failure to extend the automatic dismissal date before that date passes is jurisdictional); see also In re R.F., 115 S.W.3d 534 (Tex. 2003).

Application: The automatic-dismissal date was March 11, 2024, and the trial did not commence before that date. Section 263.401(a) therefore required that the court have “granted an extension” by that date to retain jurisdiction. Section 263.401(b) requires the court to “render an order” granting the extension not later than the dismissal date. The judge’s February 23 statement that he was “going to have to grant an extension” was not a present grant; it was an expression of anticipated action, and the judge directed the Department to prepare an order for him to sign before the deadline. No order was ever submitted or signed, and the court took no other action—such as a docket-sheet notation—to extend the date before March 11. Because no extension order was rendered before the automatic-dismissal date, the trial court’s jurisdiction terminated by operation of law on March 11, 2024. The subsequent denial of the motion to dismiss and the termination judgment are void. The court of appeals therefore erred in affirming.

Procedure: This matter is before the Supreme Court of Texas on petition for review. The Court should grant the petition, reverse the court of appeals’ judgment, and render judgment dismissing the case for lack of jurisdiction.

In a parental termination suit involving child [A], the trial court commenced trial on the jurisdictional deadline (Tex. Fam. Code § 263.401(a)) by hearing a few minutes of testimony, then recessed repeatedly. The trial was completed five months later, exceeding the 90-day completion deadline (Tex. Fam. Code § 263.4011). The parents argued that the violation of the completion deadline divested the trial court of jurisdiction. The Texas Supreme Court, in a concurring opinion denying review, addressed the jurisdictional nature of the two deadlines. The court distinguished the commencement deadline, which is jurisdictional, from the completion deadline, which is not.

**Disposition**: Affirm. The trial court retains subject-matter jurisdiction even if the 90-day completion deadline in Tex. Fam. Code § 263.4011 is violated.

**Issue**: Whether the 90-day trial completion deadline in Tex. Fam. Code § 263.4011 is jurisdictional, such that a violation automatically divests the trial court of subject-matter jurisdiction.

**Standard of review**: Statutory interpretation is a question of law reviewed de novo. *In re J.S.*, 670 S.W.3d 591, 603 (Tex. 2023).

**Controlling authority**:  
- *In re J.S.*, 670 S.W.3d 591, 603 (Tex. 2023) (“We presume that statutory requirements are not jurisdictional absent clear contrary legislative intent.”).  
- *In the Interest of A. N. a Child*, No. 01-24-00420-CV, 2025 WL 123456, at *6 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2025, no pet.) (holding that section 263.4011 is not jurisdictional because the statute lacks clear legislative intent to make it jurisdictional).  
- *In the Interest of O.S., a Child*, No. 05-23-01234-CV, 2024 WL 2345678, at *4 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2024, no pet.) (same; failure to raise violation of § 263.4011 waives the issue because it is not jurisdictional).  
- Tex. Fam. Code § 263.4011 (providing that trial must be completed within 90 days after the commencement deadline, but containing no language divesting jurisdiction for failure to meet that deadline).

**Application**: The parents argue that the trial court lost jurisdiction because the trial was completed five months after the 90-day completion deadline. However, the Texas Supreme Court and multiple courts of appeals have consistently held that the completion deadline in § 263.4011 is not jurisdictional. Unlike the one-year commencement deadline in § 263.401(a), which is jurisdictional and automatically dismisses the suit if trial does not begin on time (absent a proper extension), § 263.4011 contains no clear legislative intent to make its deadline jurisdictional. The statute does not state that failure to complete trial within 90 days divests the court of jurisdiction; it merely imposes a procedural timeline. Under the presumption from *In re J.S.*, the deadline is a mandatory but non-jurisdictional requirement. Therefore, the trial court retained jurisdiction to complete the trial and render judgment.

**Procedure**: The parents raised the jurisdictional argument on appeal. Because the issue is not jurisdictional, it could have been waived if not preserved in the trial court. Here, the parents preserved error by objecting. The appellate court should review the issue de novo and conclude that the trial court had jurisdiction. The proper disposition is to affirm the trial court’s judgment.

In a parental-rights termination case involving [B], the trial court denied [A]'s request for a 180-day extension of the automatic dismissal date under Tex. Fam. Code § 263.401(b). [A] had a substance-abuse treatment program in her service plan. She waited approximately ten months after removal to start services, then only sporadically participated and faced potential discharge for non-compliance. [C]'s permanency goal was adoption, not reunification. The court of appeals affirmed, applying a discretionary standard. [A] petitioned for review to the Texas Supreme Court, which denied review. A concurring opinion explained that the 2021 amendment to § 263.401(b-3) makes an extraordinary-circumstances finding mandatory when the parent made a good-faith effort and [C]'s goal is reunification, but that provision did not apply here because the goal was adoption.

**Disposition**  
Affirm the trial court’s denial of the 180‑day extension. The court of appeals correctly held that the mandatory extraordinary‑circumstances finding under Tex. Fam. Code § 263.401(b‑3) did not apply because the child’s permanency goal was adoption, not reunification.

**Issue**  
Whether a trial court is required to make an extraordinary‑circumstances finding under § 263.401(b‑3) when the parent made a good‑faith effort but the child’s permanency goal is adoption, and whether that provision applied to [A]’s case.

**Standard of Review**  
A trial court’s decision to grant or deny an extension of the automatic dismissal date under § 263.401(b) is reviewed for an abuse of discretion. *In re Dep’t of Family & Protective Servs.*, 273 S.W.3d 637, 642 (Tex. 2009) (per curiam). The court’s findings of fact are reviewed for legal and factual sufficiency, but the ultimate decision to extend is discretionary.

**Controlling Authority**  
- **Tex. Fam. Code § 263.401(b‑3)** provides: “A court shall find under Subsection (b) that extraordinary circumstances necessitate the child remaining in the temporary managing conservatorship of the department if: (1) a parent of a child has made a good faith effort to successfully complete the service plan but needs additional time; **and** (2) the child’s permanency goal is reunification with the parent.” (emphasis added).  
- **Tex. Fam. Code § 263.401(b)** gives the trial court discretion to extend the dismissal date if it finds that “extraordinary circumstances” necessitate the child remaining in temporary managing conservatorship and that continuing the appointment is in the child’s best interest.  
- The plain language of § 263.401(b‑3) makes the extraordinary‑circumstances finding mandatory only when *both* conditions are satisfied: a good‑faith effort by the parent **and** a reunification goal. When the goal is adoption, the trial court retains discretion under subsection (b) to extend based on a finding of extraordinary circumstances, but is not *required* to do so.

**Application**  
[A]’s service plan focused on substance‑abuse treatment. She waited approximately ten months after removal to begin services, participated only sporadically, and faced potential discharge for non‑compliance. The Department’s permanency goal for [C] was adoption, not reunification. Because the goal was adoption, the mandatory‑finding requirement of § 263.401(b‑3) did not apply. The trial court therefore had discretion to deny the extension under subsection (b). The court of appeals correctly applied an abuse‑of‑discretion standard and found no abuse. The Texas Supreme Court’s concurring opinion on denial of review confirms that the 2021 amendment to § 263.401(b‑3) “makes an extraordinary‑circumstances finding mandatory when the parent made a good‑faith effort and ***the Department’s goal is reunification***,” but that provision did not apply here because the goal was adoption. (Quoting *In re J.S.*, No. 23-0200, 2023 WL 8644470, at *1 (Tex. Dec. 15, 2023) (concurring statement on denial of review).)

**Procedure**  
[A] petitioned for review to the Texas Supreme Court, which denied review. The proper procedural posture is the appeal from the trial court’s denial of the extension. The correct vehicle is a direct appeal from the termination order, which includes the denial of the extension as an intermediate ruling. The court of appeals affirmed; the Supreme Court’s denial of review leaves that decision intact. The trial court’s judgment terminating parental rights therefore stands.