Grades, item by item

[B] is the insurer of [D] and intervened to assert subrogation claims for indemnification against [C] after [D] nonsuited its claims. The accident occurred in January 2015, and the workers settled with [A] and [D] in May 2019. [B] intervened in December 2021, nearly seven years after the accident but less than three years after the settlement. The court of appeals held that [B]'s claim was time-barred because it was filed more than four years after the accident. The Texas Supreme Court granted review.

**Disposition**
Reverse and remand (Confidence: 95%).

**Issue**
Whether an insurer's subrogation claim for indemnification accrues on the date of the underlying injury/accident or on the date the indemnitee’s liability is fixed and certain by settlement or final judgment.

**Standard of Review**
The determination of when a cause of action accrues for statute of limitations purposes is a question of law reviewed de novo. Summary judgments based on affirmative defenses such as limitations are reviewed de novo.

**Controlling Authority**
*None of the candidate opinions listed in the prompt control this accrual question.* Under well-established Texas law:
- *Ingersoll-Rand Co. v. Valero Energy Corp.*, 997 S.W.2d 203, 208 (Tex. 1999) (holding that a cause of action for contractual indemnity accrues when all liabilities and claims against the indemnitee are fixed and certain, typically when a settlement agreement is executed or a final judgment is rendered).
- *Sun Exploration & Production Co. v. Benton*, 728 S.W.2d 35, 37 (Tex. 1987) (holding that a cause of action on an indemnity agreement does not accrue until the indemnitee incurs liability or suffers actual loss).
- Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code Ann. § 16.004 / § 16.051 (four-year statute of limitations for contract/indemnity actions).

**Application**
Under Texas law, an indemnity claim does not accrue at the time of the underlying injury or accident because damages and liability have not yet been established. Rather, the cause of action for indemnity accrues only when the indemnitee’s liability becomes fixed and certain through settlement or final adjudication. 

Here, liability was established and fixed when the workers settled with [A] and [D] in May 2019. The four-year limitations period for [B]’s indemnity claim began running in May 2019. Because [B] intervened in December 2021—less than three years after the settlement—the intervention was timely filed within the four-year limitations period. The court of appeals erred in running limitations from the January 2015 accident date.

**Procedure**
Petition for review in the Texas Supreme Court pursuant to Tex. R. App. P. 53 from a court of appeals judgment affirming summary judgment on limitations grounds.

In a probate proceeding, [A] filed an application for letters of administration of [C]'s estate, claiming [C] died intestate and [A] was the sole heir. [B] filed an application to probate a 2009 will. The trial court heard both applications together. Before the court ruled, [A] filed a contest to probate of the will, alleging lack of execution, lack of testamentary capacity, and undue influence. The trial court then signed an order admitting the will to probate, denying [A]'s application, and overruling all objections to probate 'asserted through September 4, 2019' – the day before [A] filed his contest. The order did not mention [A]'s September 5 contest. [A] later requested a trial setting on the contest. [B] argued the contest was moot because the 2019 order was final. The trial court dismissed the contest in 2022. [A] appealed. The court of appeals dismissed the appeal for lack of jurisdiction, holding the 2019 order was final and [A] did not timely appeal. The Texas Supreme Court granted review.

**Disposition**
Reverse and remand. The court of appeals erred in dismissing the appeal for lack of jurisdiction; the September 16, 2019 order was interlocutory as to the will contest, making the 2022 dismissal order the final appealable judgment disposing of that discrete phase. Confidence: 95%.

**Issue**
Whether a probate court order admitting a will to probate—which expressly overruled only objections filed through a date prior to the contestant’s pending will contest and left that contest unadjudicated—is a final, appealable order that disposed of the will contest.

**Standard of Review**
Appellate jurisdiction and the finality of a probate court order are questions of law reviewed *de novo*. 

**Controlling Authority**
* *Crowson v. Wakeham*, 897 S.W.2d 779, 783 (Tex. 1995) (holding that a probate order is final and appealable only if it disposes of all parties and all issues in the discrete phase of the proceeding for which it was brought).
* *De Ayala v. Mackie*, 193 S.W.3d 575, 578–79 (Tex. 2006) (reaffirming the *Crowson* test: an order is interlocutory if it does not end a discrete phase of the probate proceeding and leaves related claims pending).
* *Lehmann v. Har-Con Corp.*, 39 S.W.3d 191, 195, 205 (Tex. 2001) (an order issued without a conventional trial on the merits is not final unless it actually disposes of all pending claims and parties or contains clear, unequivocal finality language).

**Application**
Under the *Crowson* framework, probate proceedings allow for interlocutory appeals from orders that conclude a discrete phase of administration. However, to be final and appealable, the order must dispose of all parties and issues involved in that particular phase. 

The phase of the proceeding before the court involved the validity of the 2009 will and the right to administration. Before the trial court ruled on the competing applications, [A] timely filed a will contest raising independent claims of lack of execution, lack of testamentary capacity, and undue influence. 

The September 16, 2019 order expressly limited its ruling by overruling only objections asserted "through September 4, 2019"—the day before [A] filed his will contest. Because the order explicitly refrained from addressing [A]'s September 5 contest, it did not resolve all claims and issues within that discrete phase of the probate proceeding, nor did it contain unequivocal finality language under *Lehmann*. Consequently, the 2019 order was an unappealable interlocutory order. The discrete phase concluded only when the trial court dismissed [A]'s will contest in 2022, making [A]'s subsequent notice of appeal timely.

**Procedure**
Petition for review in the Supreme Court of Texas following the court of appeals' dismissal for lack of jurisdiction. The Supreme Court should reverse the judgment of the court of appeals and remand the case to that court for consideration of the merits of the appeal.

In 2019, a tornado damaged the home of [B] and [C]. Their homeowners insurance policy, issued by [A], contained a deductible for 'Windstorm or Hail' but did not define 'windstorm.' The insurer applied the deductible, and the insureds sued. The parties filed cross-motions for summary judgment. The trial court granted summary judgment for the insurer. The court of appeals reversed, in part relying on the fact that various provisions of the Texas Insurance Code and Property Code list 'tornado' and 'windstorm' separately, arguing that this indicates an ordinary meaning of 'windstorm' that excludes a tornado. The Supreme Court of Texas granted review to consider whether the separate listing of these terms in statutes creates ambiguity in the policy language.

**Disposition**  
Reverse the court of appeals' judgment and render judgment reinstating the trial court's summary judgment in favor of the insurer (High confidence).

**Issue**  
Whether the undefined term "windstorm" in a homeowners insurance policy's deductible endorsement is ambiguous—specifically, whether statutory provisions listing "windstorm" and "tornado" separately render reasonable an interpretation of "windstorm" that excludes tornadoes.

**Standard of Review**  
De novo. Summary judgments and the interpretation of unambiguous contract and insurance policy language present questions of law reviewed de novo. *Provident Life & Accident Ins. Co. v. Knott*, 128 S.W.3d 211, 215 (Tex. 2003); Tex. R. Civ. P. 166a(c). When both parties move for summary judgment on cross-motions and the trial court grants one and denies the other, the appellate court reviews all summary judgment evidence, determines all questions presented, and renders the judgment the trial court should have rendered. *Knott*, 128 S.W.3d at 216.

**Controlling Authority**  
- *Privilege Underwriters Reciprocal Exchange v. Mankoff*, __ S.W.3d __ (Tex. 2026) (holding that the common, ordinary meaning of "windstorm" in an insurance policy unambiguously includes a tornado, and that statutory listings of "windstorm" alongside "tornado" do not create ambiguity or narrow the plain meaning).
- *Provident Life & Accident Insurance Co. v. Knott*, 128 S.W.3d 211 (Tex. 2003) (rules of policy construction and de novo cross-motion summary judgment standard).
- *TGS-NOPEC Geophysical Co. v. Combs*, 340 S.W.3d 432 (Tex. 2011) and *City of Rockwall v. Hughes*, 246 S.W.3d 621 (Tex. 2008) (principles of statutory interpretation and ordinary meaning).

**Application**  
Under Texas law, insurance policies are construed according to their plain, ordinary meaning unless the policy provides otherwise. The undefined term "windstorm" plainly denotes a storm characterized by high winds capable of causing damage, of which a tornado is an obvious and well-recognized subset. 

The court of appeals erred in finding ambiguity based on statutory provisions in the Texas Insurance Code and Property Code that list "windstorm" and "tornado" alongside each other. Legislative usage of related terms in distinct regulatory contexts often employs overlapping, belt-and-suspenders phrasing to ensure comprehensive coverage, rather than expressing an intent that "windstorm" affirmatively excludes tornadoes. Because there is no narrowing modifier or exclusionary language in the policy or relevant statutes, the separate listing of the terms does not alter the plain meaning of "windstorm." Consequently, the policy's windstorm deductible unambiguously applies to damage caused by a tornado.

**Procedure**  
Petition for review to the Supreme Court of Texas from a court of appeals judgment reversing cross-motions for summary judgment granted by the district court.

In 2019, a tornado damaged the home of [B] and [C] (collectively, the insureds). Following the tornado, it 'likely' rained for approximately two minutes. The damaged property was covered by a homeowners insurance policy issued by [A] (the insurer). The insureds submitted a claim for damages, but the insurer paid only a portion of the claim, explaining that the tornado qualified as a windstorm and therefore the claim was subject to the policy's $87,156 'Windstorm or Hail Deductible.' The policy does not define 'windstorm.' The insureds sued for breach of contract, alleging that the damage was not caused by a windstorm and that the insurer breached the policy by applying the deductible. The parties filed cross-motions for summary judgment on the interpretation of 'windstorm.' The trial court granted the insurer's motion, denied the insureds' motion, and rendered a take-nothing judgment against the insureds. A divided court of appeals reversed and rendered judgment for the insureds, holding that the term 'windstorm' is ambiguous because it is undefined and subject to more than one reasonable meaning, including one that excludes a tornado. The insurer petitioned the Supreme Court of Texas for review.

**Disposition**  
Reverse the court of appeals' judgment and reinstate the trial court's take-nothing summary judgment in favor of the insurer (high confidence).

**Issue**  
Whether the undefined term "windstorm" in a homeowners insurance policy is ambiguous and whether its ordinary and plain meaning encompasses a tornado so as to trigger the policy's separate "Windstorm or Hail" deductible.

**Standard of review**  
Contract and insurance policy interpretation is a question of law reviewed de novo. When both parties move for summary judgment on the same issue and the trial court grants one and denies the other, the reviewing court considers all summary judgment evidence, determines all questions presented, and renders the judgment the trial court should have rendered under Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 166a(c).

**Controlling authority**  
- *Privilege Underwriters Reciprocal Exchange v. Mankoff*, 708 S.W.3d 706 (Tex. 2024) (holding that the term "windstorm," when undefined in an insurance policy, is unambiguous and its plain and ordinary meaning includes a tornado).
- *National Union Fire Insurance Co. of Pittsburgh, Pa. v. CBI Industries, Inc.*, 907 S.W.2d 517 (Tex. 1995) (insurance policy language is given its plain, ordinary, and generally accepted meaning unless the policy shows words were used in a technical or different sense).
- *URI, Inc. v. Kleberg County*, 543 S.W.3d 755 (Tex. 2018) (contract ambiguity rules and objective interpretation).
- *Valence Operating Co. v. Dorsett*, 164 S.W.3d 656 (Tex. 2005) (cross-motions for summary judgment standard of review).

**Application**  
Under Texas law, the lack of an express definition in an insurance policy does not render a term ambiguous. Courts interpret undefined policy terms according to their plain, ordinary, and commonly understood meaning, informed by standard dictionary definitions and common usage. A tornado is an outburst of violent, rotating wind accompanied by a funnel-shaped cloud; thus, a tornado is fundamentally a severe type of windstorm. Because the ordinary meaning of "windstorm" unambiguously encompasses a tornado, the insurer correctly applied the policy's "Windstorm or Hail" deductible to the insureds' tornado-damage claim. The court of appeals erred in finding the policy ambiguous.

**Procedure**  
Petition for review in the Supreme Court of Texas challenging the intermediate court of appeals' reversal of the trial court's summary judgment on cross-motions under Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 166a(c).

[B] sued [A] in Texas state court. [A] is an [C] company with no registered agent in Texas, so [B] requested substituted service through the Texas Secretary of State at an address in [D]. The Secretary of State sent the citation by certified mail to that address; the mailing was returned bearing the notation "Return to Sender, Vacant, Unable to Forward." Despite having other known addresses for [A]—including one in [C] used in a pre-suit demand letter, an address in [E] on invoices, and a phone number and e-mail on those invoices—[B] took no further steps to notify [A] before seeking a default judgment. The trial court granted default judgment, the court of appeals affirmed, and the Supreme Court of Texas granted review.

Disposition · Reverse and remand.

Issue · Whether the Due Process Clause requires a plaintiff who learns that substituted service by certified mail through the Texas Secretary of State was returned undelivered ("Return to Sender, Vacant, Unable to Forward") to take additional reasonable steps to notify the defendant before obtaining a default judgment when other contact information is known and available.

Standard of review · De novo review for questions of constitutional due process and personal jurisdiction supporting a default judgment.

Controlling authority · *Peralta v. Heights Medical Center, Inc.*, 485 U.S. 80 (1988); *Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co.*, 339 U.S. 306 (1950); *In the Interest of E.R.*, 385 S.W.3d 552 (Tex. 2012).

Application · Due process requires notice reasonably calculated, under all the circumstances, to apprise interested parties of the pendency of the action and afford them an opportunity to present their objections. *Mullane*, 339 U.S. at 314. When a plaintiff knows that an attempt at service by mail has failed because it was returned undelivered, due process requires the plaintiff to take additional reasonable and practicable steps to notify the defendant if such steps are available. A complete failure of constitutionally adequate service deprives a litigant of due process, rendering any resulting default judgment void. *Peralta*, 485 U.S. at 84–86; *In the Interest of E.R.*, 385 S.W.3d at 566.

Here, [B] received affirmative notice that the Secretary of State's certified mailing was returned undelivered as vacant. Rather than taking further steps, [B] moved directly for a default judgment despite having other known physical addresses for [A] (including one used in a pre-suit demand letter and another on invoices), as well as a working telephone number and email address. Because [B] knew service had not reached [A] and failed to pursue available, reasonable alternatives to provide actual notice, the attempt at service failed constitutional due process requirements.

Procedure · Petition for review in the Supreme Court of Texas from a judgment of the court of appeals affirming a trial court's default judgment.

[A] sued [B] alleging that the [C] Agreement with [C] violated Chapter 252 of the Texas Local Government Code because it required an expenditure of more than $50,000. [B] filed a plea to the jurisdiction arguing that the contract was a revenue-generating contract and therefore not subject to Chapter 252. The court of appeals agreed, holding that the [C] Agreement is a revenue contract because it did not require the city to purchase any goods or services. The Supreme Court granted review.

**Disposition** · Affirm. (High confidence)

**Issue** · Whether Chapter 252 of the Texas Local Government Code applies to a municipal contract that generates revenue rather than requiring an expenditure of more than $50,000 from municipal funds.

**Standard of review** · De novo. Statutory construction and rulings on a plea to the jurisdiction challenging governmental immunity and statutory compliance are questions of law reviewed de novo.

**Controlling authority** · Tex. Loc. Gov't Code § 252.021(a); *Coker v. Coker*, 650 S.W.2d 391 (Tex. 1983) (unambiguous contract terms interpreted as a matter of law); *City of Houston v. 4 Families of Hobby, LLC*, No. 01-23-00569-CV, 2024 WL 2970597 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] June 13, 2024, pet. granted).

**Application** · Section 252.021(a) of the Texas Local Government Code mandates statutory competitive bidding or proposal procedures only before a municipality enters into a contract that "requires an expenditure of more than $50,000 from one or more municipal funds." Courts must enforce the plain, unambiguous language of the statute. An "expenditure" requires the disbursement or spending of municipal funds to purchase goods or services. Concession, lease, or operating agreements structured purely as revenue-generating contracts—under which a third party pays the municipality for commercial rights and the agreement expressly disclaims any obligation of the municipality to disburse or expend public funds exceeding the statutory threshold—are not subject to Chapter 252's competitive procurement mandates. Therefore, the court of appeals correctly held that Chapter 252 applies only to expenditure contracts and not to pure revenue-generating agreements.

**Procedure** · Petition for review before the Supreme Court of Texas (Tex. Gov't Code § 22.001; Tex. R. App. P. 53) arising from an interlocutory appeal of a trial court's order on a plea to the jurisdiction under Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code § 51.014(a)(8).